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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is primarily concerned with two major issues: 1/ Is growth really 
sustainable in the “long-run”? 2/ What are the consequences for growth of imperfect 
competition?
Chapter 1 explores a simple model of endogenous growth in an overlapping generations 
framework when labour supply is made endogenous. If leisure and consumption are 
substitutes, the economy experiences multiple equilibrium paths. If leisure and 
consumption are complements, then production remains bounded, although endogenous 
growth is possible and socially desirable.
In chapter 2, instead of assuming that local public goods only affect the utility of 
consumers as is usual, we assume that they are purely productive. The implications of this 
assumption are analysed within standard dynamic growth models where all factors are 
mobile. We show that the decentralisation of the first-best is more demanding than usually. 
In chapter 3, we propose a strategic model of imperfect competition with endogenous 
growth and endogenous market structure. Assuming increasing returns at the firm level and 
heterogeneity on the labour market, short-run efficiency can be maximised under 
monopoly. However, in the long-run competition can generate growth through a 
distribution effect, whereas a monopoly leads to a no-growth steady-state.
In chapter 4, the evolution of industries is viewed as a cumulative purposeful cost- 
reduction process subject to spillovers in a differentiated oligopoly. The long-run outcome 
depends primarily on spillovers. When they are weak, firms dig their niche over time and 
keep investing. On the contrary, if spillovers are strong and if the diffusion function of 
spillovers is concave, firms use ever more similar technologies. This involves less and less 
investment and thus a fall in the growth rate of productivity.
In the final chapter, we propose a two-sector economy where products are substitutes. The 
innovation function is random, product specific and the probability of success is increasing 
in R&D investment. The successful innovator is in a temporary monopoly which provides 
an incentive for R&D. When a product has a relatively lower marginal cost, the monopoly 
profits are larger because of its bigger market size. Consequently, R&D investment in this 
product increases. So does the probability of a new cost-reducing innovation. This simple 
feed-back effect implies a divergence in the investment and development patterns.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is primarily concerned with two major issues:
1/ Is growth really sustainable in the “long-run”?
2/ What are the consequences for growth of imperfect competition?
In order to motivate the chapters that follow, I will first give a short history of the theory of 
growth and then try to make the meaning of the two questions above more explicit,^
Theories o f growth: a satellite overview
Discussions about economic growth are a fairly recent phenomenon. There are probably 
many reasons for this, be they religious or ideological. A simple answer is maybe that, 
prior to the industrial revolution, rates of growth were so low that progress was barely 
noticeable in a life-span. Traditionally, economists celebrate the role of Adam Smith 
(Smith [1776]) who first highlighted the division of labour as a way to increase production. 
However, Adam Smith did not consider explicitly long-run economic evolution and the
 ^ Of course, a complete answer to those two questions (if any can be proposed now) would require much 
more than a couple o f years o f thinking and five chapters of a Ph.D. dissertation!
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possibility of ever-increasing production. The next decisive step was probably 
accomplished by Karl Marx (Marx and Engels [1967]) who first described a process of 
evolution that would, in the long-run and after a capitalist and a socialist stage, reach an 
era where goods would be available according to one’s need.
Since then, the nature of economic evolution has been at the forefront of all sorts of 
reflections, except maybe that of economic theorists (Schumpeter being a notable 
exception). All types of theories relying on wide variety of arguments were proposed. 
None was really accepted by economic theorists.
A major reason was probably because of the inability of most proposed theories to 
replicate empirical facts or because their implications were not testable. The first full- 
fledged “model” of growth that was logically consistent and empirically relevant for many 
stylised facts was developed by Solow in 1956. But here, and without diminishing the 
giant step forward made by Solow, one can speak only of “model” and not of “theory” 
since Solow aimed primarily at a description of the growth process (Solow [1957]).2 In 
other words, the “neo-classical” model of growth does not explain why the total 
productivity of factor increases, but it is a very powerful tool to describe how the growth 
process takes place^. It proved very useful in decomposing growth into various 
components (capital, labour and technology) and in understanding how the evolution of 
technology, tastes and labour influence capital accumulation and production. However, the 
model (wisely?) avoids the major issue: Why do economies grow in the long-run?
A second reason has probably much to do (retrospectively) with the general advancement 
of the rest of the economic discipline. Until the late 70s, formal analysis progressed 
essentially by using assumptions of constant returns to scale in a static framework. These 
two assumptions have many methodological advantages. First, they provide a reference 
framework that is now well understood. Second, they may have an important explanatory 
power for a wide range of phenomena. Third, they avoid the contradictory implications of 
naive or straightforward use of increasing returns. Theoretically, we can interpret the
2 If by “model” we mean an answer to the question “how” and by “theory” and answer to “why”.
 ^ However, the neo-classical model of growth is not comfortable with the qualitative aspects of economic 
evolution since it captures only 2 of the 6 broad stylised facts proposed by Kuznets [1973].
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Solow model as a proof that economic growth is impossible in the long-run without 
increasing returns (at least asymptotically) or exogenous change. The same argument 
applies in spatial economics. Without increasing returns, there would not be any economic 
agglomeration (Starrett [1978], see Krugman [1995] for longer developments on the 
analogy between the two fields).
The next step towards the development of a formal theory of growth was taken by Romer 
[1986] and [1990] (as well as Lucas [1988] and Grossman and Helpman [1991]). There 
has been much debate concerning the “real” insights brought by Romer in the theory of 
growth. It seems to me that there are two main technical insights. The first one was to 
propose a simple way of solving what seemed a complex dynamic programming exercise 
and to show the existence and uniqueness of the solution. The second one was the 
development of a model where some competition was taking place in a world of increasing 
returns. From a modelling point of view, his 1990 model keeps all (or nearly all) the 
features of the Solow model, allows for unbounded growth and does not imply 
convergence. A simplified presentation can be the following. The consumer good can be 
produced using intermediate goods (blueprints) and labour. Firms operate with constant 
returns to scale and an increasing number of intermediate goods increases the productivity 
of firms. Labour can also be also to produce new blueprints. The new blueprints give rise 
to patents and enable the production of new intermediate goods. The two important 
elements are that blueprints are imperfect substitutes so that and that the production of new 
blueprints is a linear function of existing blueprints. Moreover, the use of the blueprint to 
produce final goods gives rise to a rent that accrues to the innovator. But the new 
blueprints can be used freely by other researchers to invent new products. Truly, one can 
find many predecessors to the framework proposed by Romer. It is true that his modelling 
bears some resemblance to what can be found in Marshall [1890], Young [1928], Domar 
[1947], Harrod [1948], Arrow [1962], Uzawa [1965] or Shell [1966]. What makes his 
research important is that his work appealed to many other researchers. Furthermore, 
Romer was able to spell out the implications of his models in terms of economic policy in 
a simple way.
Romer’s two seminal contributions display with a tension between the necessity of a major
market imperfection for sustained growth to be possible (i.e., increasing returns or some 
sort of externality) on the one hand, and a desire to stay as close as possible to an Arrow- 
Debreu framework on the other hand. As can be seen from numerous syntheses (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin [1995] or Mankiw [1995]), most of the students of the growth process 
followed Romer in their approaches and used either a competitive model with an 
externality or a monopolistic competition model à la Dixit and Stiglitz [1977]. This has 
two main advantages. First it enables a better understanding of many growth models, since 
comparison with a well-understood benchmark can easily be made. Second, it also enables 
incorporation into the analysis of other real life market imperfections likely to affect the 
growth process (for instance when focusing on financial intermediation or international 
trade to name just two possible directions). The rest of this introduction discusses 
successively the way the new growth theory uses increasing returns and how it deals with 
competition. At the same time, it will also introduce the following chapters of this 
dissertation.
The sustainability o f  growth
The new “theories of growth” have not been without their critics. Empirically, cases 
against them have been made by Mankiw, Romer and Weil [1992] and Jones [1995a,b]. 
Theoretically, most critiques of endogenous growth models usually focus on the razor edge 
aspect of the production function of the accumulative factor. Indeed, most specifications in 
existing models are linear as pointed out by Solow [1994]. A usual form is:
H  = f { L ) l f  with 0 = 1,
where 77 is a reproducible factor and L a non-reproducible factor. It is true that if ô < 1, 
endogenous growth is not sustainable and if ô > 1, the growth rate is explosive (which can 
be interpreted as another form of non-sustainability). Thus the model only “works” (i.e., 
gives a bounded and strictly positive rate of growth) for a set of parameters of measure 
zero on the technological side (i.e., 6 = 1).
Firstly, note that Romer [1986]’s original demonstration is more general than the linear
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case since it only requires to be a concave function of H  for which the ratio h I h  has a 
strictly positive lower bound. Moreover, it is possible to propose some formulations for the 
accumulation equation for which an explosive growth rate is potentially possible (ô > 1 ), 
but where it is ruled out by some convex adjustment costs in the production function of the 
final good. Parente [1994] in this respect goes even further since he proposes a model 
where all the knowledge already exists (and it is the only accumulative factor). In his 
model, technologies are indexed by their productivity parameter vf. For a given technology, 
depending on the accumulated production, firms have a bounded level of expertise 
(leaming-by-doing). If they want to use a more productive technology, they incur a fixed 
cost and a loss of expertise which increases in the ratio of productivity levels between the 
new technology and the old one. What is obtained in equilibrium (which can be first-best) 
is a situation where firms regularly upgrade their technologies by a given finite proportion. 
The same kind of result can be obtained also with a capital vintage model à la Chari and 
Hopenhayn [1991].
So the conclusion is that the assumptions concerning the accumulation equation are not as 
specific as they may seem at first. They can be relaxed. However, the policy implications 
might be quite substantially affected. In standard models, the emphasis is mainly on the 
under-provision of R&D in a competitive equilibrium. Knowledge is viewed as the 
“engine” of growth (which indeed it ultimately is). However, when using an increasing 
returns to scale function for the generation of knowledge (i.e., of degree more than one in 
the reproducible factor), adaptation costs can limit the growth rate and act as the limiting 
constraint on growth as in Parente [1994] and make R&D a secondary variable. This vision 
is supported by Jovanovic [1995] who claims that the generation of knowledge in modem 
economies receives around 0.5% of the resources, whereas other activities to sustain 
growth (education, training) require around 25% of the resources. Crafts [1995] also takes 
a similar view.
Besides, an overwhelming part of the attention has been given to the reproducible factors, 
whereas non-reproducible factors have been somewhat neglected (Hahn [1989]). The 
question of the sustainability of growth with respect to natural resources is not tackled here 
since it seems obvious that if some exhaustible factors are necessary for production, then
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growth is not sustainable in the long-run. Although this problem may not be theoretically 
very interesting, it may be empirically crucial. The focus must then be on “non- 
exhaustible” and non-reproducible factors, i.e., labour. Then, if  we take a “long-run” view, 
which was the original focus of endogenous growth theory, demand factors such as labour 
cannot be neglected as underlined forcefully from different perspectives by Kuznets 
[1959], Blanchard [1994] or Fogel [1994].
A first small strand of literature has focused on the formation of the labour force, exploring 
the links between growth and fertility (e.g., Barro and Becker [1989] or Becker, Murphy 
and Tamura [1990]). The issue of labour supply has been even more neglected. Usually, in 
endogenous growth models, labour supply is supposed to be exogenous and constant. 
When made endogenous, it is under the assumption of a zero elasticity of labour supply 
with respect to long-run income (King, Plosser and Rebelo [1988] or Jones, Manuelli and 
Rossi [1994] among others). On the contrary, popular theories of growth relate economic 
development to the attitude towards work assuming implicitly a long-run flexibility of 
labour supply.
Chapter 1 therefore executes an analysis of the growth process with a non-trivial labour 
supply decision. The production function exhibits increasing returns so that sustained 
growth is possible and people live for two periods. When consumption and leisure are 
substitute, which is empirically relevant for low levels of incomes, two equilibria are 
possible. If the initial level of accumulated capital is below a given threshold, people 
asymptotically do not work or consume. On the contrary, if the initial level of capital is 
above the threshold, people asymptotically give up all their leisure for more and more 
consumption.
When leisure and consumption are complements, which is probably a good working 
assumption for developed economies (Pencavel [1986]), it is shown that the economy 
converges towards a no-growth steady-state. When a specific utility function is used (i.e., a 
CES), this result holds even if explosive growth is possible (i.e., with a production 
function homogenous of degree more than one in capital). This no-growth steady-state is 
shown to be inefficient, whereas a Pigouvian tax on investment can improve the welfare
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and generate growth. In effect, the growth process meets its limits on the demand; rather 
than supply-side.
Another important and yet not often tackled real-life change, brought about by the growth 
process, is an increased mobility of factors. A great deal of work has been devoted to the 
analysis of the locational changes induced by this increased mobility (see Fujita and Thisse 
[1996]). However, very few efforts have been made to assess the ability for states or more 
generally any kind of jurisdictions, to insure their financing when all factors become 
mobile. Indeed, the importance of public goods and infrastructure for production seems 
difficult to deny. The analysis of infrastructure in a gro^vth fi'amework was first undertaken 
by Barro [1990] and Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992]. The production function they use at 
the firm level is:
where G is the amount of accumulated public infi’astructure. What is assumed by this 
production function is that public capital is a necessary input for both the production of 
consumer goods and that of reproducible factors (since there is only one sector in the 
model). What is considered in our analysis is an “open-economy” case where at the level 
of each jurisdiction, we get:
A benevolent government then maximises the utility of the representative agent in the 
economy. A second-best steady-state is reached when the fiscal distortions created to 
finance the public goods are balanced by the efficiency gain of more infrastructure. In 
equilibrium, public and private capital grow at the same rate. In studies focusing only on 
the taxation side. King and Rebelo [1990] and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi [1993] show that 
the welfare loss of taxation can be much larger in a growth framework than in a standard 
static framework.
However, the effect of taxation on factors that are mobile between different fiscal
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jurisdictions is absent in their analysis. Given perfect mobility of all productive factors, 
will the jurisdictions still be able to provide necessary productive public goods? 
Consideration of this issue is the objective of Chapter 2. Technically it uses a framework 
close to Barro [1990] and considers the effects of tax competition. It is shovm that the 
financing of public goods will still be possible, and indeed even optimal within some 
institutional settings. The idea, as in Tiebout [1956], is to rely on perfect mobility of 
factors and also to use the land market as a way of collecting taxes. Unfortunately, it 
appears that complete taxation of the differential land rent as with public consumer goods 
(i.e., the Henry George rule, see Vickrey [1977]) does not lead to the first-best. The 
residential taxes that are required are more complex (although they can be decentralised if 
the jurisdictions have enough degrees of liberty).
Growth and imperfect competition
What the short overview above also made clear was that the new theory of growth, for 
consistency reasons, must rely on market imperfections (imperfect competition and/or 
market incompleteness). This is generally made either in a competitive setting with 
externalities or via monopolistic competition and a large number of firms. Thus, the 
exploration of the inter-relation between market structure and growth has been rather 
neglected by analysts of the new growth theories. However, this inter-relation between 
market structure and growth has always been recognised as a key issue and the topic has 
received a considerable amount of attention from policy makers as well as from the 
informal literature. To my knowledge, the number of formal studies focusing on this issue 
is very smalH. One exception is Smulders and Van de Klundert [1995]. They consider a 
small number of firms in a monopolistic competition framework. They can invest in R&D 
to improve their product. A higher market power reduces the free-rider problem arising 
because of R&D spillovers across firms and increases the appropriability of investments. 
But, the monopoly power creates its usual dead-weight loss. The problem of the model is 
that the market structure is fixed exogenously and can never change. Moreover, this paper 
does not consider strategic interactions among firms although the focus is on imperfect
 ^ As stated by Stiglitz [1994]; “Rather, it is that the standard Arrow-Debreu model (the competitive 
paradigm) not only does not include (endogenous) changes in the technology but its framework is 
fundamentally inconsistent with incorporating technological change”.
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competition.
A second perspective is given by Schumpeterian competition. This strand of literature is 
based on the arguments developed by Schumpeter [1911] where the successful 
entrepreneur gains a competitive edge over his or her competitors and is rewarded by 
monopoly profits (the seminal paper combining the new growth theory with 
Schumpeterian ideas is Aghion and Howitt [1992]). This monopoly rent is only temporary 
as another entrepreneur will eventually innovate to reap the monopoly rent for himself. 
From our perspective, the major drawback of Aghion, Harris and Vickers [1995] or 
Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [1995] is that again the market structure is ignored or 
modelled without strategic interactions (the focus of these two papers however is different 
from ours). The second problem of these neo-Schumpeterian studies is that they primarily 
conclude that monopolies are a strong factor of growth. This, of course, clashes with the 
usual intuitions of economists concerning competition (be it casual empiricism or more 
serious econometric studies like Nickell [1996]). It is only with major amendments that 
neo-Schumpeterian models favour competition (Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [1995]).
The main reason for this difficulty of considering imperfect competition probably lies in 
the basic contradiction in straightforward extensions of the basic framework between the 
micro-modelling of the market structure and the technical requirements for growth to 
occur. The fundamental problem is that the accumulation equation is again of the form:
H  = f ( L ) H
That is, new knowledge (7 /) is an increasing function of non-accumulative resources (e.g., 
skilled labour) and a linear function of existing knowledge ( / / ) .  At an industry level, it 
seems reasonable to think that productivity gains are created within the sector (maybe by 
the adaptation of some knowledge generated elsewhere). Since, in many sectors, the 
number of competing firms is small, one can disaggregate:
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Then, if n is small, it seems natural to think that firms are able to internalise those dynamic 
gains (at least partly). This assumption is not usual in the endogenous growth fi*amework 
but it is a major feature in the industrial organisation literature^ (see Tirole [1988] or 
Kamien and Schwartz [1982] for related empirical evidence). The implication of this 
assumption in a standard endogenous growth setting nonetheless is that, any degree of 
dynamic appropriability, however small, implies a monopoly, at least in the sector where 
the reproducible factor is accumulated.
In Chapter 3, we explore the connection between market structure and growth. As in much 
of the existing literature, we assume increasing returns at the firm level. The overlapping- 
generations set-up implies that labour is a short-run factor, whose allocation is decided 
after that of capital. This sequencing makes it impossible for one firm to secure all the 
available capital when savers cannot co-ordinate. Then, due to the presence of labour 
market heterogeneity, firms, exploiting a differentiated technology have no incentive to 
hire all the labour. In other words, this imperfect factor mobility makes it impossible for a 
monopoly to dominate the economy when the market is sufficiently large, despite there 
being increasing returns at the firm level. We can then show that within a period the First 
Welfare Theorem does not hold because of increasing returns. Indeed, productive 
efficiency is maximised under monopoly. But in the long run, the monopoly generates a 
monopoly rent which is not re-injected into the economy and growth may not take place. 
By contrast, when the market structure is competitive, sustained positive growth may 
occur. So competition is sub-optimal, but generates growth, whereas a monopolistic 
market structure implies a particular Pareto-optimal dynamic path that leads to a no-growth 
steady-state.
In Chapter 4, we also tackle the issue of imperfect competition and growth but this time 
with a focus on purposeful (and incremental) innovation and spillovers. In the existing 
literature, it is assumed either that knowledge is purely firm- (or product-) specific (it is the 
case in the neo-Schumpeterian literature, see Grossman and Helpman [1991, chapter 4]) or 
that there exists a common body of knowledge that everyone can use. We study a 
differentiated oligopoly model à la Hotelling where cost-reducing investments are possible
 ^But the problem in this literature is that the time horizon of the model is limited.
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and where the cost reductions can spillover partly to competitors. The intensity of 
spillovers is decreasing in the distance between firms in the product space. The location of 
firms is itself endogenous so that firms locate, invest and sell and then may change their 
location, invest again, etc...
Depending on the shape of the diffusion function for spillovers, two polar situations are 
possible. It is shown that products can remain highly differentiated when spillovers are 
low. In this case, firms keep investing at the same rate. On the contrary, for a diffusion 
function concave in distance and strong spillovers, products tend to acquire increasingly 
similar attributes until they are so close to each other that, given the spillovers, there is no 
more incentive to perform R&D.
Finally, chapter 5 also tackles the problem of imperfect competition and growth but this 
time with a focus on Schumpeterian style or drastic, instead of incremental, innovation. It 
is shown that Schumpeterian competition acts as a self-reinforcing mechanism. If products 
are substitutes, a small advantage in the beginning for one product induces more R&D 
invested in this product and implies asymptotically that eventually most or all the research 
is engaged only in one direction. Consequently, it is not so much that a monopoly is good 
for growth, but growth which creates monopolies by reducing diversity.
17
CHAPTER 1 
ENDOGENOUS LABOUR SUPPLY, GROWTH AND 
OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
Abstract : This chapter explores a simple model of endogenous growth in an overlapping 
generations framework when labour supply is made endogenous. The following results are 
obtained:
- If leisure and consumption are substitutes, the economy experiences multiple equilibrium 
paths (either high growth and high labour supply or no growth and low labour supply).
- If the demand for leisure is inelastic, then the economy enjoys steady growth as in 
standard models.
- If leisure and consumption are complements, then production remains bounded, although 
endogenous growth is possible and socially desirable.
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In the light o f our earlier discussion, technological and other limitations on the supply side can hardly be 
viewed as an important factor. [...] A long term rise in real income per capita would make leisure an 
increasingly preferred good as is clearly evidenced by the marked reduction in the working week in freely 
organized non authoritarian advanced countries. [...] The pressure on the demand side for further increase 
is likely to slacken. Kuznets [1959]
I. INTRODUCTION
Although modem theories of growth tend to focus primarily on technological change, 
human capital, knowledge and capital accumulation, many popular explanations often 
relate the wealth of nations to the supply of labour. These popular arguments are used to 
account for two different phenomena: the persistence of under-development in the Third 
World and the productivity slowdown in the developed countries. Some countries, 
supposedly, remain poor because their populations are “lazy” {i.e., a level effect) and more 
subtly, rich countries do not grow as fast as they used to because of “declining efforts” of 
the labour force {i.e., a growth rate effect). What credit should we give to these popular 
arguments? The answer on the face of it is: Not much. Of course, one can always introduce 
a cultural parameter to explain differences in labour supply but the causality that goes from 
laziness to poverty is probably at best spurious. The most obvious counter-example is that 
this type of view attributed the stagnation of China until 1950 to the spirit of Confucianism 
(refusal of innovation, laziness, etc.). Yet now the same Confucianist motives are used to 
explain the astounding growth in China (hard-working people, emphasis on savings, 
respect for authority, etc)!
However, labour, which still receives a large share of income in most countries, is subject 
to important time-series and cross-section variations. Historically, Blanchard [1994] 
underlines that before the industrial revolution people enjoyed a relatively light work load 
in Europe, labouring only 100-150 days a year. This pattern was spatially and temporally 
widespread. With a reduction of population, and a resultant rise in wages in fifteenth- 
century England and the Netherlands, however, they worked only some 80-100 days. Later, 
with a higher population depressing wage rates, the peasants were forced to deploy their 
labour time in commercial and industrial pursuits, and accordingly had to work harder. 
Modem patterns of labour and leisure emerged only with the Industrial Revolution. The
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new norm was set around 300 days of ten hours a year. It continuously decreased since 
then. One should also mention that potential labour supply has sharply increased since 
1750, as underlined by Fogel [1994]. Consequently the fraction of labour effectively 
supplied has strongly decreased. More precisely, Maddison [1991] provides us with some 
data concerning labour supply in developed countries over the last century:
Annual hours worked per person Germany UK USA
1870 2,941 2,984 2,964
1950 2,316 1,958 1,867
1973 1,804 1,688 1,717
1989 1,607 1,552 1,604
Table 1
Among others, this decline of working hours is also emphasised by Pencavel [1986] who 
provides significant additional evidence on shorter week hours, longer vacations and earlier 
retirement. So our first stylised fact is a steady decrease of labour supply over time as 
incomes grow in developed countries. Note also that the growth rate has been declining 
over the last 20 years, possibly as a consequence of lower working hours. One may wonder 
how they might evolve in the future.
If we now look at a cross-section of countries (Smith-Morris [1990]), we can see that:
Country Working Hours in Manufacturing 
(per week, 1985-87)
Growth rate of GDP per capita 
(%, 1980-88)
South-Korea 54.0 7.9
Singapore 49.2 5.3
Malaysia 45.6 2.2
Kenya 41.0 -0.5
Table 2
Our second set of facts shows that among developing countries, those enjoying high growth 
also tend to work more, whereas persistent poverty is associated with a low work load. Of
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course, our sample is by no means large. However, it is representative of a wide pattern. 
How can this duality be explained? Do we need to invoke an exogenous parameter or is it 
the consequence of basic economic forces?
Given their emphasis on technology, most endogenous growth models assume constant and 
exogenous labour supply and do not offer many insights or deal with this issue. ^  The only 
causality runs from labour supply to output and growth through the production function. 
When endogenous labour supply is assumed in the growth literature, it is invariably under 
the hypothesis of a zero wage elasticity of leisure demand. Then, it is immediate that 
individual labour supply will remain constant over time, as capital (or knowledge) is 
accumulated, which, as we have seen, is counter-factual. Only changes in the value of 
technological parameters or in preferences can lead to a change in the supply of labour. 
However convenient it might be, this assumption is not sustainable in the long-run, when 
one focuses on issues dealing with growth and labour. If labour supply is endogenous there 
is no a priori reason why the elasticity o f  labour supply with respect to the wage should 
precisely be zero. This zero elasticity is only a particular case in a general model. If 
anything goes, according to the empirical facts given by the survey of Pencavel [1986], the 
income elasticity of leisure demand is positive in the long-nm and negative in the short-run 
in developed countries. Our objective is then to study the behaviour of growth models 
when labour supply is made endogenous and see whether we can generate stylised facts 
similar to those above.
We consider an overlapping-generations (OLG) model where labour is an essential input 
and where, depending on the amount of labour supplied, growth can be either positive or 
negative. Our reasons for choosing an OLG structure are multiple. First, the Infinitely- 
Lived-Agents (ILA) with exponential discounting assumption does not receive much 
empirical support (Wilhelm [1996]). Second, ILA models with endogenous growth do not 
allow us to replicate some of the stylised facts described above (see the discussion below). 
Third, ILA models are often restricted to the analysis of balanced growth paths for heavily 
specified models. Here, our OLG structure enables us to obtain results for more general
 ^ There exists a sizeable literature dealing with the endogenous evolution of fertility and its interactions with 
growth (e.g., Becker, Murphy and Tamura [1990]). We focus here on the determination of the individual 
labour supply and we abstract from the evolution of the population.
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paths than balanced growth paths using more general utility functions. We are also able to 
derive some results for production functions that cannot be studied under the standard ILA 
approach.
Our results show that, when leisure and consumption are (gross) complements, we find 
asymptotically that endogenous growth does not occur, although it is both possible and 
socially desirable. Complementarity between leisure and consumption thus implies that 
people work too little and that “demand” limits to growth are met (in the sense of Kuznets 
[1959]). The increase in wealth induces a rise in wages. Given the complementarity 
assumption, workers will substitute part of their consumption for increased leisure. 
Working hours will then decrease until production remains constant over time. As usual in 
an OLG structure, welfare is not maximised in the long-run since part of the work of the 
current generation benefits future generations (longer working hours result in higher 
savings and consequently higher wages at the next period, but this is not internalised by the 
current generation in the absence of inter-generational altruism). In models with fixed 
labour supply, there is no possible Pareto improvement since higher future consumption is 
at the cost of a lower utility now. With variable labour supply, however, there is room for 
Pareto improvement. Increasing working hours can benefit all generations, including the 
first one. The disutility of a heavier work load can be compensated at the next period by 
higher returns to savings due to the harder work that will be performed by the next 
generation. This Pareto improvement also generates a positive growth rate. This cannot 
happen in a competitive equilibrium, because there is no enforceable contract that can link 
future generations with the current one.
This result might support the view that labour supply should be constrained directly or 
indirectly through a tax mechanism, because people are not working hard enough. This 
“rigidity” of labour supply is crucial to maintain economic expansion over time. Our 
argument then goes against the traditional laisser-faire argument saying that labour supply 
should be made as unconstrained as possible.^ So, under complementarity of leisure and 
consumption, our model gives some support to the popular view on the evolution of labour
2 Leisure is a good whose consumption obviously enters the utility function o f agents. If labour supply is 
constrained, the equilibrium cannot be in general Pareto-optimal in any Arrow-Debreu framework. The first 
welfare theorem requires unconstrained labour supply. Moreover, subsidising investment as in traditional 
endogenous growth models would only make things worse.
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supply and its consequences over time in developed countries. What we also show is that 
this evolution can be explained by using a simple assumption receiving wide empirical 
support concerning the demand for leisure.
Under substitutability, which may constitute a good working assumption for low-income 
countries, multiple equilibria are possible. The model converges either towards a poverty 
trap with no work or towards a high growth - heavy work equilibrium. The intuition for the 
result is the following. In the high growth case, as capital is accumulated, the successive 
generations experience an age of augmented expectations concerning the labour supply of 
the following generations. Then, the current generation works hard, since it expects that the 
next one will supply a higher quantity of labour and so will induce high yields for its 
savings. On the contrary, the poverty trap is entered after an age of diminished expectations 
concerning the labour supply of the following generations. Expectations of low yields 
induce a substitution of work for leisure. The next generation will then face very low wages 
and low expectations, so that it effectively has even less incentive to supply labour heavily. 
Thus the economy is stuck in a poverty trap. So people are not poor because they are lazy, 
rather they do not work because they are poor. The popular causality is thus reversed. In 
such a poverty trap, only strong government intervention, sacrificing the welfare of the 
current generations, can set the economy on a growth path again.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Sections II to IV explore respectively the 
case of zero, positive and negative income elasticity of leisure demand in a simple general 
equilibrium model with endogenous growth. The last section contains some final remarks.
II. INELASTIC LABOUR SUPPLY
To introduce the notation and structure of the model, consider first a very simple 
succession of overlapping generations of agents in a production economy. Individuals live 
for two periods: they work when they are young and are retired when old. At the end of 
their youth, they get a wage. This wage is saved and used as productive capital by the next 
generation. Before dying, old individuals consume the interest and the principal of their
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savings. They leave no bequest and we assume that the population of each generation 
remains constant, normalised to one. Labour supply is endogenous and maximum labour 
supply is equal to one. For simplicity we restrict our attention to an environment, where the 
individual bom in t works in period t and consumes only in period ^+1. Of course, there is a 
disutility of work or, conversely, the individual is happier with increased leisure:
Uf-U( l t ,Ct^]) ,
U i  > 0 ,  U Ç > 0 ,  U I I  < 0 ,  U ÇQ < 0 ,  U i ç  > 0 ,
with If being the individual leisure time (If < 1 ). There is only one good in this economy. It 
can be used either as an investment or as a consumption good. The production function at 
the firm level is standard, assumes that labour is an essential input and it is homogenous of 
degree one in capital [kf ) and labour:
(2)
There is an externality at the aggregate level. Following Romer [1986], we suppose that the 
aggregate production function shows linear returns in the accumulated factor where upper­
case letters denote economy-wide aggregates:^
A, = AKj~^ => Y, = AK, (l -  i ,  . (3)
The economy is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Capital depreciates fully after one 
period."  ^It is accumulated according to:
^ t ) '  (4)
The budget constraint is :
 ^As usual, the accumulated factor is capital in its broadest sense, be it knowledge, human or physical capital. 
A more complete discussion on that issue is provided further in this paper.
 ^ Our results are robust to less extreme assumptions concerning depreciation. They hold as long as the 
depreciation rate is strictly superior to zero.
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c,+i = w ,r ,+ i( l- ; ,) .  (5)
With competitive factor markets, we obtain:
and (6)
v ~ ^ t )
And thus at the aggregate level:
-  ^  (!) A 6  -L
Q+I = z , (l -  4 ) '" ^  with Z, = P(l -  f^)A^K, (l -  4 + ] ) '" P . (8)
Moreover, given (1) and (8) we can derive the existence of a simple demand function 
l(Zf ) for aggregate leisure. We also define the “zero-growth labour supply” Z* such that 
jKf  = 1, we find:
(9)
In this section, we also make an additional assumption concerning leisure demand: the 
income elasticity of leisure demand is zero. The alternative cases of positive or negative 
elasticities will be explored in the next two sections. Assumption (aO) is then:
(aO) Inelasticity of leisure demand: 5/(z^ = 0 VZ^.
Young individuals bom in t maximise their utility given the values of the different 
parameters and variables in period t and the expected values of the parameters and 
variables in period /+!. Namely, if we assume the stability of the production function and
tastes, individuals optimise over given and )), that is the expected
value of given Lf and Kf. A temporary equilibrium is defined by = Lf and
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£j+l = e {l ,+\ /  ( i , , ) j . The consumer program can be written:
Mca (10)
h
subject to: (l - =  c,+i •
Due to (aO), we get the simple solution: If = = L . (11)
The specific feature of our assumption concerning the utility function (the income effect 
exactly offsets the substitution effect) implies that the choice of the effort today is 
independent of the expected returns of the savings. The dynamic behaviour of the capital 
stock is then almost trivial:
= (12)
For instance, we can use the following utility function as an illustrative case: 
U = ln{lf) + %.ln{cf+i). We obtain Kf+ijKf  = ( l - p )^ ( x / ( l  + x)Ÿ   ^ and 
If = Lf = l/(l + x ) . Thus, depending on the value of x, the economy will experience steady 
negative growth (low x), a steady-state or steady positive growth (high x). See Figure 1 for 
an illustration.
As a conclusion, we can see that the inelasticity-of-labour-supply assumption is very 
convenient because it allows us to neglect future events and because it implies a constant 
share of leisure. However this simplification is obtained with an important loss of 
generality. Nonetheless, except for Eriksson [1996] in a continuous time framework (but in 
his case labour supply does not affect accumulation) or Hahn [1989] for neo-classical 
growth models, papers dealing with growth and endogenous labour supply usually adopt 
this assumption. The fact is that labour supply in these papers is just an ingredient not their 
specific object of study. See Benhabib and Perli [1994], Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi [1993] 
or King, Plosser, and Rebelo [1988] for examples of such treatments.
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III. SUBSTITUTABILITY BETWEEN LEISURE AND CONSUMPTION
A first justification for this section is that substitutability between leisure and consumption 
should be considered as a theoretical possibility. Moreover, it is empirically relevant for 
low levels of income as assumed by traditional labour supply curves.^ We make the 
following assumptions:
(al) Substitutability:
(a2) Convexity:
(a3) Continuity:
(a4) Boundary conditions:
dl{z,)ldZ, < 0 . 
8^l[z,)/dz}  > 0 .
/(Z) is continuous.
lim l{Z) = 1 and Urn l(Z) = 0 
Z—>0 Z~>+oo
Assumption (al) is the main assumption. It states sure that an increase in wage increases 
the supply of labour. Assumption (a2) ensures that the labour supply curve must be 
concave (or convex demand for leisure). Assumption (a3) implies that the demand function 
is well defined. Note that the boundary conditions in (a4) could be relaxed. We just need 
labour supply to be able to create positive and negative growth. The use of 0 and 1 will just 
make the proofs easier. All these assumptions can be summarised on a simple graph:
l ( Z ) k
Graph 1
 ^ It seems also that, empirically in the “short-term”, leisure and consumption are substitute (Pencavel [1986]). 
Yet this short-term assumption is apparently contradicting our OLG structure. We can nonetheless put 
forward the following argument: by the word generation we do not mean literally half a lifetime but the 
horizon of predictable future. Then “generations” are assumed to last around 5 years. And 5 years can be set 
as a limit for predictable future, as well as for the time during which consumption and leisure are substitute. 
The OLG structure can then be used as a modelling device capturing the idea of myopic agents who do not 
consider their future beyond the horizon of predictable future.
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Using (6), we can write:
(PI) 5Z^+i(Zp K^^jdLf > 0  and 5Z^+i(Zp K^^jdKt  > 0 .
(P2) < 0 .
(P3) (l, Kf)  = \ and for Kf sufficiently large: dLf+\ ( z ^  | ^   ^ < 1.
(P4) lim Z^+i[z^,ic) = - 0 0  and Ve >0, 3 such as Z^+i(8, iC^ ) = 0.
//,—>0
That is, there is a map Z^+i(z^, Kf)  that is increasing in Lf and in If the labour
supplied in the next period is high, the interest rate is also high. Young individuals are then 
willing to substitute some of their current leisure time for more consumption tomorrow.
For a high enough K, due to (P3), we can define the fixed point of Kf)
such that iJ^Kf ) = (z(^^ ), ) (and # l). Note that in general this fixed point is
not a rational expectation equilibrium given that it varies with K. We also define L^iKt)  
such that Æ^) = 0. Figure 2 gives a simple diagrammatic illustration of some
typical situations. In short HjC^) is the demand for leisure in t such that the same demand 
is expected in r+1. is the demand for leisure if zero leisure demand is expected in
r+1. Of course, since K^) is an expected leisure demand, it can be negative for
some values of L (in that case, it means simply that the expectations are not consistent with 
the rational expectation assumption).
In other words and more formally, property (PI) establishes substitutability, whereas 
properties (P2)-(P4) ensure the existence and uniqueness of z(ZT^  ) for K  sufficiently large
and that (z^, ) is well-behaved to avoid trivial issues (or intractability if labour
supply is not concave). For example the CES utility function
 ^We analyse the dynamic mapping (z,,A!,) instead of the more traditional L^  since many of the
proofs are not backward looking but forward looking whereby the equilibrium path is derived by 
contradiction.
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Uf =lj  ^  a)+ x c/+f /( l  -  a ) with % > 0 and 0 < a  < 1 satisfies assumptions (al) to
(a4) (and consequently (P1)-(P4)).
The interesting feature when leisure demand is elastic is that the dynamic behaviour of the 
economy is determined by both its past behaviour and its expected future behaviour. The 
equilibrium (= Lf) depends on Lf+ j and Kf. In turn Lf+ j is determined by Lf+2‘ Then Lf
depends on the whole sequence of {T/+i, } • On the contrary Kf is a state variable,
resulting of all past actions and initial conditions. Since the relation is strongly non-linear, 
there is no hope of generating a complete analytical solution of our problem. Nonetheless 
some results can be derived:
Proposition 1 Under (al)- (a4), there exist a trivial steady-state and a non-trivial one.
Proof If the economy expects Lf+j = 1, (P3) implies that no labour is supplied
today {i.e., Lf= 1). Then Kf+j = 0 and the economy is trapped in this equilibrium forever. 
This is an equilibrium since this is self-fulfilling. We call this equilibrium the trivial
steady-state. We can also define K* such that Lf^\{^L*,K*^ = l!". The existence and
uniqueness of K  directly stem from the intermediate value theorem with (al)-(a4). We 
can check easily that is a steady-state since K f ^ \ { j ^ , K * ^ -  K* and since
demanding Z* is self-fulfilling. According to the definition of L , no other level of leisure 
demand can imply a steady-state. Any other level of capital except for K * , makes the 
demand L inconsistent with rational expectations. ■
Proposition 2 Under (al)-(a4), there exists at least one equilibrium path with sustained 
growth for a large enough initial K. For this equilibrium path, demand for leisure tends to 
zero.
Proof in Appendix 1. ■
The argument is as follows: we can show that if Lf is in a neighbourhood left of iJ^Kf ) , the
29
underlying expectations would not be consistent (they would imply Lf above L and thus
negative growth in a finite time). There exists also a neighbourhood right of such
that, if Lf is in that neighbourhood, the underlying expectation should become inferior to
Lç^i^Kf), which is again inconsistent (expected L is negative in finite time). Since no point
can belong to both neighbourhoods, there is at least one equilibrium path with sustained
growth. Moreover, since Lf is right of L^ijCf^ and left of ), when K  becomes very
large, L is driven to zero. Any equilibrium with growth then implies that leisure time 
should converge to zero. Individuals are asymptotically working all the time.
Proposition 3 Under (al)-(a4), the equilibrium path with growth is unique.
Proof in Appendix 2. ■
This last result builds on the slope of Lf^\ , K f ^ . l f K  becomes very large, the slope of
the curve becomes very steep. Then in case of two (or more) equilibrium paths with growth 
for a given level of capital, the amounts of leisure demanded should be diverging. This is 
ruled out since growth drives leisure demand to zero asymptotically.
Proposition 4 Under (al)-(a4), there exists at least one equilibrium path with negative 
growth. Negative growth is the only outcome when K  is less than K  .
Proof The first part of the proposition is straightforward: the trivial steady-state is
always possible. The second part is also quite easy to understand. In case of sustained
growth, working backwards, clearly we need Lf < L* V r and {Lf} is decreasing. Then if 
we reverse the time scale {L_f} is increasing and bounded above. Then it must converge
toward a level lower than L* (if it was converging towards Z > Z*, then growth would be 
impossible in the first stages). From Proposition 3, the lowest level of capital consistent
with that assertion (i.e., z(^ '^)=Z *j is . By contraposition, K < K *  implies negative
growth. ■
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Corollary 1 The non-trivial steady-state is unstable.
This corollary stems directly from Propositions 1 and 4. ■
If the economy is at a small perturbation in K  drives the economy out of the
steady-state for ever. Consequently, the economy tends either to the trivial steady-state 
(which is reached in case of negative groAvth) or with the unique positive growth path.
The most important result of this section is that growth, although possible, is not 
automatically given. If the economy starts at a sufficiently low level of accumulated capital, 
growth will not occur and the trivial steady-state with no capital will eventually be reached. 
The trivial steady-state can be interpreted as a poverty trap.^ Even above the threshold, the 
low level equilibrium can never be ruled out. Rational expectations can lead to multiple 
equilibria that can be Pareto ranked.
The only equilibrium path that involves growth also implies a sustained decrease of leisure 
time towards zero. The intuition of the proposition is the following: assuming a sufficiently 
high level of capital, the current generation works hard because it expects the next 
generation to work very hard as well and, in so doing, to offer the future retired people high 
yields for their savings. The next generation has the same beliefs. Since the amount of 
accumulated capital is higher, wages are higher. So the incentive to substitute leisure for 
work is even stronger. In that case, expectations are self-fulfilling and labour supply 
increases over time. Note that upper-comer solutions for labour supply are impossible 
because of the infinite marginal utility of leisure (as assumed implicitly with the demand 
function), when leisure demand is close to zero. Technically, this results simply from the 
substitutability assumption that implies a rise in labour supply when wages are higher.
On the contrary, expecting a low return for their savings, people will mainly demand
 ^ If the depreciation rate was strictly positive or if the minimum labour supply was above zero, then the low 
steady-state would imply a strictly positive level of capital. Moreover it must be noted that this poverty trap 
does not stem from restrictions on the production fimction as in Azariadis and Drazen [1990] (i.e., an 
exogenous non-convexity in the returns of the production function.) but it results from the structure o f tastes, 
initial conditions and expectations. Of course, the model can also be “growth-constrained” if the minimum 
labour supply is high enough to generate growth whatever the expectations or if the depreciation rate is zero.
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leisure, so that capital at the next period will be scarce and wages will be low. This will 
make work unattractive for the next generation and will confirm previous expectations. 
The simplest case is given by the trivial equilibrium. Work is not supplied today with the 
expectation that it will not be supplied tomorrow. If no work is supplied, no capital is 
accumulated and there is effectively no point in supplying any work at the next period.* 
This co-ordination failure arises because of the OLG structure, not because of the 
externality in the aggregate production function which merely enables growth. In this 
second case, the economy is then trapped in a low production equilibrium (production is 
zero) and there is no possibility to escape it in a laisser-faire economy. This argument can 
act as a rationale for government intervention (justified only by a Utilitarian and not a 
Pareto criterion) in low income countries, for which the substitutability assumption might 
be valid. The point here is that this intervention may not create too many distortions since it 
suffices for the government to intervene for a finite number of periods. Once the high 
growth equilibrium path is triggered, no more intervention is required. The length of this 
period is ultimately an empirical question. The Korean and Japanese experiences in the 
post-war period may suggest however that it can stay reasonable.
Propositions 1 to 4 hold under well-behaved utility functions exhibiting substitutability.^ If 
individuals consume when young as well as when old, results get more complicated. 
However it seems natural to focus on the assumption of complementarity or multiplicative 
separability of the two consumption levels. As a consequence, both consumption levels are 
“tied” in the sense that pessimistic expectations about future returns will not induce people 
to substitute future consumption for present consumption but consumption for leisure.
* An interpretation in terms of product multiplicity can be also developed (with / figuring some index of 
consumption of goods produced with constant returns such as agricultural products or manufactured goods 
produced with a traditional technology).
 ^They are also robust to the formation of expectations. The rational expectation assumption might look a bit 
strong. If one thinks of simple possible rules of thumb, one may supply Lf such that E[l,^.i/lf,Kf)=Lf. The 
individual is rational but unable to forecast the changes o f economic conditions due to the accumulation of 
capital. With this rule of thumb, we can see that L,=Z(K,) . Then we have three different possible situations.
If K=K* , then the economy stays at the (unstable) steady-state. If K>K* , then L , < Ü . The economy keeps 
growing: and Z,,+i<Z,,. Capital grows unbounded, whereas leisure tends to zero. If K<K*, then
If > L . The economy experiences negative growth with labour supply and capital going to zero. Our rule of
thumb then yields results with the same flavour as the model with rational expectations.
The consumption during the youth is positively related to the future consumption as typically implied by 
the FOCs. Consequently future consumption still determines the demand for leisure.
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The essence of the results then should not be modified by this refinement of the model.
Finally, note that sociological theories of growth often emphasise the importance of culture 
in the process of development. Cultural values are supposed to govern the attitude towards 
work. Here, we simply assume, that the economic returns are higher when one works more. 
If we accept here the idea that consumption and leisure are substitutes when people are 
poor, there exist multiple equilibria. Consequently, poverty may not be the result of cultural 
values, but a matter of self-fulfilling expectations and initial conditions. Nonetheless, 
sociological explanations may have a part to play. To escape the trivial (or low) steady- 
state, Weber [1930] emphasises some form of irrationality with respect to our specification 
for utility. In his introduction, he underlines that (With Protestantism) man is dominated by 
the making o f  money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose o f  his life. [...] Economic 
acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction o f  material 
needs.
IV. COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN LEISURE AND CONSUMPTION
The case for which leisure and consumption are substitutes is empirically weakly relevant 
for rich countries since most studies surveyed by Pencavel [1986] show a long-run 
complementarity between those two goods (the wage elasticity of labour supply is negative 
in all cases; however it is close to zero). Another reason to justify this complementarity 
assumption is that time is the ultimate scarce resource as consumption goods become 
abundant. Even with a longer life-expectancy, our lifetimes still remain bounded, whereas 
there is no reason for consumption to be bounded in the future. This view states that time is 
valued for its own sake. Becker [1965] takes a more materialistic approach (where time has 
no value as such) and underlines that utility is derived from both the amount of 
consumption and the time devoted to consumption with a complementarity between the 
two. Both approaches are equivalent in our model.
We make the following assumptions:
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(a5) Complementarity: 6/(z^ > 0.
(a6) Continuity: /(Z) is continuous.
(a7) Boundary conditions: lim /(Z )e(z* , l) and l iml(Z)<L*\ / 7 vAZ->+0O Z-^0
Assumption (a5) states that leisure demand is increasing with the net return to labour. 
Assumption (a7) is just here to ensure that leisure demand can be low enough to imply 
positive growth or high enough to yield negative growth. So, apart from complementarity, 
we just specify that demand is continuous and can change sufficiently to create positive or 
negative growth. As previously, these assumptions can be summarised on a simple graph:
l ( Z ) k
Graph 2
There is a new map [ i f , From (a5-a7), it has the following properties:
(P5): dLf+i{^L^, <0 and > 0 .
(P6): Kf)  is continuous.
(P7): (O, Z rJ > l  and lim , AT 1 = -oo.
L,->Max L
These properties ensure the existence of Z(A') and Zo(A') such that Z(Æ) < Zq(^ )  (refer 
to Figure 3 for a diagrammatic exposition). For example the CES utility function
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Uf =l ]  ^ / ( l  -  a ) + jcc]^\ /( l  -  a ) with % > 0 and cr> 1 satisfies assumptions (a5) to 
(a7). Our basic result for this section is then quite easy to establish:
Proposition 5 Under (a5)-(a7), sustained positive or negative growth are impossible.
The proof is by contradiction: suppose positive growth is possible, then we need L< L 
for capital to keep growing. Consequently K  would become superior to K  and then 
K f)  would become such that Z(Æ) and Lq(K) are superior to L . For capital
to continue to grow, we still need Lf <L*. This implies that Lf^i > L* is expected. Then, 
when these rational expectations are fulfilled, it means Kf^2 < ^t+\ • Thus sustained 
growth is impossible and the same argument runs with negative growth. The economy 
cannot experience explosive cycles either, since the growth rate is bounded by (l -  p ) ^ . If
we are below the threshold for which Lq(K)<L* , capital increases without cycles. ■
The corollary of this result is that the economy in the long-run is either at the steady-state
,K*)  or experiencing small scale fluctuations within some given bands around the
steady-state. In other words, the Romer assumption coupled with a positive income 
elasticity of leisure demand imply a Solow-type outcome. The intuition is that, when 
wealth increases, individuals tend to work less due to an increased demand for leisure. 
Working hours then decrease, until production remains constant over time. Unsurprisingly,
depending on the slope of Lf^\{^Lf, Kf)  at the steady-state is either locally
stable (if the slope is superior to -1) or unstable. Moreover our results can be extended for a 
larger class of production functions, which can be studied only in an OLG framework:
Proposition 5' Sustained positive or negative growth is impossible with the production 
function y f = Ak ] (l -  // )  ^  ^ and with Uf = /( l  -  ct) + x /( l  -  cj) ( x > 0
and (5>\).
11 This result is robust to the formation of expectations like in the previous section. If one expects 4 + i = A ,
when Kf>K*, one gets ^nd hence negative growth. When K < K * , one gets and hence
positive growth.
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Proof in Appendix 3. ■
With fixed labour supply, this production function should yield explosive rates of growth. 
Here, we show that the no-growth result can be extended for potentially explosive returns 
in the case of a CES utility function. In other words, again effort decreases until it becomes 
insufficient to generate growth.
A possible objection to these two results could be raised using the fact that our engine of 
growth is very specific. In particular, do our results hold with what is usually referred to in 
endogenous growth models as “accumulation of knowledge” or “technological progress” 
(Romer [1990] and many subsequent papers)? These more sophisticated models of 
endogenous growth use a constant returns to scale production function for the consumption 
good, along with another sector (R&D) for which the creation of new knowledge is a linear 
function of existing knowledge and an increasing function of labour employed in this 
sector. Technically, both frameworks are the same, yielding the same kind of results (see 
Grossman and Helpman [1994]). The only differences rest with the treatment of the 
competitive assumption. So our conjecture is that in such models, growth would imply a 
decrease of the labour supplied in the R&D sector (growth should reduce the incentive to 
supply labour in the manufacturing sector, which in turn reduces the value of patents). Thus 
this would drive growth to end. If instead of knowledge, human capital was accumulated 
the results should also remain valid as long as the demand for leisure increases in the 
income.
This stagnation due to Propositions 5 and 5' would not be very worrying if this situation 
was Pareto-optimal (and it would be so in an ILA framework with a CES utility function 
after correcting for the externality in the production function). One can easily imagine a 
situation with growth still being possible, but the agent preferring to work less and still 
enjoying a high income. But this is not the case.
Proposition 6 When the economy is at its steady-state, it is possible to improve the welfare 
o f all future generations including the current one. This welfare improvement implies 
positive growth.
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See Appendix 4 for a formal proof. ■
Then, although endogenous growth is possible and socially profitable, it does not take 
place. A Pareto-improvement is possible because a small increase in the labour supply of 
the future generations (i.e., higher consumption) compensates for a small increase in the 
labour supply of the current generation. Yet the current utility decreases due to more work 
today, but it also increases due to more consumption tomorrow (higher interest rate given 
by the supplementary work of the next generation).
In contrast to many endogenous gro'wth models, the inefficiency does not come from 
insufficient investment in R&D or in physical capital, but from sub-optimal labour supply. 
Typically, in models with exogenous labour supply, the unregulated growth rate is equal to 
the optimal growth rate minus a constant which depends on the difference between private 
and social returns. Here, whatever the “potential” growth rate, our complementarity 
between consumption and labour drives the growth process to a complete standstill. To 
restore efficiency, it may be possible to tax investment or savings in order to induce 
workers to work more (instead of subsidising it in models with constrained labour supply). 
It may also be possible to directly compel people to work sufficiently so that perpetual 
growth should occur. This may be very hard to implement since it is possible to extend the 
model realistically with, every generation voting on taxes or working hours. This voting 
process should bring us back to Proposition 5.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The perspective on growth in this chapter is quite different that of the existing growth 
literatures, both neo-classical or endogenous. Their typical questions are: under what 
technological assumptions does growth happen? (or what are the engines of growth and 
what should we do to propel growth?). Here, we explore what are the conditions on the 
“demand” side under which growth occurs, given that it is technically possible on the 
supply side. Although barely tackled, a better understanding of the determination of 
“effort” seems to be a major issue in the growth and development issues. In the framework
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developed above, it is shown that obtaining positive growth is demanding concerning 
labour supply since it precludes leisure and consumption being gross complements.
This assumption, however, does make sense empirically. We face here an apparent 
contradiction. Although the model predicts that growth should stop, it still occurs. It might 
simply be that we are converging to a steady-state we have not reached yet, but that 
eventually demand limits to growth will appear. Yet, many other candidate explanations 
can be at work to explain the ex-post rigidity of labour supply, but most of them must be 
ruled out regarding our case. Traditional labour economics stresses the importance of 
labour externalities, indivisibilities and increasing returns to labour effectively supplied. 
But except from extreme forms of indivisibilities (individual returns are zero if one works
less than 24^ 1 -  T*) hours per day), this may not be sufficient to reverse Propositions 4 and
5.
One possible way to explain the persistence of high levels of labour supply is the existence 
of some “oligarchic wealth”. Typically the only engine of growth usually found in 
economic models is greediness for consumption. Given the consumerist objective, people 
work, accumulate, learn or trade indefinitely to maximise their intertemporal utility 
assuming that wealth is “democratic”, i.e., that all goods can be multiplied. For instance 
one may assume that total social reward within a group is fixed (that is, there can be only 
one winner) and that honours or positions are sought for their own sake (more generally, 
there are goods in limited supply whatever the state of development). Then unlike the quest 
for consumption, the quest for social reward (for instance being the richest man in the 
village, the most quoted economist, or owning a painting by Vermeer) is endless.
Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite [1992] proposed a matching model where people are 
interested in physical attributes and thus have an incentive to work in order to be able to 
mate with the best partners. In other papers, Comeo and Jeanne [1994] or Fershtman, 
Murphy and Weiss [1996] introduced directly a concern for social status in the utility 
function. Then, the pursuit of relative utility is never exhausted since they are no 
decreasing marginal returns. This type of simple argument is consistent with a deeper 
observation of the empirical data provided by Pencavel [1986]. The average working time
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may be declining, but many highly qualified and wealthy people still work 60 hours a 
week, very often at a high cost for their family or their health. The elite may be part of a 
“rat race” fi*om which growth might be only a side-effect.
As a final point, this chapter has explored the behaviour of a standard growth model with 
endogenous labour supply. We showed that with a negative income elasticity of labour 
supply, the economy converges either towards a level equilibrium or towards a high growth 
and high labour supply situation, thus replicating the situation in many developing 
countries. On the contrary, when consumption and leisure are complement, demand for 
leisure should increase as the economy grows richer until a no-growth steady-state is 
reached. Further work should focus on the generality of this result. Moreover, new 
arguments able to restore the possibility of positive growth should enrich our 
understanding of the growth process.
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APPENDIX 1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Because of (PI), ^ K > K *  and Z g[l(X),1], we observe . As long as
Z g[z(X),Z*], Z^+i(z^) is shifting to the left since L< L . But {ZJ is increasing and
eventually becomes larger than Z . Then capital starts to decrease and falls below K  .
When L> L and K < K * , growth is not possible anymore: to get sustained growth (i.e., 
growth for all ftiture periods), we need the necessary condition L<L( K)  to be satisfied. It 
means that leisure time must decline over time since dL(K)/dK < 0.
The second step is to show that there is a neighbourhood left of Z(X) such that sustained 
growth is impossible for any Z in this neighbourhood. If note that
z(a'^^_i)<Z^+l(z^,X^) = z(x^) since Z(X) is decreasing in K  due to (a2)-(a4). By 
continuity, there is a neighbourhood I\{K)  , left of L(K) such that for all x e I i { K ) , we
have z(x^+i (%)) < (x, K f ) <x <  Z (X ). Since Z^+j > z(x^ ), this implies Lf+j > ^t+l
and a continuous decline of labour supply until the capital accumulated starts to decrease 
(i.e., until L> L ) as we demonstrated in the first step.
Recursively we have / 2 (^)> left of I\{K)  and such that
4 + 2 Kf ) <x  and Z^ +g > 4 + 2 - the same way and due to the 
continuity of Z^ + ;(.), we can define 4 (X )  for any integer «>0. Then we have:
/ = + 0 0
I ( K ) ^  U 4 W -  (Al)
/=1
Thus, to get sustained growth, we need Lf be left of l[Kf  ). Otherwise expectations would
be dynamically inconsistent v^th the growth hypothesis (Z would end up being superior to 
*
Z , see step 1).
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For the third step, we can show that we also have a neighbourhood J\{lC), right of Lç {^lCj 
such that it would be dynamically inconsistent to demand e J i ( K ) .  In fact, we would
get Lf+j < Zo(a^^+i). If we demand Lq(K),  we will need L^+j = 0 to fulfil our 
expectations. This is impossible (this is ruled out by (A4)). The existence of is
established by continuity. We set J 2 (K) such that L^+j is feasible and Lf+2 <
Then as previously:
/=+oo
J ( K ) ^  U / , W -  (A2)
/=!
So for sustained growth, a necessary condition is that any Lf must be left of I(K) and right 
of J(K). If leisure demand on the right of I(K), the path of labour supply is not decreasing 
enough, whereas if it is on the left of J(K), it is decreasing too fast to be dynamically
consistent. A growth path will exist if, for any K> K* ^  there is at least one sequence of 
leisure demand not inconsistent with rational expectations. In particular, if there is any Lt
left of l {Kf )  and right of j { Kf ) ,  we will observe left of and right of
j{Kf+ri) for any positive integer n (this means that expected leisure demand is always 
consistent with rational expectations for all future periods). Then one can check that this is 
sufficient for growth to occur since: Lf <L* => Kf+\ > K f .
So for the fourth step, it remains to show that, no point can belong to both neighbourhoods, 
I(K) and J(K). Suppose there is Lf e I ( K )  and Lf e J ( K ) ,  then there must be x > / such
that > L^ and L^+i <Zo(â'^+i). These last two conditions imply Z,o(^x+l)>
By definition, we also have Lq[k ^)> Lq[k ^+i ). Then we must observe L^ >L q[k ^). 
This leads to a contradiction since we need L^ <L q[k ^),  otherwise it would mean 
^T+1 = 0. So, there always exists at least one feasible perfect foresight equilibrium with 
growth. This path is such that leisure is decreasing and capital is increasing. ■
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APPENDIX 2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Step 1 Suppose that for a given level of capital sufficiently large, there are two
possible levels of leisure demand and consistent with rational expectations and 
growth. We define 0 such that jL^\ . Due to the concavity of
^ t+ \ t h e  boundary assumptions, 0 increases with K  and can be arbitrarily 
large when K  is large enough. Then, for K  large enough, we obtain 
-^ T+1 “  the accumulation equation implies that:
K.
K.T+1
< ■  '  / .(A3)
^T+1 t -  ^T
Then if 0 > 1 + l/( l  -  )) ,we find that -  ^-c+l ) / ^ t+1 < A +l “  ^T+l •
Step 2 Assume that for any r > T , the following property holds:
(A4)
Now we can define , Lf j the underlying leisure demand induced by Kf  and L f .
Note that Lf^i (Kf ,  Lf^> Lf^\{^Kf, Since K f > K ^ ,  we get the result that
4+1 “  4+1 >^ (4 “  4 )*
Step 3 Using the equilibrium condition /^  = , we can write:
4+1 "  4+1 - ' - ( 4  1
l/(l-P )
1
i/( i-p )
P ( l - P ) ^ 2 ^ , p ( i - p ) ^ 2 ^ ;
(A5)
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From (al) and (a4): < 1; that is jj ^<1.  Then (A5)
implies:  ^ Using (A4), this induces
Lt+\ -  Lf+i <Lf -  Lf .  Combining this last inequality with the result 
Lf+l -  Lf+i > obtained above gives us Lf+i -  Lf+i > (0 -  l)(z^ -  j.
Step 4 Given the saving behaviour, we have:
4 ^ - L , r - K , { l - L , y
K,^l k 'J- '•
(A6)
Using (A4), we find {k ',+x ~ K.'t+i<{\ + K , L , ^ { l , -  L, ^ after
manipulation. Now using the result of step 3, we find:
K,t+l
1+
So for 0 > 2 + \ j( \  -  )), we find Lf^\ -  Lf^\ > ) / •  Then
recursively, the property holds for all / > x . So the distance between and is 
increasing geometrically, which obviously contradicts that the fact Lf should converge to 
zero in all cases. The equilibrium path with growth must then be unique for K  large 
enough.
Step 5 Now it remains to show that uniqueness is also true for any other K> K  .
Assume a temporary equilibrium [Lf , Kf )  on the growth path such as the slope of
Lf^l (.,.) in Lf is superior to 2 + l/(l -  ). Because of the monotonicity of Lf^ \ f o r
a unique Kf_\ there exists a unique Lf_\ such that {^Lf,Kf) will be reached in t.
43
Moreover, it is straightforward that, for > Kf_ \, the associated leisure demand such 
that is attained in r is L^_i < . We can write that
Kf = (l -  ^ A Kf _ i  (l -  Lf_x (Kf_\ ))  ^  ^. Because of this last equation Kf  is increasing with 
Kf _i . Consequently, there exists a unique Kf_\ such that Kf  will be reached at the next 
period. Of course, Kf > Kf_\ and Lf > Lf_\ . Recursively, the temporary equilibrium with
positive growth is unique for each level of capital above K *". ■
APPENDIX 3 PROPOSITION 5'
We assume Uf =lj  ^  / { l - a )  + x /( l  -  a ) (with x > 0 and a  > l) and the aggregate 
production function to be Yf = A K ] ^ ^ { \ - L f ^  ^ . In this case, the labour supply that 
leaves initial conditions constant is not independent of K  anymore. We can define Z*(x^)
such that Kf ^i / Kf  =1 , that is (l -   ^ =1. In order for sustained
positive growth to be possible, we need Lf < Z*(x^) and the expectations are such that 
^t+\ < - Individual maximisation implies:
4+1 -1  -
( 1 - 4 ) (A8)
The temporary equilibrium is then such that If = L f, so we find:
4+1 = 1 -
a /( l-a )
0 “ 4 )
l-(l-p )(l+ p )
(A9)
Using the definition of I^[Kf^x ) , we get:
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=  ( A io )
The consistency of expectations with growth requires Lf^\ < L (aT^+i ) . From (A8) and
(A9), this condition writes Growth in
period t also requires Lf < L*{^Kf ) ,  which implies (l -  ^ A K .f  (l -   ^ > 1. Combining
the two previous inequalities, we obtain:
) • (a i  d
Since lim Z^  = 1, we need a / ( a - l )  + ( l - p ) / p  + p < 0  which is a contradiction.
t^->+ao
APPENDIX 4 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
At the steady-state (z*, X* j , the utility of each generation is:
U* = u {^ l \  ( l - P)^A:*(i- with X* = 1 -((1  - ( A12)
and L* satisfies:
l"P/  ^ A,,*/, ,*\1"Pdu[l,  ( l - P )P W ^(l- X*) (1 - l)K*( l - X*)
= 0 , (A13)
dl
[ / ,[^ x * ,( i  - p )^ x :* ( i  - X* j'"'’ j  -  (1 - p )p ^ ^ x :* (i - x*)'"^'^ x
=> X . (A 1 4 )
Uc
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The authority can fix L*  forever. If all excess production for (l -  Z** j > (l -  I*) is given 
to the young generation, we observe then:
AU = A Lx  [//f - Z,”  1 C/gf z " , ( l - P )^z :* (l- z“ )""  1 .(A15),1-P'
For L = Z , it implies:
A f/  = AZ
\  
f
Uc . 
\  V
,1-2P
♦ \i"P
(A16)
In this case, using (A 14), one can check that the second term of the rhs of this expression is
strictly positive. Consequently by continuity there exists Z** < Z* such that we can set
Z = Z**. In that case, the generation bom in t-1 receives the same income, whereas the 
generation bom in t is better-off. All the generations bom after t are also better off since 
they work the same and consume more than the generation bom in t. ■
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THE CASE OF UNITARY ELASTICTITY OF SUBSTITUTION
BETWEEN LEISURE AND CONSUMPTION
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CHAPTER 2
FINANCING PRODUCTIVE LOCAL PUBLIC
GOODS
Abstract: Public economics typically assumes that local public goods only affect the utility 
of consumers. We assume on the contrary that local public goods are purely productive. 
The implications of this assumption are analysed within standard dynamic growth models. 
Investment in the public good enhances productivity only in the jurisdiction where it takes 
place. Capital as well as people are perfectly mobile. After characterising the first-best 
equilibrium, we show that its decentralisation is more demanding than with local public 
consumer goods. In particular, efficient decentralisation cannot be obtained with 
competing land developers providing the public good through a simple land capitalisation 
scheme.
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I. INTRODUCTION
How can an economy achieve optimal provision of local public goods (LPG)? Traditional 
public economics, originating from Samuelson [1954], stresses the difficulty of the 
provision of public goods in a general context. Basically, a decentralised scheme cannot be 
implemented because of a standard free-rider problem. Moreover, the first-order conditions 
for the central planner to achieve first-best require him to observe the consumers' marginal 
rates of substitution. So, even with a benevolent planner, the optimum is difficult to reach. 
However, Tiebout [1956] devised a clever alternative solution. His answer to the pivotal 
question raised above was to rely on the local aspects of some public goods and to use 
competition among the jurisdictions. In his original paper, assuming an optimal number of 
jurisdictions led by profit-maximising developers, people, by voting with their feet, can 
choose between different levels of provision for the public good and the associated head- 
taxes. Then the competitive equilibrium is a first-best situation.
Yet the assumption of an ex-ante optimal number of jurisdictions and the possibility of 
head-taxes are rather restrictive. However, the subsequent literature (see Wildasin [1987] 
or Mieszkowski and Zodrow [1989] for complete surveys on this issue) managed to relax 
them elegantly.^ The Tiebout idea relies on the strong analogy between fiscal competition 
and the competition to supply private goods. Consequently free-entry of developers leads 
to the first-best just as free-entry of producers can achieve the First Welfare Theorem for 
private goods. As for the head-tax, the idea is to replace it by using the land market. 
Implementation of the first-best just requires the developer to be able to take advantage of 
the differential land rent in her jurisdiction since public spending is capitalised in the land 
value. This differential land rent stems from the agents' competition for space.^
The profit function of each developer in the most direct case is equivalent to total 
differential land rent {TDK) minus expenses for the public good (G). Then an immediate 
implication of the zero-profit condition is TDR = G. This result is known as the Henry
 ^ To insure existence, some restrictions on the utility functions are still necessary. See Fujita [1989] for 
developments.
2 By differential land rent we mean the share of land rent created by the action of the developer. In the paper, 
without any land development, land rent is equal to zero so that total land rent and differential land rent are 
equal.
51
George Theorem (George [1879]), Then the only informational requirement to implement 
the first-best in a decentralised way is the observation of the land market. This result 
appears in Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski [1974], Vickrey [1977] and Amott and 
Stiglitz [1979] among others. Of course it relies on strong assumptions. It is not valid with:
- Imperfect competition, see Scotchmer [1986];
- Imperfect geography (if the land-rent is not well-defined at the border of the city), see 
Amott and Stiglitz [1979] and Pines [1991];
- Congestion, see Scotchmer [1986] and Fujita [1989];
- Imperfect taxation (if only a property tax is available instead of a land tax), see 
Mieszkowski [1972] or Hoyt [1991];
- Imperfect mobility (if agents cannot vote with their feet at zero cost).
Despite all this, Tiebout's idea seems to be empirically relevant: Oates [1969], Edel and 
Sclar [1974], Hamilton [1976], Meadows [1976] or more recently Wassmer [1993] all 
draw favourable conclusions and show that mobility influences the mix of public goods 
offered at the local level. Moreover, some important projects are explicitly fimded by land 
capitalisation schemes. One can think for instance of the railways in Tokyo (Kanemoto 
[1984], Kanemoto and Kiyono [1993], Midgley [1994]) or the public transports in 
Hongkong (Midgley [1994]).
Strange as it might seem, most potential applications of the capitalisation hypothesis (i.e., 
public good finance through the differential land rent) concern infrastmctures (which are 
“productive public goods”), whereas the theoretical analysis focuses entirely on “public 
consumer goods” (which directly enter the utility fimction).^ For infi-astmctures, it is 
possible that user-charges can provide convenient, albeit not always simple, pricing 
schemes; a general synthesis on these aspects is provided by Laffont and Tirole [1993]. In 
particular, perfect spatial discriminatory pricing is seldom available, although most 
infrastmcture have an important geographic dimension. For road networks, airports or even 
electricity or water distribution, location matters. In other ^oxàs, public infrastructures are 
a crucial part o f  the production process at the local level (see World Bank [1994]).
 ^ The concepts of productive public good, public capital and infrastructure are equivalent in the analysis that 
follows.
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Apart from user-charges, another alternative to finance public infrastructure is given by 
capital taxation at the local level (Wildasin [1989]). The literature on this matter shows the 
existence of a fiscal externality leading jurisdictions to implement sub-optimal levels of 
capital taxation because of factor mobility. This literature usually takes public expenditures 
as given and ignores any linkage between taxation and the marginal productivity of capital; 
that is, it again assumes implicitly that public goods are consumed rather than productive. 
However, the fiscal externality is likely to persist and even worsen 'with productive local 
public goods. So, as it seems difficult to finance productive public goods with either user- 
charges or capital taxation, our aim in what follows is to assess to what extent the land 
market can contribute to the financing of productive local public goods as it does for 
public consumer goods.
Another possible perspective is to consider that many local public consumer goods also 
have a productive aspect. Indeed, only purely recreational public goods such as parks and 
museums can be considered as pure public consumer goods. Even in these extreme cases, 
it may be argued that they have some productive aspects: museums can improve education, 
whose productive role is obvious."  ^The quality of leisure also has an impact on production. 
A final motivation is that public economics typically recommends that local expenditure 
should be financed through the taxation of the differential land rent. However land taxes 
represent only a small fraction of local public finances (see Prud'Homme [1987] and 
Henderson [1995] for evidence). We offer here a new explanation for this stylised fact.
For public consumer goods, a partial equilibrium analysis is sufficient. We just need to 
consider an exogenous income, which generates a demand for the public good mediated by 
the land markets. Then, the problem is to see how the public good can be financed through 
the land market. On the contrary, in the case of productive public goods, the initial income 
generates a demand for private goods, for land and for savings. Using the demand for land, 
it is possible to finance local public goods but the story does not end here, since the 
savings and the amount of public good determine future production. A dynamic general 
equilibrium analysis is thus required. In other words, the analysis of productive public
 ^ Education presents some specific features that justify a separate analysis with different assumptions. For 
instance, see Bénabou [1993].
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goods is inherently dynamic, because public capital can be accumulated and influences 
further production.
Moreover, assume for convenience that private producers operate with constant returns to 
scale. Then the introduction of public capital which is assumed to increase the marginal 
productivity of private capital, implies increasing returns at the aggregate level. For these 
reasons, our model is dynamic and also embodies increasing returns. Using such a 
framework, we explore whether the Classical results due to Tiebout and George are still 
valid when the productive aspect of public goods is taken into account. It is shown below 
that, although Tiebout-style (i.e., first-best) results can be obtained, they are very 
demanding and rely on strong assumptions. The Henry George Theorem does not hold in 
the usual sense. Simple capitalisation schemes do not work because the marginal product 
of public investment in one jurisdiction benefits both the workers who live in the 
jurisdiction and also capital holders who need not live where their savings are invested. As 
a consequence, land rent capitalises public investment only up to the increase in wages it 
causes multiplied by the share of housing in expenditures. On the contrary, increased 
public investments in one particular jurisdiction raise the marginal return to capital. Thus, 
it increases the financial income of everyone in the economy and it follows that the 
demand for land in all the jurisdictions goes up.
In Section II, we propose a simple framework of a competitive production economy with 
productive public goods. In Section III, we analyse various decentralised frameworks. 
Finally the last section ends the analysis with some considerations concerning the 
provision of local public goods.
II. ECONOMIES WITH PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC GOODS: THE FIRST-BEST
We consider a large economy composed of S  “islands”, each of surface unity. The total
population size N  is such that N  < SL*, where l /  L is the minimal amount of land to be 
consumed per capita in order to enjoy positive utility. A given island may or may not be 
populated. Individuals are infinitely-lived (or finitely-lived with a dynastic utility function)
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and supply continuously one unit of labour inelastically. their utility function is:
JO 1 - a
with Uf =Zf s f  if  Sf>l lL*,  (1)
Uf =0 i f  Sf < l /1 * ,
a  > 1.
Instantaneous utility is thus a Cobb-Douglas fimction of z, the per capita consumption of 
the final good and s, the per capita quantity of land (which is a proxy for housing 
consumption). There is a single good, which can be consumed, used as public investment 
or transformed into private capital. The production function in each island is;5
= A c f f  Kj f  “ i f f  with a  > P > X, / = 1,..., .S. (2)
This specification makes public capital a necessary input. In this respect we follow the 
empirical literature (Aschauer [1989] or Gramlich [1994]). Moreover, we do not consider 
the case of publicly provided private goods. Note that if land consumption is equally 
divided between inhabitants of the same island z, we observe 5/ = 1/Zy since we suppose 
that people should live and work on the same island. For the sake of simplicity we ignore 
depreciation and any unit of capital (K), labour (Z) or public spending (G) can be used only 
in one island.^
Capital and labour are perfectly mobile across islands. The good can be transformed into 
capital and shipped elsewhere, but then it cannot be consumed anymore. In short, what 
consumers eat must come from their residential area. This assumption may seem rather 
unappealing but it makes sense for non-tradable goods like most personal services. 
Furthermore it leads to considerable technical simplification.^ Note also that only
 ^ As usual, dynamic results can be obtained only for heavily specified models. Our instantaneous utility 
function may seem ad-hoc. It allows however to consider the inferior good aspect o f land. A Stone-Geary 
specification would be more elegant but it is not tractable in a dynamic context.
 ^There is no overlap. See Hochman, Pines and Thisse [1995] for the implications of this problem.
 ^ In particular, it will simplify our first-best land use (land is used with the same intensity wherever it is 
used). Otherwise, we may be led to more complex patterns of land use (the density in inhabited islands need
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consumers use space. This simplifying assumption, which is relaxed below, allows us to 
neglect the issue of competition for space between different categories of agents (producers 
and consumers). Finally, the analysis that follows concentrates on steady-state behaviours 
of our economy.*
A tendency to agglomeration is driven by the increasing returns present in the production 
function. Reducing the number of populated (or developed) islands increases production. 
Production becomes very large when only one island is developed. On the contrary, the 
taste for land acts as a dispersion force. The balance between agglomeration and dispersion 
is stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The first-best where individuals are treated symmetrically is such
that NIL* islands are populated by L inhabitants eachP
See proof in Appendix 1. ■
The intuition for this lemma is that as long as the marginal productivity of public capital 
multiplied by the marginal utility of consumption is higher than the marginal utility of the 
consumption of space, it is socially worthwhile to reduce the consumption of space to 
increase production in order to avoid the spatial dilution of public capital.
Proposition 1 : The first-best is such that mobile factors are symmetrically allocated
across existing jurisdictions. I f  ^ < a ,  the long-run level o f  capital accumulated is
A" = ^(l -  /p j . I f  P = cc, public capital, private capital and
consumption all grow at the rate ( (^  “  o f  AL - p i m
not be the same everywhere at the optimum). This “asymmetric” first best would render decentralisation more 
problematic. This assumption is relaxed in Duranton [1997].
* In the model we consider, the analysis of the transition dynamic is either straightforward since the problem 
reduces to a neo-classical model of growth when p<a or trivial since there is no transition dynamics when
P=a .
 ^This assumption is here to avoid a first-best for which consumers would not be treated symmetrically as it 
sometimes happens in public or urban economics. See Mirrlees [1972] for an example where utilitarian 
welfare leads to unequal treatment.
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Proof Thanks to Lemma 1, we can restrict our attention to symmetric situations
with constant consumption of land. It is then possible to write the social planner's program 
independently of land consumption.
Subject to the "representative island" budget constraint: = Z, ,
and to the transversality condition: Um (3)
/-> + o o
Since a  > 1, intertemporal utility is always well defined. Thus this transversality condition 
does not play an important role in our analysis. The first-order conditions of (SP) are:
= X
X { \ ~ a ) A G ' ^ K ~ ° - L * ° ' = - i  (4)
= - i
From this, we can state:
i  ( l - a ) '  - p
and -  = i  (6 )
z a
Depending on the value of p , we distinguish two different cases:
• P < a  (Solow case). There is a long-run steady state for which z/z = 0 :
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V
(7)
In this case, we have overall increasing returns but decreasing returns to the reproducible 
factors. Consequently the economy converges towards its long-run equilibrium level K .
• P = a  (Barro-Romer case). From the previous equations, we get:
 ^ z ^  G ( l - a ) > - “ g “ ^ r - p  
~ ^ z ~ K ~ G ~  a  •
Here, given that returns to the reproducible factors are precisely one, endogenous steady 
growth is possible. The equilibrium growth path is such that consumption, public and 
private capital are all increasing at the same rate. ■
The initial program involved a dynamic optimisation over two choice variables with two 
state variables. However, thanks to Lemma 1, the consumption of space remains constant 
which allows us to get rid of one choice variable. Then, the marginal productivity of public 
capital should be equal to that of private capital which reduces our problem to a standard 
dynamic programming problem. Depending on the value of p , two different results can be 
obtained. These two different cases underline two different conceptions of the role of 
public spending in the growth process. In the first case, growth is taken as exogenous (to 
the model), that is to say infirastructures do not act as the engine of growth (although they 
may intervene crucially in the productive process). This vision is defended for instance by 
Gramlich [1994]. It states that infrastructures do matter for production to occur, but that 
they do not influence the long-run growth rate. The other conception states that public 
spending can be considered as a major engine of growth. Theoretically, this vision was put 
forward by Barro [1990] and Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992]. Empirically, this conception 
is defended by De Long and Summers[1991] and [1993]. We do not want to intervene here 
in the controversy on this matter. We use both specifications and show that our results are 
similar for both cases.
As usual in growth models, the case p > a  does not make much sense economically since it implies 
explosive growth.
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It can be shown easily that the first-best solution in these two programs can be 
decentralised, given the provision of public goods. In the Solow case with no exogenous 
growth, the government just needs to provide the optimal amount of public infrastructure 
in each jurisdiction as in equation (5). Firms then face a well-behaved production function 
with constant returns to scale in private inputs. The steady-state is such that no further 
public spending is required after it is reached. In either the exogenous or endogenous 
growth case, public spending can be financed through a tax on production. Barro [1990] 
shows that the government's optimal rate of taxation is also the one that maximises the 
growth rate. In a competitive equilibrium, consumers receive an interest rate rt for their 
savings and a wage Wf for their work. Each factor is paid its marginal product and firms 
make zero profits. Moreover consumers have to pay a rent Rt for each unit of land (and this 
rent can be re-injected through public land property). Consequently, the competitive 
equilibrium is efficient. Our concern in what follows is then to explore whether it is also 
possible to decentralise the provision of public infrastructure and to explore the 
implications of factor mobility.
111. DECENTRALISATION OF THE FIRST-BEST 
Some possible institutional regimes
We suppose now that the development of islands is undertaken by competing developers. 
The competitive process is the following. On any undeveloped island, a developer can 
create a jurisdiction where she vsdll provide the public good. Consumers then make their 
location and saving decisions with both labour and capital being perfectly mobile.
Within this broad framework, decentralisation can be established through various 
institutional regimes. The first alternative we consider is one in which the developer has 
complete control over everything in her jurisdiction {Regime 1). All possible fiscal and 
financial instruments are available and can be implemented. In this case, therefore, the
The efficiency of this tax rests on three strong assumptions, which are i/ observability of private 
production, ii/ no distortion of labour supply and iii/ immobility of factors. Financing infrastructure through 
the land market avoids these shortcomings.
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decentralisation of production is not complete due to the possible intervention of 
developers in the production process. Regime 1 can be viewed as a benchmark case, but it 
may also be applicable to the US where land developers can have extensive powers (see 
Henderson and Slade [1993]). It also strongly reminds us of traditional factory-tovms.
We also consider a second regime where the jurisdiction can either can implement a 
residential tax or set the price of land as a local monopoly {Regime 2). This is the case in 
countries with a decentralised system of government like Switzerland. With this regime, 
jurisdictions can also issue debts. Decentralisation takes place in this framework at two 
levels since, on the one hand, the provision of public goods is left to private developers 
and, on the other hand, production is realised within the jurisdictions by independent 
private producers.
Finally, and this may be more relevant to describe the countries with a centralised system 
of government (where local public goods remain locally provided), we consider an 
environment in which the land developer cannot use any fiscal instrument and faces a 
competitive land market on the supply as well as on the demand-side {Regime 5). 
Consumers bid on an individually optimal quantity of land, taking its price as given. 
Although the developer cannot set land rent directly in her jurisdiction, she can manipulate 
it indirectly by public expenditure actions. Besides, since the Henry George Theorem is 
often valid Avith public consumer goods, the natural temptation is to restrict the 
jurisdictions to use only land rent to finance the productive public goods. If this 
arrangement enables us to attain first-best, then its practical implementation should be 
simpler than in the two previous cases since it would just require land prices to be 
observed.
Our aim is thus to see how we can replicate the first-best equilibrium within the least 
demanding framework. We may prefer a priori a situation for which the developer should 
not be allowed to intervene too much in the local economy with her role restricted to the 
provision of the public good. Our analysis starts ft"om the most demanding fi*amework, that 
is the one for which the developer can intervene extensively in the local economy (fixing 
land rent, wages, public spending, capital investments, borrowing on the capital
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markets...). Then we examine the effects of various restrictions. Before going into the 
detailed analysis of these institutions, it is useful to state the follovring lemma.
Lemma 2: Whatever the regime, any competitive equilibrium is such that the area
developed per consumer is equal to s = \ j  L .
Proof: An equilibrium must be such that no developer should have an incentive to
change her strategy and no consumer should have an incentive to move. For regimes 1 and 
2 , in case an individual should move, suppose that all the surplus created is distributed to 
the consumers within the jurisdiction and consumed immediately. If this raises the level of 
instantaneous utility, then the situation cannot be in equilibrium. It is a sufficient condition 
for an increase in total utility since it does not modify the state variable (a similar argument
could be made using increasing profits). If L<L*, then one can calculate that
A m /AL = a y / . Since o l> x  and Y> Lz  ^ then A m /A Z  > 0. For Regime 3,
a similar proof can be made by comparing the increase in wage with the rise in land rent. ■
Regime 1
In that case, we get the follovring proposition, which unsurprisingly states that if 
developers have enough degrees of freedom, the first-best can be reached.
Proposition 2 : The equilibrium under Regime 1 is first-best.
Proof: Developers maximise the sum of their discounted profits, but due to perfect
factor mobility this objective is equivalent to the maximisation of instantaneous utility at 
each point in time. Thus, each developer faces the problem:
M a x n ,= Y ,+ R ,- w ,L t- r ,K ,- r ,G ,^  
s.t. Uf > U.
The developer can maximise profits without any restriction on the instruments she uses. 
Her only constraint is to offer a level of utility as high as can be obtained in other islands.
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Given the concavity of the utility function, each developer will divide her land equally 
among her consumers. Wages and rents are redundant since labour supply is inelastic and 
land is equally divided. Without loss of generality we can therefore normalise R=0. Our 
program becomes:
Max = Yf - Wf Lf  -  rfKf -  
W,G,K,L
s.t. Ut =U
where \v is the wage distributed when land rent is normalised to zero. Before solving the 
developers' program, we must consider the consumers' program:
(CP.)
s.t. Wjf +r^Zf =Zf + Zf 
and 5 / >\ l  L* ,
where Z is individual wealth. Due to Lemma 2, the available lots all have the same size, 
constant over time. Consequently, it is possible to take the term in s in the utility function 
out of the integral. The first-order conditions for (CPI) are then:
=X,
Then, we find that 
r{c - 1) + p
Zf — Zf . ( 1 1 )
Returning to the developers' program (DPI) and using (11), the first-order conditions are:
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w +
ÔY ÔY .= r ,  w = -x \i
^ r ( a -  l) + p^
Z
ÔK dL 1^+^ ( 1 2 )
ÔY , 1
where p is the Lagrange multiplier of (DPI). Using Lemma 2 and the zero-profit 
condition, we obtain in the Solow case:
( i - a + p ) y = ( G  + ü:>,
G =
1 - a '
a - p  (13)
r  = (l-a)'"PpP .4A :P"“ £* .
Consumers then save until the steady-state is reached. This steady-state is such that r = p.
We find the long-run level of capital is K  as in equation (7). Consequently, our 
decentralisation scheme enables us to implement the first-best in the Solow case. As for 
the Barro-Romer case, the first-order and zero-profit conditions read:
Y=={G + K)r, 
n -
.  (14)
w = 0,
*a
r = ( l - a ) ‘ .
From this we can easily obtain that the growth rate is the same as in equation (8 ). Thus, it 
is also possible to decentralise our first-best solution if  we allow for endogenous growth. ■
Note that heavy intervention is required in our “factory-island” since the developer is 
responsible for both the wage policy and the spatial allocation of consumers. Moreover the 
Henry George Theorem becomes meaningless since the first-best solution can be obtained
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for any level of land rent. To get more intuition concerning the working of the model, we 
need to explore the two other regimes.
Regime 2
If the developer can intervene on the land market through a residential tax, we can now 
show that the first-best equilibrium can be decentralised without her direct intervention in 
the production process.
Proposition 3 : The equilibrium in Regime 2 is first-best. Developers set a (steady-
state) residential tax equal to:
- Tf = { \ - ( x  + l)(a -  p))w^ -  xpZf in the Solow case.
r(a  - 1) + p , „
-  Tf = W f  - X ----------------------Z f  in the Barro-Romer case.
G
Proof The consumers' program is:
" “ ‘' - f  (CP2)
S .t. W i  f  +  r f Z f  -  Z f  -  T i  f  =  R i ^ f S i  f  +  =  E ( w h ^
and Si t ^  •
E(wt^ is the expenditure of the consumer at date t and is the taxation in jurisdiction i.
The wage w is offered by independent competing producers. After simplifications, and 
given that the equilibrium is such that s is constant over time, the first-order conditions can 
be written:
z r -  p 
z a
Rs = xz, (15)
s = \!  L .
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Because of the mobility of the productive factors, the developers' program reduces to:
Max Uf = Rf + LfTf -r^Gf ,
G.T.L _  (DP2)
S.t.  Uf = U,
where T is the residential tax. Instead of solving this program, note that we can write:
Wf - T f  -  RfSf =Wf.  (16)
We can then re-write the developer's program:
Mca TTf =WfLf -  WfLf -  ,
C.w.L _  (17)
S.t.  Uf = U.
Moreover competing producers within each jurisdiction will induce:
w ,L ,= ^Y , and r,K , . (18)
Equations (17) and (18) are equivalent to (DPI) after using the first-order condition for K
(remember that equation ( 1 2 ) states that r^Kf = (l -  and is thus equivalent to (18)). 
Then, using the zero-profit condition and (15), we obtain (13) again. This means that the 
first-best can be obtained if we replace the developer’s direct intervention in production by 
a residential tax. This result is not very surprising. Due to capital mobility, the first-order 
condition with respect to K  is the same if the developer decentralises production. Direct 
wage setting is replaced by a residential tax. This tax can be characterised easily, in the 
Solow case, using (13), (15) and the steady-state condition for which Z = 0 . We get:
Tf = (l -  (x + l)(a -  p))wf -  xpZf . (19)
In the Barro-Romer situation, we have:
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- 1) + p
T t = w t - x - ^  (2 0 )
with r as in (14). ■
This residential tax may seem at first difficult to implement since it requires knowledge of 
all the parameters in the model (as in most public good provision problems). Note that our 
tax has two components, one related to wealth and the other to the wage, but since we are 
in a representative agent framework and at the steady-state, where all endogenous variables 
change proportionally, this tax could be calculated differently. Specifically, because of the 
symmetry across individuals, we just need the developer to be able to observe the land rent 
and to set a local income tax to maximise her total profit. Note also that the taxes in 
Proposition 3 can be interpreted partly as “congestion” taxes. The idea is that any marginal 
consumer in a jurisdiction lowers the average productivity of labour due to decreasing 
returns. On the contrary, the developer benefits from his arrival since he also generates a 
positive pecuniary externality for the returns to private and public capital and since his 
demand for land increases land rent. The rest of the intuition is left for the next sub-section 
(i.e., why this tax is not equal to zero).
Regime 3
Since the first-best requires a non-zero tax/subsidy, it is impossible to obtain efficiency 
under Regime 3. However analysis of Regime 3 is revealing because we can explore the 
inefficiencies resulting from a more constrained regime. This also strengthens the intuition 
concerning our previous results.
Proposition 4 Regime 3 leads to under-investment in public and private capital.
The equilibrium is such that jurisdictions may run positive profits. Profit increases with 
the preference for land when x is small.
See proof in Appendix 2. ■
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Consumers want to live where they receive the highest wages. Since land is scarce, 
competition for land creates a land rent that enables the financing of the local public goods. 
In the traditional case of public consumer goods, there is a direct relation between public 
expenditures and the utility of consumers. In the case of productive public goods, the 
relation is not as direct: more public expenditures induce higher production and only a 
share of the marginal production is received by workers (i.e., a fraction a ) .  And the 
marginal increase of wages generated by the marginal public investment is used only 
partially for housing expenditures (the share of housing is x/(x + l) in the total 
expenditures). So the marginal value of public investment is capitalised only through the 
share of wages in the production multiplied by the share of housing in consumer 
expenditures.
Alternatively, note that in the case of public consumer goods, efficiency is defined by the 
equalisation of marginal rates of substitution. Here, on the contrary, efficiency is defined 
by the equalisation of marginal rates of return. The problem is that the developer's 
marginal revenue for public investment is given by the marginal increase of land rent, 
which is driven by a preference parameter. Thus, we introduce a preference parameter in a 
“technological relation”.
On the other hand, land rent in a given jurisdiction partly capitalises public investments 
made in all other jurisdictions. This happens because the demand for land (and thus land 
rent) depends not only on current income, but also on total wealth. So higher public 
investments in jurisdiction j  imply a higher interest rate for private capital in the economy, 
and thus a higher wealth for consumers in jurisdiction i. So land rent in jurisdiction i 
increases after investments in public goods are made in j  (as well as in any other 
jurisdictions). If this effect is sufficiently strong, land developers make positive profits. 
(No zero profit condition can be at work here since there is no instrument available for the 
developer to redistribute the rent.)
Land as factor o f  production
Until now we have assumed that land was only used for housing purposes. It may be worth
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looking at what happens when land is (only) a factor of production. More specifically, 
suppose that now utility is:
(
t / = r  — -^------e~^*dt with a > l ,  (2 1 )
•0 1 — a
but he individual production function is:
s ] l f  with y > p  and a > 0 . (2 2 )
So in each jurisdiction:
Yi,t = L l .  (23)
Since y > P , the first-best is such that all land is developed since the marginal productivity 
of land is superior to the marginal productivity of the local public good (and the optimal 
population per island is N j S ^ Û * ) ,  It can be shown easily that the first-best level of 
public good is:
G =
P ;
l/(a+Y-p)
with r = p . (24)
But this level of accumulated public capital cannot be reached using only land rent. Indeed, 
at the market equilibrium, each factor is paid at its marginal productivity. Thus, total 
differential land rent equals:
We can also show in the long-run that free-entry drives profits to zero (all the land rent is 
devoted to the financing of the public good) and that the population in each island is
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L -  L . Then in the steady-state:
R = pG o  G = y
-p
V
(26)
=>/f = |^G  (27)
Consequently, straightforward land capitalisation does not induce first-best and again the 
Henry George Theorem does not hold. Another instrument is therefore necessary to 
decentralise the first-best. The reason is that at the market equilibrium all factors are paid 
at their marginal productivity when we assume homogeneity of degree one for private 
factors. Then there is no reason for the marginal productivity of land to be equal to the 
marginal productivity of the public good. In other words, the land rent, which is equal to 
the share of land in the production function, does not provide in general an optimal level of 
infrastructure since it is not equal to the share of public capital.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE PROVISION OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS
We have shown in this chapter that considering the productive aspects of local public 
goods seriously complicates the decentralisation of the provision of infrastructures. The 
first-best can be decentralised, but the local authority must be able to intervene at least 
through a residential tax (indexed on wealth and the wage). With heterogeneous agents, the 
required residential tax could be even more difficult to implement; other instruments may 
be necessary, and the second-best taxation should be indexed on variables that are clearly 
difficult to observe at the local level (e.g., wealth in the upper-tail of the distribution).
Without any tax, direct internalisation of the land rent is not efficient. Marginal local 
public investments are capitalised in local land values only through the share of housing 
multiplied by the share of wages in local production. Conversely, land values within one 
jurisdiction also capitalise public investments made in all the economy because of the
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mobility of capital (higher interest rates induce a higher demand for land).
However, despite our apparently rather negative results, Tiebout and George's ideas may 
deserve more attention than they are presently given. Our interpretation of existing land 
capitalisation schemes is that they constitute useful additional instruments (capitalisation 
occurs up to the share of wage multiplied by that of housing). For instance the Hongkong 
underground network was partly financed through a land capitalisation scheme (see 
Midgley [1994] for more details). Before the construction of the network, the operator was 
able to buy large parcels surrounding the future stations. Now the operator receives a 
majority of its income through the fares, but the profit made on land operations 
(development of shopping areas, commercial real estate and residential buildings) is by no 
means negligible, at around 15% of the construction cost. As a consequence the Hongkong 
underground is the only profitable underground network in the world.
Respectively introduce competition at the local level and use information available on the land market,
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APPENDIX 1 PROOF OF LEMMA 1
After some straightforward manipulations (i.e., broadly similar to the ones performed 
through equations (2 ) to (6 )), the optimal consumption path for a fixed amount of 
developed land is:
z = Y -  g[K+ G) with g  =
CT
(Al)
where g  is the growth rate of the economy. Then we can write:
z = (1 - a ) '  “ - p f l - a  + P
1 - a
K (A2)
This leads to:
P _q-G (l a) ^ ^ P ^ A - a  + p^   ^ p (  1 - g  + P
1 - a /  CT V 1 - a  /  ^ 1 - a
(A3)
After simplifications, one can check that for any z >0:
J < 0
ds
(A4)
So for a given accumulation path (i.e., some existing G, K  and savings at each date), from 
X < p , a typical consumer can always increase his instantaneous utility by consuming less
space until the constraint 5  > l / z  is binding. Suppose now that there exists an asymmetric 
equilibrium (with some jurisdictions that are less populated). Then, at the equal-treatment 
first-best, we require instantaneous utility to be the same for everybody. By assumption, we 
also need production to take place in the jurisdiction where one lives. Whatever c, the 
share of production consumed, we find that instantaneous utility is equal to
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l l - a V
(A5)
Then, whatever c, K  and G, we find that the per capita consumption of land that 
maximises instantaneous utility is f  = l / z  in all the jurisdictions. The first-best is then 
symmetric and s = \ /  L . ■
APPENDIX 2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The consumers' program is:
Max U
z,s
= (CP3)
•U 1 — (7
S .t. W t  - \ - r f Z f  - Z t  =  R f S f  + Z f =  E { w t ) ,
and S t > \ j  L .
After simplifications, the first-order conditions can be expressed by: 
E{w)
R =
5(1 +  l / j c ) ’ 
r - p
(A6 )
Z = Z
As for the developers' program, we have:
Max % ^ - R f - r f i t  
G,L
s. t. Uf = U.
Using (A6 ), the first-order conditions of the developers are:
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(DP3)
=-X,(x + l),
dw L ÔW- r  = X (A7)
ÔG( l  + l/x) a G ' i * ( l  + l/x)
dw ,  x{x + 2 )
r = —— Z --------
àG {x + D2  *
(A8 )
Moreover, equalisation of the marginal rates of productivity between private and public 
investment implies:
(A9)
Wages offered by private firms are then:
w (AlO)
If we plug the derivative of (AlO) in (A8 ), we find after simplification:
r = apP(l -  a)‘-“ ^ gP-“
{ x ^ l f - (All)
Of course, as in the previous cases, the equilibrium is such that Z = Z (Lemma 2).
• P < a  (Solow case). The steady-state is reached when r = p.  The long-run level of 
accumulated capital is then:
K =
a . ( l - a ) > - P ^ p P r ^ f c ^  
{x + l f
(A12)
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Using equation (7) and after some manipulations, we can observe that K < K .  Note also 
that free-entry does not drive profits to zero because of the increasing returns (see Lemma 
2 again). The steady-state is such that all instantaneous income is spent. Consequently, the 
steady-state land rent is:
Then, the long-run level of profit is given by:
71 = A p
U - a J Vx +1
L - a p  . (A14)
Profits can be either positive or negative. This stems essentially from the passive role 
played by the developers (they just maximise over G). We do not really bother about 
negative profits and we can assume that they can be financed through lump-sum transfers. 
Note that profits increase with the preference for land.
• P = a  (Barro-Romer case). Using (All)  and the symmetric equilibrium condition 
L = L* ,WQ obtain a growth rate equal to:
ap^^(l-a)^ " A G ^ - ^ L  ^ -----^ - - p
i  = ( A . 5 )
Z CT
By a straightforward comparison with equation (6 ), we can see that, due to the terms in a  
and X,  the growth rate is below the optimal one. After simplification, the profit is expressed 
by:
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71 =
xK
JC +  1
a a x(x + 2) ^
(^ + 0 ^
a  (1 -  a ) ' - “  -  p
1 (x + l) 2
( l - a ) i *
(A16)
Then, for % = 0, we get tc|^^q = 0 and:
dn
dx x=0 4
a a
+
• '" “  ( l - a ) r a
> 0 , (A17)
which ends the proof.
75
CHAPTER 3
GROWTH AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION ON 
FACTOR MARKETS: INCREASING RETURNS AND
DISTRIBUTION
Abstract: Although seldom modelled outside the monopolistic competition framework, 
market incompleteness and imperfect competition are central to the new growth theories. 
We propose here a strategic model of imperfect competition with endogenous growth and 
endogenous market structure where we focus on labour market issues. For growth to be 
possible, we assume increasing returns at the firm level. Due to heterogeneity on the labour 
market, the market structure is not degenerate. Then, because of increasing returns, short- 
run efficiency is maximised under monopoly and free entry implies too many firms in the 
market. However, in the long-run competition can generate growth through a distribution 
effect, whereas a monopoly leads to a zero-growth steady-state. Thus there is a trade-off 
between static and dynamic efficiency. This trade-off implies the existence of a growth- 
maximising degree of competition in our economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What are the macro-economic effects of dynamic imperfect competition? This question is 
clearly at the heart of contemporary economic theory. Static micro-economic theory is 
overwhelmingly favourable to competition. A higher degree of competition is in general 
associated with higher welfare as can be found in any standard textbook. The typical policy 
recommendation is then to use government intervention to prevent market failures and to 
promote fair competition. However, when measured empirically, the static welfare gains of 
competition often appear very small (see Vickers [1995] for a complete survey on the 
question, including empirical references). Moreover, casual observation suggests that the 
relevance of the First Welfare Theorem is probably limited for practical matters given the 
pervasiveness of increasing returns and thus of imperfect competition. These two facts are 
consistent with the 'widespread opinion, outside the world of economists (!), that there can 
be “too much competition”.
Despite these weak empirical micro-validations, economic organisation, based on markets, 
mitigated by some amount of state intervention (without making precise here how and how 
much) seems to produce, in the long-run, far better outcomes than alternative forms of 
economic organisation. The superiority of market economies must then lie in its 
“dynamics”. Recently Nickell [1996], amongst others, has found a positive correlation 
between competition and productivity growth. This dynamic superiority is also stressed by 
many popular discussions of the issue. The present chapter seeks primarily to reconcile 
economic analysis with this popular view.
Our analysis is also motivated by the following theoretical problem. Typically, in 
endogenous growth models (Romer [1990]), the incentive to produce knowledge is given 
by the possibility to appropriate a monopoly rent (obtained by the patenting of new 
blueprints). For the economy to enjoy perpetual growth, knowledge must also have a public 
good aspect (which cannot be denied) for newcomers to be able to create new knowledge 
from the existing one. But the necessary assumptions for growth to be consistent in those 
models with some degree of competition are fairly restrictive since, in the R&D sector, new 
knowledge is added to the old without its producer being able to internalise it at all.
11
Although it is sensible from a macro perspective, this assumption of “zero dynamic 
internalisation” seems at odds with the situation in many sectors where only a small 
number of firms compete. These oligopolistic firms are in many cases likely to internalise, 
at least partly, the effects of their current R&D effort on their own knowledge and on the 
knowledge in their sector (see the survey of Tirole [1988, chap 13]). Typically in 
endogenous growth models, the production of new knowledge Ki by Firm i using L/ units
of labour for research follows Ki = yKLf and it is not able to internalise the effects of its 
R&D, Kf on the total stock of knowledge (Æ) since it is atomistic. If this assumption is 
relaxed, the production function of knowledge might be written Ki =y(i^/ + ,
where K_i is knowledge of competitors. Consequently, the production function then 
exhibits increasing returns to scale at the firm level. As a consequence of partial dynamic 
internalisation (however small), the economy would be completely monopolised, at least in 
the R&D sector. In other words, with partial internalisation of the usual extemality-like 
effects, competition is no longer sustainable in an endogenous growth model. ^
A possible solution to this problem may be that increasing returns exist only at the level of 
the technology for a given product (that is we reintroduce some rivalry concerning the use 
of the accumulative factor). If consumers favour diversity, and if  this taste for diversity is 
sufficiently strong, competition may again be possible despite increasing returns at the firm 
(technology) level (see Parente [1994]). We consider in our analysis another possibility 
where the labour force is heterogeneous (i.e., the mirror image of product differentiation in 
a factor market). Assuming differentiated skills as well as differentiated technologies, firms 
will find it attractive to hire workers whose skills are “close” to the technology they use, 
whereas the marginal product of some other “remote” workers can be very low. Despite 
increasing returns at the firm level, this leaves some room for competition. With this 
approach, heterogeneity of the labour force provides a natural “brake” to increasing returns 
so that our model can allow for growth in a fully-fledged imperfectly competitive 
framework. The justification of our focus on labour is that the labour market is widely
 ^ The same type of problem arises in other types of growth models. In “Schumpeterian growth” models 
(Aghion and Howitt [1992] and [1994] or Grossman and Helpman [1991, chap, 5]), the same assumption of 
perfect diffusion of knowledge is necessary. Outside those two strands of literature, there are also some 
perfectly competitive models of growth (Romer [1986] or Lucas [1988]). These theories also require a very 
specific market imperfection for growth to occur and to be consistent with competition.
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acknowledged to present major market imperfections. Moreover, labour is also a crucial 
part of the growth process, whereas existing models tend to focus on the product markets.
More specifically, we assume two factors of production: labour; and capital, which can be 
accumulated. Workers, endowed with labour during their youth, save part of their first 
period income. What is considered as an external effect with a large number of firms can 
be internalised partly because of the small number of competitors. As a consequence, for 
growth to be possible the production function must be homogenous of degree one in capital 
at the firm level. Labour is sufficiently differentiated that no firm has an incentive to hire 
all the labour force when the market is sufficiently large, despite there being increasing 
returns at the firm level. The market structure is endogenous. Depending on the size of the 
market, the equilibrium number of firms can vary between zero and infinity. In short, 
labour market heterogeneity is the feature we use to make imperfect competition and 
growth consistent with each other.
Starting from these micro foundations and making suitable assumptions about strategic 
behaviour, we explore the dynamic macroeconomic implications. Due to increasing returns 
at the firm level, the First Welfare Theorem is likely not to hold. In our model, free-entry 
implies too much competition and static efficiency is maximised under monopsony. In fact, 
to generate growth, increasing returns are needed and the economies of scale they generate 
are more important than the deadweight loss associated with the monopsony. However this 
monopsony is dynamically inefficient because it implies a low rate of investment. On the 
contrary, competition yields a distribution of income more favourable to growth when it 
increases the income of people with a high propensity to invest. There is thus a trade-off 
between static and dynamic efficiency. This trade-off implies the existence of a growth- 
maximising degree of competition. As a side result, we also show how labour market 
institutions can affect the growth rate.
These results can be contrasted with the (small) literature dealing explicitly with 
competition and growth. In relation to our topic, Smulders and Van de Kuldert [1995] have 
proposed a model of R&D and growth with imperfect competition, focusing on spillovers 
but they assume that firms do not behave strategically. Aghion, Harris and Vickers [1995]
79
also focus on R&D and propose a Schumpeterian model of growth where the usual 
assumption of leapfrogging (or creative destruction) is relaxed in a duopoly setting. They 
show that when competitors are close to each other, more R&D is performed. From a 
different perspective Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [1995] look at the connection between 
competition, growth and the internal organisation of the firm. They obtain positive dynamic 
effects of competition that they relate to the incentives given by the market. Those two 
papers, however, do not derive the market structure endogenously. By contrast, our market 
structure is endogenous and we consider strategic behaviour explicitly. More 
fundamentally, we take the view that the distribution of income is important and that 
competition yields positive dynamic effects when it induces a distribution of income that 
promotes investment and reduces unproductive rents.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section II describes the features of the 
model, while Section III solves the equilibrium under different market structures. Section 
IV discusses briefly other possible specifications. Finally, Section V contains some 
concluding remarks.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE OLG MODEL 
Population and preferences
We consider here a model of overlapping generations of worker/consumers (referred to 
hereafter just as consumers). They live for two periods, leave no bequest and are endowed 
with one unit of labour during their youth. There is a population of mass Nt for the 
generation bom in Our economy starts in period 0, when only youngsters with no 
endowment of the good are present. There is only one composite good in the economy and 
its price is normalised to one. This assumption allows us to abstract from all relative prices 
effects across sectors. This greatly simplifies the analysis and enables us to focus on labour 
market issues.^ We denote and C°, the consumption of respectively young and old
2 Time subscripts are ignored unless they are necessary.
 ^ Besides, this assumption can be justified by a second-best argument since, if all sectors are imperfectly 
competitive in the economy, the distortions created by an oligopoly within a particular sector are ambiguous.
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consumers and we assume the following utility function:
t/{c/’,C,‘’) = /n(c/') + 6./«(c,“i),with è> 0 .  (1)
Production and consumption
Labour is differentiated and each worker is located on a circle of radius x  and indexed by 
his address j  g[0,2ti] corresponding to his specialisation. The distribution of skills is 
uniform over [0,27o:] with density one. Then, we observe 2 t i x  = # .  At the end of their 
youth, people receive their first period income (as determined below). This income can be 
consumed or saved.
To produce the consumption good, two types of technologies are freely available. First, the 
traditional technology is simply
Yj = an + k ,  (2 )
where n is the quantity of labour and k the quantity of capital. Whatever its characteristics, 
each unit of labour yields a  units of the good, whereas each unit of capital yields one unit 
of the good. The traditional sector should be thought as a possible reserve sector where the 
wage is a  and the interest rate is unity. There is also a continuum of increasing returns to 
scale industrial technologies located on the same circle as workers and indexed by 
i g[0,27t] . This creates a matching problem in the labour market since the location of a 
given worker does not in general coincide with the location of the firm he is working for. A 
training cost must be incurred by any worker willing to work for a particular firm. Training 
is time consuming and thus reduces the supply of labour. This training cost increases in the 
distance between the worker’s characteristics and the firm’s specialisation (it is a direct 
analogue of transport cost in spatial economics). The reduction in labour supply is equal to: 
c X distance. Then, expressed in terms of numéraire, the training cost for worker j  working 
with firm i is equal to fVf x c x  Minimi-j\,\i- y  + 27i|), whereby Wt is the wage. Without
loss of generality we suppose that firm 1 locates at / = 0. We also assume that a fraction t
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of this training cost is bom by the firm and that the rest is bom by the workers.^ The 
production function of firm i is assumed to be:
Yi=AKtL^,,  p S l .  (3)
where is the capital which fully depreciates in one period and Z, is the net labour it
uses.5 Note that endogenous growth models often assume linear retums for all “private” 
factors at the individual level and linear retums for the reproducible factor (in the “growth- 
creating” sector) at the aggregate level. The gap between the two usually takes the form of 
an unspecified extemality of the amount of capital on the individual production function 
(Romer [1986]) or is modelled as a complementarity between inputs to create new 
knowledge (Romer [1990]). Here, the production function is homogenous of degree 1+p at 
the firm level. However, due to the imperfect labour market (i.e., all types of labour are not 
perfect substitutes) and to the timing (described below), when the substitutability in the 
labour market is sufficiently low (i.e., training costs are sufficiently high), no firm will 
have an incentive to hire all the labour. Our assumption of increasing retums generates 
both imperfect competition and a potential for growth since the production function is 
homogenous of degree one in capital.^ However, our specification of the production 
function completely ignores spillovers and purposeful investment which are treated in the 
next chapter.
We can now solve the model for the saving decision. If WP is the net income of a 
consumer, his program is:
s.t. C j - S ,  and
 ^ We assume t< 1 . Otherwise, the existence of a pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium is not guaranteed due to a 
discontinuity in the best-response correspondence.
5 Note that our productive factors could be called respectively specific human capital and general human 
capital (e.g., managerial abilities) instead of labour and capital without changing the set-up.
 ^No explicit R&D process is considered as we consider that in a given sector productivity improvements may 
be endogenous to the sector (R&D, learning) as well as exogenous to the sector (diffusion from other sectors, 
adaptation, cheaper inputs). For the sake of simplicity we restrict ourselves to a one-sector model with a 
production function like (3). See Grossman and Helpman [1994] for an extended discussion on the 
differences and the similarities between growth models based on research and development and models using 
leaming-by-doing,
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We find that: C j = and S, = —  W".
‘ 1 + 6  ' 1 + 6  ' (5)
Timing o f the game
At each period, for each generation the same game is repeated. The timing is as follows:
Entry o f firms
Location decision 
and competition 
for labor
Distribution of income 
and consumption takes 
place
Allocation of 
capital
Production 
takes place
Period t Period t+1
Figure 1
At the beginning of each period, firms willing to operate on the market enter freely. As 
long as entry is profitable, new firms keep entering. Once expected marginal profits are 
zero, the number of firms remains stable. Then the savers allocate their capital among 
firms, assuming that firms cannot commit a given return and that the savings received by 
firms are not observable until the end of the period. Indeed, firms would always have an 
incentive to renege ex-post on the promised return to capital because there is insufficient 
income to pay all factors at their marginal productivities (increasing retums). Thus capital 
is treated as a residual claimant. Because of this impossibility of commitment, savers 
cannot be given more than residual profits. The assumption of independence is here to 
prevent any co-ordination of the savers.^ In a third stage, firms locate and competition for 
labour takes place. The youngsters make their working decision (i.e., either work with the 
traditional technology or become an industrial worker and choose a particular firm to work 
for).
Due to the mobility of capital, the market is contestable at each period so that firms can
 ^ However and as usual, a monopolist might be much more profitable than two firms. Savers have then an 
obvious incentive to co-ordinate. This important question of financial economics is resolved here by our 
observability assumption.
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maximise only current profits. The profit function is thus:
n,- = J K , - i f  -  W j L j  - x W j C i f  /4, (6)
where is the wage offered by the firm i and /, is the measure of the area over which
firm i hires workers. Profit is equal to the production minus the wages and the share of the 
training costs paid by the firm. Of course, due to the training cost, Lj < /y. The profit given 
by equation (6 ) is distributed to the stockholders of firm i. The return to capital in firm i is 
Q, = T iJ K i .
III. SOLUTION OF THE OLG MODEL 
The monopoly
Before trying to solve the whole game, we focus first on a very simple situation. The 
monopoly (or properly speaking, monopsony) will be used as a benchmark case. We 
suppose either that we are in a situation of natural monopoly or that only one firm was 
given the right to operate in the economy (i.e., the first stage of the game is ignored). This 
monopolist can be choose to develop more than one technology if she v^shes. We also 
assume in this subsection that the monopolist is unable to discriminate among workers with 
different skills and that she has all the bargaining power vis-à-vis the workers. This 
assumption is the analogue of mill-pricing in spatial economics (see Anderson et al. 
[1992]).
Proposition 1 There is a minimal market size under which no firm can operate.
Proof Since savers always have the alternative to use their savings with the
traditional technology, we need Q, > 1. From our assumptions, the relation between the
market area and the net labour supplied to a monopolist is:
A/ 2
I ,  = 2  J(1 -  cx)dx = /, -  c lf  /4. (7)
0
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We need I j o l  for the productivity of the marginal worker to be positive. The profit 
function becomes:
n , = AKi[ li - c l f / À f  - c l f l 4 ) - x W , c l f l 4 .  (8)
From equation (8 ), we can infer easily the existence of a minimal size of the labour market. 
If # <  y  A , then 7/ <\ /A  and Yj < Kj so that Q, < 1 and no industrial firm can be set-up.
Similarly, if the training cost c is very high, whatever the market size, very few workers 
can be hired for any technology, so that no firm can profitably operate. ■
For simplicity, we will suppose below that p=l. The essence of the results remains the 
same when p < 1. The next claim states that:
Proposition 2 There exists a finite profit maximising market area for the technology used 
by the monopolist.
Proof Note first that the marginal worker is such that he is indifferent between
working for the monopolist or working with the traditional technology. Thus:
Using this last equality, the monopolist maximises her profit with respect to Wt. However, 
it is technically equivalent to optimising over 7y. Then the monopolist sets her employment 
area I*{K) such that 511,/ 5 7* = 0 . In order for the solution to be a maximum, we need
2/((l -  t ) c )  > I* , which is satisfied since her marginal worker has a positive productivity.
Consequently, the profit maximising employment area I*{K) must satisfy:
*    *  r  -r* \
= 0, (10)
85
* a  dW  a ( l - x ) c
where: W = 7 --------------- - p r  and — p  = —------------- ------ -p.
( i - c ( I - t ) / / 2 )  dl 2 ( i - c ( 1 - t ) / 72)
Since the Ihs of (10) is monotonie in I, whatever K  and c>0, I*{K) is unique and finite. ■ 
Moreover we can write:
Proposition 3 The monopolist introduces only one technology and maximises short-run (or 
static) productive ejficiency.
Proof Assume the monopolist introduces n technologies. Her profit is:
n „ = t { A ^ L i  - W L j- ic W l f  Ia \. ( 1 1 )
Obviously, 111 > n „ ,  V «>1. Moreover, with n technologies, production is equal to 
= n(ALi K jn) . If only one technology is used with the same population, production is 
equal to = AKl^ + a n f  which implies immediately Yi>Y„, V «>1. The monopoly 
consequently maximises production. ■
Proposition 4 The monopoly leads to a steady-state with no growth.
Proof in Appendix 1. If we define g ; as the asymptotic growth rate reached with the 
monopoly, our proposition means that g ; = 0 . ■
Remark 1 Proposition 3 states that the monopoly is efficient in the short run (or 
statically). This result can be understood easily. Since firms face increasing retums, then it 
is no surprise that the First Welfare Theorem does not hold. In our case, the increasing 
retums are so strong (and they need to be so for the model to be able to generate growth) 
that static efficiency is achieved by using only one technology. Of course, using less 
extreme assumptions would give us results less favourable to monopoly, but it would not
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re-establish the First Welfare Theorem.*
Remark 2 Proposition 4 shows that a monopoly induces strong dynamic inefficiencies. 
The production fimction is such that endogenous sustained growth is possible, but due to 
the market power of the monopolist, no growth occurs. The intuition is as follows. The 
monopolistic behaviour implies that the young are given their reservation wage. Capital 
accumulation is then limited by the low wages. Of course, if capital becomes abundant for 
some reason, the monopoly has an incentive to hire more labour. If more labour is hired, 
higher wages must be given (since discrimination is impossible in the labour market, the 
intra-marginal worker receives a rent). However, the monopoly wage rises less than 
equiproportionately with capital (wages increase less than capital). A given increase of 
capital leads to a smaller increase of wages, which in turn induces an even smaller increase 
in the capital accumulated. So sustained growth is impossible in a monopoly with our 
dynamic structure.
Remarks What would the results be if we allowed for wage discrimination? They 
would be reinforced since discrimination enables the monopolist to pay lower wages to the 
intra-marginal workers. Thus, accumulated capital is bounded again and a lower steady- 
state is reached. Consequently giving rents to intra-marginal workers implies a higher (but 
non-increasing) level of production with a monopoly.
The duopoly
Instead of considering only one firm in the market, whatever the population size, we now 
allow for two firms to compete on the labour market.
Typical situations are:
* The partial instead of complete internalisation of increasing retums would just reinforce our argument in 
favour of the desirability of monopolies who are likely to internalise more than competitive firms.
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Employees of Firm 1 Employees of Firm 1
B
C
Employees of Firm 2
Craftsmen
Figure 2a 
(abundant labour, high c for instance)
B
Employees of Firm 2
Figure 2b 
(scarce labour, low c  for instance)
In figure 2a, Firm 1 uses the technology in A and her boundaries are B and F. Firm 2 has 
boundaries at C and E. The workers with a specialisation between B and C and F and E use 
the traditional technology. In this case, the two firms are local monopolists for all the 
workers they use. In figure 2b, on the contrary, the firms have connected employment areas 
and compete for some workers (at least those located in B and C). Due to our assumption 
concerning entry, two firms are present, whenever the duopoly is profitable. We assume in 
the rest of this subsection that the market size is such that only two firms are present.
Proposition 5 With a duopoly, the economy enjoys perpetual growth as long as firms 
cannot act as local monopolists for all their workers.
Proof To demonstrate this proposition and to characterise the situations for which
the duopoly occurs, we need to solve the game. The last stage is the labour market 
equilibrium. When competition is effective between the two firms, marginal workers in 
equilibrium are indifferent between firms i and j .  The indifference condition reads:
Wi
f
= Wf
2 j
1 -
c l j ( \ - x )
= >  7, =
( l-x )(
W j{^ c /y d -x )^  
1   _
V
.(12)
Thus the profit function can be written:
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H/ = AKi 1 - 2 ( 1 - t )
1 -
1 -
Wi
1 -
W i
cl
1 -
c/ ; ( 1 - t ) /
- W j - W j
) j
1 -
c l j i l - x )
( 1 3 )
Using, /, + /y = 270:, the firm i then sets such that 5 1 1 , =  0 . This condition is
necessary and sufficient for maximisation. Appendix 2 shows that the second-order 
condition is well-behaved. This solves the Nash equilibrium for the wage competition. On 
a circle, the location stage is trivial: firms locate at each other's opposite. Because of 
independent allocation by savers, capital is allocated equally among firms 
( Kj = K j = K jl  ). At the symmetric equilibrium we find that:
W = A I ^ \ -
CTZX
1 -
cnx ( 1 - T )
1 + 1 -
cnx ( 1 - T )
(14)
Thus the economy enjoys a growth rate g2 '.
imx
1 - c7u:(1-t)Y, C7tx(l-x)1 -
82 = 1 + 6
1 + 1 -
( 1 - T )
- 1.
( 1 5 )
Then we must check that profits are positive in order to solve step 1. We can plug the 
equilibrium wage (14) into the profit function. After simplification, we obtain the 
following existence condition for the duopoly:
A t i x 1 +
cnx(\-'z)  (c7o:)^(1 - t ) ( 1  + 3 t )
8
] 1 ( f
> ^ 1 +
J 2 I
1 -
C K X ( 1 - T )
(16)
If T is close to one, we obtain a much simpler expression:
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A t i x  >  I  ( 1 6 ' )
The equilibrium wage given by (14) will be observed as long as it is larger than the 
minimum wage of the local monopolist. In other words, we need the net wage given by 
(14) to be superior to the wage offered by a monopolist:
Otherwise each firm acts as a local monopolist for all her workers and we are trivially 
driven back to the monopoly case where no growth occurs. ■
Remark 1 Contrary to what happened in the previous sub-section, when there is some 
competition on the labour market, growth is made possible. This result seems at odds with 
“casual extrapolation” of standard endogenous growth models. In standard models (e.g., 
Romer [1986] or [1990]), competition is efficient in the short-run, but induces a sub- 
optimal rate of growth in the long-run. One might think that introducing imperfect 
competition with strategic behaviour would reduce static efficiency but increase dynamic 
efficiency, since imperfectly competitive firms have some market power that enables them 
to internalise the dynamic effects of their investments. This reasoning is flawed for two 
reasons. First, to generate imperfect competition and for imperfectly competitive firms to 
be able to generate growth, increasing retums are needed. In that case, the First Welfare 
Theorem does not hold anymore and less competition can actually increase static 
efficiency. Second, income distribution plays an important role in the growth process (see 
Phelps [1961], Bertola [1993, 1996] or Uhlig and Yanagawa [1996]). In our model, more 
competition means a distribution of income that favours people who invest in the 
accumulative factor (a similar effect is present in Bean and Pissarides [1993], but there, it 
stems from a higher bargaining power of the workers). What is new here is that the income 
distribution is not given directly by the parameters of the production function, but by the 
competitive process. So, through a distribution effect, more competition increases the 
dynamic efficiency of the economy (see below for discussions of the welfare and of 
alternative dynamic stmctures).
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Remark 2 If the initial level of capital is too small with respect to the productivity of 
the alternative technology, growth can never occur, although it is feasible. It may also 
happen that the productivity of the industrial technology A is sufficiently high to be able to 
generate growth, but too low for the profits to be positive. Conversely, it is possible that 
with a high initial level of capital, competition is possible but implies negative growth. 
Then the economy retums to a monopoly situation.
A large number o f  firms
We now allow for a large number of firms to compete on a large labour market (high x) and 
derive some conclusions concerning the asymptotic growth rate when the market becomes 
very large.
Proposition 6 The growth rate is increasing with t, decreasing with c, and converges 
towards goo as defined in equation (20). The asymptotic rate goo does not maximise growth.
Proof To demonstrate this, note first that the equilibrium wage is determined as
previously. We observe then:
- (18)
where k^  is the capital in each firm ~ ^ t )  f  is the employment of each firm.
Moreover free entry drives profits to their minimum. Consequently 11/^ = kf t . After 
simplification, we get:
IT, = * , ( ^ 7 , ( 1 - c/ , / 2 ) - i ) / [ / , ( 1 - c( 1 - t ) / , / 4 ) ] .  ( 1 9 )
The system composed of equations (18) and (19) solves for both the equilibrium wage and 
the equilibrium size of each firm. Note that this system is equivalent to (14) and (16) with 
equality. No simple closed-form solution can be obtained for the size of the firms.
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However we can write the implicit growth rate of the economy and perform some 
comparative statics on the growth rate. After manipulation, we get:
2b A l f{ \ - c l f ) { \ - c { ) . - x ) l t )
+ C l + ( l - c ( l - x ) / , f  "■ (20)
The comparative static results are obtained directly by using (18), (19) and (20). The last 
part of the proposition is straightforward. Note that is also the growth rate obtained with 
the smallest market size for which a duopoly is present and profitable (the strategic 
behaviours are the same and the conditions (14) and (18) are equivalent). ■
Remark 1 Now suppose that the labour market is expanding steadily {N is increasing). 
We can look at the timing of entry for new firms and how the growth rate evolves. If we 
summarise what has been seen up to now, for a very small economy, only the traditional 
activity is performed. A monopolist enters for a size Ij of the labour market. It is such that 
expression (8) is set to zero with a wage determined according to (9). This monopoly 
induces bounded capital accumulation. Still, the duopoly cannot exist due to tight 
competition to attract workers. Competition decreases when the labour market becomes 
larger so that a duopoly can be sustainable. The second firm enters for a size 2 / 2  such that 
n ,  = Ki /2  with a wage determined according to (14). In the duopoly, an increase of the 
market size N  has ambiguous effects on the growth rate g. The first effect is that a larger 
economy has a bigger labour force, so that productive efficiency is higher. On the contrary, 
competition is relaxed and it leads to a lower distributive efficiency.^ Using equation (15), 
it can be seen that the growth rate within a duopoly increases and then decreases when the 
market grows larger (if we ignore further entry). For even larger labour markets, two firms, 
each acting as a local monopolist for all their labour force, may be present. In that case, we 
are back to the monopoly regime with bounded capital accumulation. With free-entry, due 
to the equivalence between (14) and (18), the competitor enters for an economy whose 
size is nl2 . The long-run growth rate may vary as follows:
 ^For instance if we set the share of the training cost bom by the firm x arbitrarily close to 1, the growth rate 
of a duopoly is maximised for tlx = l/c and two firms are present for this size of the economy if l u o l jA  
(see equation (16’)).
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gmax
N o  firm M onopoly D uopoly Perfect com petition
Figure 4
There is then a growth-maximising intensity o f competition. Assume a large market, which 
is initially such that all firms make normal profit. If competition is exogenously relaxed, 
then the share of production distributed to the young and subsequently invested decreases, 
but static efficiency (i.e., total production) increases. Overall, investment increases. 
However, if we relax competition too much, each firm will become a local monopolist for 
all her labour force and long-run growth will not take place.
Remark! Unsurprisingly, the higher the training cost, the lower is the growth rate.
More interestingly, as in Thisse and Zénou [1996], the higher the share of the training cost 
bom by the firm, the higher is the growth rate. The intuition for the result is the following. 
The marginal worker is exerting a pecuniary extemality on the wage paid by the firm. If the 
firm pays a higher share of the training cost, it diminishes the rent paid to the intra­
marginal workers. This rent has two different effects. The first effect is intertemporal: 
lower wages induce lower savings, and therefore a lower rent has an adverse effect on 
growth. The second effect is an efficiency effect, the lower the rent, the higher the incentive 
to hire new workers and to raise productive efficiency. In a competitive environment, only 
the second effect matters (efficiency is increased), since the no-extra-profit condition 
annihilates the first effect. Then, net wages as well as savings are higher and capital as well 
as production increase faster.
Remark 3 Despite the specificity of the model, we do believe that this tradeoff (which
is opposite to the traditional Schumpeterian tradeoff) has some relevance. Clearly, in a real 
multi-sector economy, the monopoly can lose some of its short-term appeal because of the
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usual deadweight loss involved by relative price effects, although this effect is far from 
being certain if all sectors are imperfectly competitive. It is likely however that free entry 
will remain inefficient as is usual in differentiation models (see Anderson et al. [1992]). 
The terms of our tradeoff may be altered but, keeping the same dynamic structure, 
competition is still likely to be desirable because of its dynamic effects and not because of 
its short-run efficiency. Given that growth is generated without specifying any 
sophisticated behaviour from either producers or consumers, an extreme interpretation of 
the results obtained here is that growth is a by-product o f  competition in an n^^-best world.
Remark 4 The welfare analysis is ambiguous but straightforward. Clearly, a higher 
growth rate is harmful for the current old generation since it is achieved vvith a reduction of 
the current retums to capital. However if this higher growth rate is obtained by keeping the 
same market stmcture, it is beneficial for the all future generations since it increases their 
income and their welfare unambiguously. If the market structure is modified (e.g., more 
firms), the higher growth rate will also mean a lower production for the current period and 
a different stmcture of wages. Thus, this may hurt the current young generation as a whole 
as well as its immediate successors (but after some time all the generations will benefit 
from this). Because of this conflict between generations, the Pareto criterion is not 
satisfied. When using a utilitarian criterion, as usual the optimal growth rate vvdll be 
inversely related to the rate of time preference used by the central planner.
Competition between discriminating firms
We suppose now that firms are now able to discriminate among workers depending on 
their specialisation.
Proposition 7 The growth rate is higher when firms can discriminate.
See Appendix 3 for a proof. ■
From the previous results, we can draw the following picture describing the relationship 
between the asymptotic growth rate and the market stmcture:
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ERRATA
1/ Erratum to page 95. The following paragraph replaces the first paragraph page 95.
Remark 1 This proposition is a bit counter-intuitive since it states that increasing the 
power of firms over workers induces a higher growth rate, whereas we saw that the growth rate 
depends on the level of wages. The explanation is that, with discriminatory wages, the total 
wage bill increases due to an increase in efficiency of the firms. With discriminatory wages, all 
intra-marginal workers are paid below their marginal productivity and only the marginal 
worker is paid at his marginal productivity. So the firm expands her market area until her 
marginal worker is paid at his marginal productivity. By contrast, with non-discriminatory 
wages, the firm hires workers until the productivity of the marginal worker is equal to the 
marginal increase of the total wage bill (remember that with non-discriminatory wages, intra­
marginal workers exert a negative pecuniary extemality and benefit from the wage given to the 
marginal worker). So competing firms are bigger with discriminatory wages. Thus, in a 
competitive environment, discriminatory pricing induces higher productive efficiency (unlike 
in the monopoly case). It is therefore preferable from an efficiency perspective.
Non discriminating 
firms with increasing x
Discriminating
firms
Figure 5
Remark 1 This proposition is a bit counter-intuitive since it says that increasing the
power of firms over workers induces a higher growth rate, whereas we saw that the growth 
rate depends on the level of wages. The explanation is that, with discriminatory wages, we 
avoid the negative pecuniary extemality of intra-marginal workers. All intra-marginal 
workers are paid below their marginal productivity (and the difference finances the fixed 
cost) and only the marginal worker is paid at his marginal productivity. So the firm 
expands her market area until her marginal worker is paid at his marginal productivity. On 
the contrary, with non-discriminatory wages, the firm hires workers until the productivity 
of the marginal worker is equal to the marginal increase of wages for all her workers. Thus, 
in a competitive environment, unlike in the monopoly case, discriminatory pricing induces 
higher productive efficiency. It is therefore preferable from an efficiency perspective.
Remark 2 However, if an economy switches from non-discriminatory to discriminatory
wages, inequality may rise considerably with the rise in efficiency. Nonetheless it is 
possible to argue that some lump-sum transfers can restore a more egalitarian situation, but 
it would be hard for a social planner to compensate the losers, since the “proximity of the 
skills to a technology” is hard to measure.
Remark 3 Now, one can think of industrialisation as a switch fi*om the traditional to
the industrial technology resulting from a larger market or a smaller training cost. The idea 
of a larger market can be justified historically by a fall in transport costs. Better 
transportation may favour mobility in the labour market, the transport of physical goods as 
well as a better circulation of information. Smaller training costs can result from a change
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in the technological environment with the possibility of mass production that reduces the 
role of specific skills. In any case, with our model, industrialisation begins with the 
formation of a monopoly. This monopoly induces a higher level of production and a 
slightly higher level of wages without turning all this into sustained growth. This monopoly 
also implies a rise in inter- and intra-generation inequalities. If the rise in market size or the 
fail in training costs continues, competition endogenously arises and promotes sustained 
growth, much higher wages and possibly a reduction in inequalities.*^ Thus, a steady 
increase in the market size generates a Kuznets curve pattern with first rising inequalities 
associated with the beginning of industrialisation and then decreasing inequalities 
generated by competition (see the discussion of these well-known stylised facts in 
Williamson [1991]). In short, competition acts as a trickle-down mechanism.
IV. OTHER SPECIFICATIONS
Our aim in this section is to show that the specification of utility may affect dramatically 
the dynamic properties of the model. Although the case explored above offers useful 
insights, it should be seen primarily as a theoretical benchmark. Keeping the same initial 
model, we now assume that the consumers are infinitely rather than just finitely lived, 
leaving all static features unchanged (they supply one unit of labour in every period and can 
accumulate capital over time). We also assume that firms are managed by successive 
generations of managers or that the rate of time preference is high enough so that, despite 
the infinite horizon, competition between firms is effective (i.e., no folk theorem applies).
We now get the result:
Proposition 8 The growth rate is maximised with a discriminatory monopoly.
Proof The new consumer’s program is:
*(* Mokyr [1990] puts the emphasis on this argument.
** “After 1750, Anglo-Saxon economies tended to be more competitive than others, cartels and formal 
barriers to entry were far more common on the continent”. Mokyr [1990].
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u  = Y , - r — b '  (21)
r= 0 ^" '^
S. t. K . f^ \  — • K.f +  Wf — C f .
The solution of this program is such that = Q + i/Q  = (06)^/^. From this last
equation, the rest of the proof is straightforward. The growth rate is positively related to the 
return of capital. Since, it in turn is equal to the rate of profit, the monopoly is more 
efficient than competition in the long-run as well as in the short-run. ■
The previous results are thus reversed. The reason is fairly simple. In this extreme case of 
infinitely-lived agents, savings do not depend on wages, but on capital income; that is the 
distributive effect disappears. Furthermore, we supposed that collusion among competing 
firms was impossible. If firms could collude, the degree of collusion could positively 
influence the growth rate.
Note that the assumption used here is another possible working assumption which can help 
us understand the previous results. In fact the extreme OLG structure of the benchmark 
case and the infinitely-lived agent with exponential discounting can be understood as two 
limit cases of a more general model (see Bertola [1 9 9 6 ]).^  ^ xhe growth literature has 
mainly focused on the infinitely-lived agent case. However, this assumption does not seem 
to receive wide empirical support and has been questioned directly by Wilhelm [1996] or 
indirectly by Uhlig and Yanagawa [1996]. The distribution effects of our OLG structure 
could also be derived from an imperfect capital markets argument.
V. CONCLUSION
In this chapter we proposed an analytical framework that combines imperfect competition 
and growth. We used a standard industrial organisation set-up with increasing retums.
In a more general model where agents live longer and receive income for reproducible as well as non- 
reproducible factors during all their life, Bertola [1996] shows that qualitatively the dynamic structure 
remains the same as in our benchmark case provided the intertemporal elasticity o f substitution is sufficiently 
low.
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Increasing returns generate both growth and imperfect competition. They also imply that 
the First Welfare Theorem no longer holds. In our model, we reached the result that in the 
short-run (i.e., statically), the monopoly maximises productive efficiency. In the long-run, 
the implications are different. The market structure has an impact on income distribution. 
In turn, income distribution is crucial since it determines investment. In our model, 
increased competition on the labour market increases the income received by young agents 
endowed only with non-renewable specialised labour and decreases rent-seeking. With a 
higher first period income, they invest more which will increase production in the next 
period. So in our model, increasing competition (e.g., through a larger market) decreases 
static efficiency (the volume of production) but increases dynamic efficiency (the share of 
production devoted to investment), so that there exists a growth-maximising degree of 
competition.
Then, the (not so original) macroeconomic implication consists in looking for the 
propensity to enhance growth. In practice, when growth stems from physical capital 
accumulation, the “growth enhancers” are the savers. This might imply wage moderation 
when the “capitalists” have a higher propensity to save than the workers. On the contrary, if 
growth is driven by human capital investment, a distribution favouring young people may 
be growth enhancing. Although we have to remain cautious in the interpretation, this 
argument is consistent with the explanations developed by Amsden and Singh [1994] and 
Eichengreen [1996] for the respective cases of growth in east Asia and Europe after World 
War II. These situations might have involved a high growth rate, because profits were high 
(due to weak competition), kept within the firms and invested.
Note also that, in our competitive process, the highly mobile and differentiated factor 
enjoys a high share of the income because of the competition for it. So if capital becomes 
more mobile and more differentiated for some reason (e.g., market integration, lower 
transport costs, higher compatibility between inputs), the competitive process is modified. 
This also alters factor distribution and thus the growth rate. For instance, it may be that 
after 1970 the developed economies shifted from a growth process generated by physical 
capital accumulation to a growth driven by human capital and knowledge a c c u m u l a t i o n .   ^3
And governed by some transitional dynamics after the massive destructions and the scientific discoveries 
ofW.W.II.
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At the same time, lower transport costs led to a higher mobility of physical capital and 
more competition and thus higher returns for physical capital at the expense of other 
factors. Thus, these changes in the income distribution, favouring physical capital reduced 
simultaneously the incentive to invest in human capital and knowledge. The net effect was 
to reduce the growth rate. Of course, more sophisticated models and empirical verifications 
are needed, but this preliminary conclusion is underlines the possible gains fi*om a further 
inquiry into the dynamics of market structure and income distribution.
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APPENDIX 1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The idea of the proof is to show that the amount of capital remains bounded with a 
monopoly. We know from (9) that we need I* < I jc  and that it implies W* < a /x .
• Then, for all x e (0 ,l), the sum of distributed wages remains bounded. Thus capital 
accumulated per capita remains bounded and consequently steady growth is impossible.
• If X = 0, then /* is such that:
A K - a
V (l-c/72).
(1 - C . / 7 2 ) - ac =  0. (Al)
This third degree equation has only one real solution which is:
_ 6 A K - a  
3AKc
a
+a^'j-3aAK^6(27A^K^ +a )^ %
\a{S4A^K^ +a^)-3oAK^6(27A^K^ +a )^
3AKc
(A2)
It is then immediate that if K  becomes large, a  becomes negligible with respect to K. Then 
we could approximate I* by:
/  , 2  { 2 - ^ f  _____________0^ _
C {Ai;) c 3 ( 2  -  .s/2 f^  (AK) c (A3)
Moreover, the capital accumulation equation states that
ab
+ b
(A4)
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=> ^t+\ \ + b
2 [2 -V 2 ] '/ '
c
2A^I^K}l^a
[ 2 - V 2 f ,
+
Then we find that lim Kf+i/K^ = 0 . Thus capital cannot grow unbounded.
K—^+00
APPENDIX 2 SECOND-ORDER CONDITION FOR THE PROFIT FUNCTION
dW,- dWi 4 (A6)
with
dL 2{W ,-W j)
{Wi +  n 'j)  c ( i - x )  {iv , +  W jy
(A7)
= >
eii 2Wj
( f V j  +  W j ^  Vc(l-t)
(A8)
Then we can write:
ô ^ n
d m
f  = (A K ,-fF ,)
d^L
TC
T
dW/
d^L dL
dW,
(A9)
The first and the second term of the rhs are obviously negative (otherwise the firm acts as a 
local monopolist and sets its wages as in the previous subsection). It remains to show that
cW; d^L dL (AlO)
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A straightforward injection of the derivatives (A.6) in the previous expression implies that 
(A. 10) is equivalent to:
2Wj
{Wi + W j)
\2
4WiWj
{fV, + W jy c(l-x)
4Wj (4+4)
c(l-x)
>0
(All)
O > 0. (A12)
This is always true if W i>W j. Then there is no incentive to propose a higher wage than 
the one given by the first-order conditions. A symmetric argument runs for firm j .  ■
APPENDIX 3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Bertrand competition implies that firms are ready to bid for workers up to their marginal 
productivity. It means that the maximum wage offered by firm i for a worker located at x 
is:
CX^
■ y J -
(A13)
This wage is only given to the marginal workers. All infra-marginal workers, working for 
firm i are given the wage proposed by the second highest bidder (i.e., the neighbouring 
competitor). It means that the equilibrium wage for a worker located in x  is:
1 - c
I , + I j
- X
J j
, with fVj(x) > B. (AM)
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So we can define x such that V% < x, fV{x) = B . That is, x is the maximum distance 
between the firm’s technology and a young worker’s specialisation. If the gap between the 
specialisations is below %, the firm acts with its workers as a local monopolist. We have:
X = 1 - B
V
(A15)
Free-entry induces a no-profit condition. Then:
cL /,/2n ,  = ^ ^ , 7 , 1 1 — ^ 1 - 2  \w,(x)dx = K,. (A16)
Depending on x, two cases must be distinguished:
X > 0. At the symmetric equilibrium = k ), profit are:
cL
U i = A k l h - - f \ - 2 \ B d x - 2 k i \ - c(/, - x p x  = k. (A17)
After simplifications: 2AkI - 2 B I - k — — ( A k - B f = 0  
Akc
(A18)
Then: I  = ^ \ - ^ - — 4 b ^ -2 A kB  + A^k^ - Ack^ 
c V A U  Akc
(A19)
For k very large, we can approximate (A. 19) by:
(A20)
We find then: (A21)
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So: x>Q < ^A < 2 c . We can now derive an asymptotic growth rate:
(A22)
This latter expression can be compared to (20) with x arbitrarily close to 1
A 1 , 1 2 (A23)
If 2c > ^  (i.e., X > 0 ), straightforward calculation shows that (A.23) is satisfied. It means 
that discriminatory wages enable a higher growth rate.
# % < 0 (i.e., there are no worker for which the firm can act as a local monopolist). From
(A.20), we know that % ^0 <=>2c< ^4. From (A. 16) and after simplification the profit
function becomes IT/ = A K jC lf. Consequently, the normal-profit condition implies
/  = ^ ll(A c ) . Thus, we can infer the asymptotic growth rate:
goo = {\+b)
- 1. (A24)
Then it is immediate to check that
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CHAPTER 4
CUMULATIVE INVESTMENT AND SPILLOVERS IN 
THE FORMATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL
LANDSCAPES
Abstract: In this chapter, the evolution of industries is modelled as a cumulative cost- 
reduction (or quality improvement) process subject to spillovers in a differentiated 
oligopoly. Our results suggest that the long-run outcome is dependent on spillovers. It is 
found that when they are weak, firms find their niche over time, differentiation remains 
important and cost-reduction keeps going. On the contrary, if spillovers are strong and if 
the diffusion function of spillovers is concave, firms tend to agglomerate towards the 
centre of the market and to use similar technologies. This standardisation process involves 
less and less investment and may induce instability in the industry. Standardisation leads to 
a fall in the growth rate of productivity. For spillovers of intermediate strength, complex 
technological landscapes may arise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The existing theories of technological change tend to offer a uni-dimensional view of the 
“technological landscape”. In a first branch of the literature, models of expanding varieties 
represent knowledge as a segment whose length increases over time (e.g., Romer [1990]). 
This segment has very specific properties since location does not matter because of the 
features of the Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] type of monopolistic competition. In the other 
stream of literature, models of quality improvements view the growth process as a vertical 
segment (a ladder) over which firms are moving upwards (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 
[1991] or Aghion and Howitt [1992]). It seems however that “technological landscapes” 
are much richer than this simplistic picture.
For instance, the existence of “technological clusters” has long been acknowledged. In this 
vein, Jaffe [1986] measured empirically technological proximity between firms. This 
enabled him to provide evidence and stylised facts concerning technological neighbours in 
the product space. For instance, an innovation made by a firm, say in the aeronautics 
industry, will spillover primarily to its direct competitors using the same type of 
technologies and then, maybe to a lesser extent, to technologically related industries like 
the car industry.
When dealing with the knowledge of this landscape over which technologies are located 
according to their attributes, it seems clear that some areas are still totally unexplored, 
whereas some others are well known. ^  Among these explored areas, some are “intensively 
cultivated”, whereas some others are deserted and considered as hostile. If we restrict our 
analysis in terms of costs, there are some hospitable (low costs) “valleys” and some (high 
costs) “mountains”. For instance, when dealing with transport technologies, steam-based or 
electric technologies can presently be likened to mountains whereas technologies with 
internal combustion engines are valleys where all car makers work. This technological 
landscape in the car industry has, however, undergone radical changes in the last century. 
Before that, the steam-based technologies constituted a valley. This chapter is concerned
 ^ The exploration of unknown territories is the main concern of models of expanding varieties. On the same 
issue, Jovanovic and Rob [1990] provide an interesting alternative approach.
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with the evolution and the emergence of relief on the technological landscape. It is a 
contribution to the understanding of the formation of some market and technological 
configurations and to the analysis of their implications. In our model, the market structure 
influences the technological landscape which in turn determines the market structure.
No doubt, the fundamentals of the “technological base” have the potential to explain the 
technological landscape just as geology is crucial to explaining physical landscapes (e.g., 
the potential for improvement in electric engines is nowadays acknowledged to be greater 
than that for steam engines). Some technologies can be naturally more subject to “cost 
erosion” (or quality improvement) than others. But, as in physical geography, and probably 
more strongly so, human action is determinant. Besides, there is no a priori reason why 
man’s activity should always take place in the technologically most favourable areas. In an 
influential paper, Arthur [1989] argues that when two products (1 and 2) are imperfect 
substitutes and “strong” leaming-by-doing is present, path-dependency is possible. If 
customers in the beginning keep buying Product 1, its producers will experience some 
leaming-by-doing for their technology. So the cost of Product 1 decreases, whereas the 
cost of Product 2 remains very high. Consequently, Product 1 will attract new consumers at 
the expense of Product 2 and the cost gap between products will widen. This cost 
advantage may become decisive so that Product 1 can dominate the market after some 
time. This may be sub-optimal since Product 2 might present a far better potential for 
further cost reductions. In the comparison between steam and internal combustion engine, 
Arthur [1989] pretends that steam technologies offered a lot of room for improvements 
that were never undertaken due to the head-start of internal combustion engines. From our 
perspective, Arthur [1989] proposes a theory where the landscape results passively from 
economic activity (like erosion for physical landscapes). It is subject to path-dependency 
(e.g., erosion due to human activity may not take place in the best land).
Our argument assumes away differences in the potential for improvement and passive 
leaming-by-doing to focus on purposeful investment. In a long-run dynamic framework, 
firms manufacture differentiated products over a simple Hotelling-type segment (the 
technological landscape). In the first period, we assume a flat landscape (the cost function 
is the same whatever variety is manufactured) that is common knowledge for all firms. On
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the one hand, the market share effect pushes firms towards the centre. On the other hand, 
the price competition effect favours the dispersion of firms.
Suppose we begin with a duopoly, if  transport costs are quadratic, it is well known that 
firms will tend to adopt the principle of maximum differentiation and locate opposite each 
other (see d'Aspremont et a l [1979]). The distinctive feature of our model is that firms can 
invest to reduce the cost of their production (or to improve quality). This cost reduction 
directly benefits one’s own technology, but also spills over to neighbouring technologies 
so that competing firms also benefit from this investment. When horizontal spillovers are 
weak, the investments made by a firm will only benefit the technologies very close to the 
ones it uses. If we then recognise that the location of firms in the technological landscape 
can change over time, the appeal of extreme varieties will be reinforced in the next period 
because of cost considerations. So, to the standard effects, we have an additional a cost 
effect since firms prefer to locate where costs are low. In this case of weak spillovers, firms 
will keep locating on the sides of the market. The cost function over the differentiation 
space takes an inverse U-shape and firms keep investing over time and thus dig their 
“niche”.
On the contrary if spillovers are strong and if the diffusion function for innovation is 
concave in technological distance, intermediate technologies can benefit from the cost- 
decreasing investments made by both firms. This cost reduction in the middle of the 
segment can exceed those at the extremities. In the next period, firms will then locate 
closer to one another since the appeal of intermediate technologies is reinforced by this 
cost advantage of the centre. In this case, the technological landscape takes a U-shape and 
firms locate closer and closer. As the distance between firms decreases, the spillovers 
become stronger and the free-rider problem between firms becomes more acute so that they 
invest less and less. A steady-state can be reached when firms are so close that they do not 
invest in R&D anymore. This standardisation process can have very adverse welfare 
implications since firms have a very low degree of differentiation and productivity is 
stagnant. It is also possible that an equilibrium in pure strategies ceases to exist after a 
couple of periods. The conjunction of cumulative investment and spillovers can thus 
generate instability over time.
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A possible example of standardisation is provided by the market for personal computers. 
When Apple launched its first products, the “technological distance” with IBM-compatible 
computers was important (assuming an axis measuring the ratio of “user-friendliness” over 
“power”). Then IBM-compatible computers benefited from and copied the innovations 
brought in by Apple (introduction of the mouse for instance). At the same time, it seems 
likely that the Apple technology also benefited from investments made by the IBM- 
compatible computer producers or their suppliers (e.g., improvements in the chip 
technology). Recently, Apple launched computers that are competing directly with IBM- 
compatibles (Power PC). This increased proximity is hard to measure but one can note for 
instance that advertisements in this industry now rely more on emotional appeal than on 
technical description (see Freeman [1994]). It may seem also that the pace of progress has 
slowed down in some way.2 The explanation may be framed in terms of product cycles (all 
major possible improvements have been exhausted), but it is also possible that the 
incentive to innovate was reduced by this greater technological proximity. This progressive 
rise of homogeneity out of heterogeneity seems to be a widespread feature in many 
industries, from soft drinks to automobiles.
This analysis can be seen as a contribution to the theory of growth. In contrast to previous 
models, we assume that differentiation is endogenous and that competition is local (each 
firm competes with only a few firms), whereas the existing literature focuses on global 
imperfect competition and fixed differentiation. Our main insight is that the addition of a 
second dimension reveals some new effects generated by the interaction between the two 
dimensions. This chapter can also be related to the literature on economic agglomeration. 
In our case, the excessive similarity denounced by Hotelling [1929] is not automatically 
given and when it occurs, it is only progressively and incompletely. In our model, 
agglomeration stems from cumulative investment that makes some locations more 
attractive. In turn subsequent investment reinforces this process. This explanation is new 
with respect to the existing literature (see Gabszewicz and Thisse [1992] for a survey or 
Ungem-Stemberg [1988] and Weitzman [1994] for more specific models of endogenous 
product differentiation).
2 Clearly the performances of computers keep increasing but this may be due to the progress made in the 
semi-conductor industry.
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Moreover, our chapter can also be read in relation to other traditions in the field of 
industrial organisation. As in Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1980] or Flaherty [1980], both the 
market structure and the innovative activity are endogenous. What we add here is an 
endogenous determination of the technological parameters (e.g., costs). As in d’Aspremont 
and Jacquemin [1988] or Motta [1992], we study a model of investment in an oligopoly 
model with spillovers. In our case however, differentiation is endogenous and may change 
over time. Eventually, our model can be viewed as a theory of the life-cycles of industries 
(see Nelson and Winter [1978], Jovanovic and MacDonald [1994] or Klepper [1996] for 
alternatives).
The rest of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the model (Section II). Some 
extensions are performed in Section III. Section IV contains some concluding remarks.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
Assumptions
D em and . A s usual in this type of model (Gabszewicz and Thisse [1992]), each consumer 
buys one unit of product in each period if the price is below his reservation level and we 
assume that the reservation levels are not binding in what follows. There is a mass one of 
horizontally differentiated consumers. Consumers are indexed by x  e[0,l] and their 
distribution is uniform over this segment. They face quadratic transport costs (and mill- 
pricing). For instance a consumer in x who buys a product located in x^ has to bear a
transport cost of t(x Of course, consumers buy the cheapest available product.
M arket  str uc tur e  a n d  tim ing . We assume a market which is contestable at each period. 
Two different firms only can enter at the beginning of the period.^'^ These two
 ^ An interpretation of our framework can be given in terms of patents. When firms enter they have a patent 
with a length of one period and a limited breadth so that competitors can benefit partly from their 
investments. At the next period, the present cost function will be available for new innovators.
 ^ Our assumption is however supported by David [1975] who states that "... changes are shown as being 
‘guided’ or directed in an ex post manner by previous myopic decisions - decisions having their objective in 
the minimisation of current (as distinct from future) private cost of production. One can also refer to
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assumptions are rather restrictive and are relaxed in section III. First, firms choose a 
location over [0,1] and a level of cost reducing investment. Price competition takes place 
in a second stage. The same game is played again at the next period with no additional cost 
if firms change location. The two firms are indexed by 1 and 2. Without loss of generality, 
Firm 1 is located on the left of Firm 2.
PERIOD t-1
Entry
PERIOD t
Price competition
Location and investment 
decisions 
Spillovers take place
Profits
F ig u r e  1 T im in g  o f  e v e n t s
PERIOD t+1
Production . Firms face a constant marginal cost of production which depends on the 
variety they manufacture. Each variety on the segment faces a potentially different cost. 
We denote by C(jc) the cost of the variety in x. We assume thatC(x) is common for all 
producers and common knowledge.
F ig u r e  2
In vestm ent . To reduce its cost in its location, each firm can invest to reduce its
costs by where C^_j = Mm|Q_i(x)|x e [0 ,l] |. This cost-reduction function is
such that it is continuous and piecewise twice differentiable with r ’> 0 , r"<  0, r(0) = 0
Rosenberg [1996] to support empirically our assumptions. Theoretically, the assumption is also used by 
Klepper [1996].
I l l
and lim r(l) < 0.5. The restrictions on the shape of r(.) are required to ensure regularity.
/ - > + ( »
The limit condition implies that costs are reduced at most by a half for one firm and that all 
costs remain positive. The specification of the cost-reduction process also assumes that it 
is conducted at the beginning of the period by using the product itself manufactured with 
the cheapest available technology. For instance the cost-reduction fimction might be of the 
following shape:
F ig u r e  3
S p i l l o v e r s . The investment performed on a given technology spills over immediately to 
neighbouring technologies (adding a time-lag would just reinforce our argument). That is 
the effort undertaken to reduce the cost of production for one product also decreases costs 
for neighbouring products. If an amount I  is invested in x, the reduction of costs in X  is 
equal to a(|% -  X ^r(I)C . These spillovers are additive in the sense that one firm benefits 
completely from its own cost-reduction and partially fi"om the investment made by the 
other firm. We assume that the diffusion function, a(.) is continuous and piecewise twice 
differentiable with a '<  0, a(0) = 1 and a(.) > 0.
1
distance
Figure 4
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For instance, if the cost function is and if there is only one firm located in 
investing /, then the new cost function may be as follows:
C m
F ig u r e  5
Fundamentally, our model enables us to study the interaction between spillovers and 
oligopoly. Spillovers impact directly on investment through location (as the distance 
between the two firms changes, the intensity of spillovers varies) and on location through 
past investments (in each period cost-reduction and spillovers modify the shape of the cost 
function). The model is setup in terms of cost-reducing investments, but of course our cost 
index can be interpreted as an inverse quality index since it is well known that horizontal 
differentiation is a special case of vertical differentiation (Cremer and Thisse [1991]).
The static game
Now we can characterise the equilibrium of the one period game that takes place at date t 
according to the timing described by Figure 1. We still focus on the case where firms live 
only one period. The implications of multi-period maximisation are described in Section
111. If we summarise our previous assumptions, the cost functions can be expressed by:
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c, = = C,_,(%])-Ç ,( r ( / ,)  + a(%2 -X1X/2)), (1)
and C2 =C,{x2 , / 2 ) = C,_|(x2 )-Ç ,_ ,(?-(/2 ) + a (x 2 -X |)r ( /,) ) .  (1’)
The cost faced by Firm i in period t is equal to the cost in period t-\ minus the cost 
reduction given by its own investment and the spillovers from the investment made by 
Firm j .  The profit functions are then:
(2)
and H 2  = (P2  -  C2  )(1 -  -  C,_, / 2 , (2’)
where is the price of Firm i and y  is the location of the consumer indifferent between
the two firms. Note that the cost of investments also depends on the minimum of the cost 
function in the previous period. This specification enables us to have a level of investment 
independent of the production costs when we ignore spillovers. That is, if investment is 
sufficiently productive, the cost-minimising monopolist will keep investing at the same 
pace over time.^ Note moreover, that our assumptions are qualitatively the same as the 
ones made in the R&D models of growth (e.g., Romer 1990 or Grossman and Helpman 
[1991]).
Using the concept of Perfect-Nash-Equilibrium in pure strategies, we can now state our 
first result:
Proposition 1 I f  the cost function is U-shaped and symmetric, the candidate symmetric 
equilibrium is unique and such th a t  \—-  = — ( 1 + 4xi , — = -,------   ^
&; 2^  a/i (l-a(l-2x,*))
and P* = P2 = C,(x|* W  t(i -  2X]*).
 ^ Abstracting from all location problems, when a quantity Q is produced, the total cost function is 
TC^  = QC, +/,C,_i.  Following our previous specifications, we get: TC, = C,_i(g(l-r(/,))+/,) and the 
minimisation of this expression in Ms independent of time.
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Proof. First, the indifferent consumer on the market is defined by the following 
arbitrage condition:
P ^ + z { y - x ^ Ÿ  =P2+ x(x2 - y f .  (3)
Substituting into the profit fimction yields:
2 t ( X 2 - X i )
and symmetrically for Firm 2. The concavity of H] (P|) is immediate so that the first-order
condition is necessary and sufficient for a maximum. After simplification, we find the 
equilibrium prices:
~ + Q  +"^(^2 - X i ) ( l  + X2 +^i)) ,  (5)
a^d ^2 = —(2 C2 + Q + x ( x 2 - X i ) ( 4 - X 2 - X i ) ) ,  (5’)
which solves for the second stage of the game. We can inject this result into the profit 
function. We obtain:
n  -* i) (2  + * 2 + ^ l )  + Q - Q ) ^
1 8 x (x , -* , )  ->■
Now for the first stage, the first-order condition for profit maximisation of Firm 1 with 
respect to investment reads:
a n ,  + ^ , ) + Q
5 /1  9 t (x 2 -X |) -Ç . (7)
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First, note that if we had x{x2 - Xi){2 + X2 + Xi) + C2 -  Ci < 0 , using the equilibrium 
price as defined in equation (5), we would find that Pj < Q  and Eli < 0 which cannot be a 
maximum. When setting the first-order condition to zero, we find a unique candidate 
symmetric equilibrium which satisfies:
dll 5 /, j
-3 C  = 0 . (8)
Using our specifications concerning the spillovers, we can simplify this further into:
dll (9 )
As for location, the first-order condition for Firm 1 is:
aUi _ 1 
dx\ ISl^
2 + ^2 4- +
i ^ 2  - X i ) ,
x(-2 + X2 - 3 x i )  + — — —  + 2
X2 - X 1
a c , '' ' '
 ^dx^ dx^ />
(10)
When we set this expression equal to zero, two solutions are possible. As previously, 
Q  = t ( x 2  -Xi){2 + X2 +Xi) + C2 would imply < 0 . Consequently, the maximum is
such that q  < % (% 2 -  %i)(2 + ^ 2  + X]) + C2 . Thus the candidate equilibrium is defined by:
t( -2  + X2 - 3 x i )  + — — —  + 2 
X2 - X 1
^dC2 a q ^
I dxi)
=  0 (11)
Using the analogue of (11) for Firm 2, we can prove easily that we have only one candidate 
symmetric equilibrium location. It is defined by:
a c aCn (12)
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We find after further simplifications:
Given the convexity of the initial cost function, this candidate symmetric equilibrium is 
unique. This achieves our proof. ■
Proposition 2 I f  the cost function is symmetric with minima in 0 and 1, at the candidate 
equilibrium, firms locate at each other's opposite and their level o f  investment is such that
3
d l '  ~ ( l- a ( l) ) '
Proof The demonstration is essentially the same as in the previous proposition,
except that given the shape of j , we find x{ = 0 . Then the investment equation is
immediate. Note that this case includes all symmetric functions with an inverse U-shape. ■
Note that these propositions give only necessary conditions for the equilibrium. The issue 
of existence is tackled later.
We have here five types of effects. As usual, the market share effect tends to favour 
agglomeration since firms have an incentive to locate at the centre of the market to 
maximise their sales. This effect is counter-balanced (and even dominated with quadratic 
transport costs and a flat cost curve) by a standard price effect. When firms locate closer to 
each other, price competition is stronger and consequently firms face an incentive for 
increased differentiation.
The other effects stem from the new features of our model. First, there is an R&D effect on 
location that implies that each firm will tend to locate further away from the centre in order 
to avoid the competitor’s free-riding on its own R&D. However, to free-ride on the 
competitor’s R&D, the firms are encouraged to locate closer to the centre of the market.
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With our specifications, at the symmetric equilibrium when it exists, those reciprocal R&D 
effects cancel each other out.
Second, when the cost curve is convex, the cost effect works as a centrifugal force and it 
adds to the price effect, so that maximum differentiation is achieved in equilibrium. With a 
U-shaped cost curve, on the contrary the cost effect pulls firms towards the centre (of 
course, if the slope of the curve in xj = 0 is superior to - x /2 ,  we still obtain a comer 
equilibrium since the cost effect is not able to overcome the price effect anywhere). This 
cost effect can be decomposed into two parts. There is first an “absolute cost component”. 
By locating closer to the middle, a firm lowers its cost of production and so raises its 
profits. Second, there is also a “business stealing” effect, since a lower cost enables firms 
to be more competitive and to take a bigger market share. The comparative statics of the 
equilibrium location shows that the closer to the centre, the steeper the cost curve must be 
at the equilibrium location. This occurs because the cost effect must in equilibrium balance 
the price effect, which becomes more intense as differentiation decreases. Moreover, the 
higher the transport costs, the further away firms locate. The reason is that, when firms 
move towards the centre, the benefits in terms of market share are smaller when transport 
costs are higher.
Finally, there is an effect of location on R&D. As already noticed by Spence [1984] or 
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin [1998], in a duopoly, the presence of reciprocal spillovers has 
detrimental effects on efficiency-enhancing investments. Here, the intensity of spillovers is 
endogenous and depends on location. The closer the firms, the stronger are the spillovers 
and thus the smaller the investment. We can now examine the welfare properties of our 
equilibrium.
Proposition 3 The symmetric market equilibrium implies too much differentiation and too 
little investment.
Proof The second part of the result stems directly from the existence of spillovers.
Note that the total surplus is maximised when total costs are minimised. For the short-run 
(static) welfare, we define , 7^^ and which minimise total social cost:
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T c ( x T , x T , I ^ ' , l f ] =  Min •
'  ' x ,^x- ,^l ,^Ï2<y
| ’x(x, - i f  dz^ - |x(x2 -z)^& + C(/i +I2) 
y C { x \ ,  x j ,  h ,  12)  +  (l-y)C(%2. *1.4 , a )
.(14)
After solving for the first-order conditions in location and investment, we find after 
simplification:
8 r { ^ r )  2
(15)
g y - '  = l ( l  - 4%r) - 2a'(l - 2xr)r{ir)c and x f  = 1 - x ^ '  (16)
Then a straightforward comparison with equation (13) implies that the equilibrium
locations involve too much differentiation. In period 1, we have > 1/4. To determine
the optimal location, three effects are at stake, the cost effect (locate where the costs are 
low), a transport cost effect pushing firms towards the quartiles and a joint-investment 
effect pushing towards the centre. We can also define a long-run welfare function by taking 
the net present value of the social cost function over time:
+00
ZTC = Min
H,t>^ i,vh,t’h,vyt t=\
|r(x2  , -z)^cfe+C,_,(A, + /2,,) 
y,c,{xi„ X2,„ A,, A , , ) + ( i-y,)c,{x2,„ xy. A,,, A ,)
(17)
When solving for the first-order conditions in and , we can see that the joint
investment effect has one more term (the future cost reduction of the joint-investment in t). 
This just reinforces agglomeration for the optimal location since the joint-investment effect 
is centripetal. Note finally that the equilibrium location can be optimal when the cost curve 
is sufficiently convex (comer location). ■
We have multiple sources of inefficiency, each corresponding to one decision variable of
119
our game. Firstly, prices are too high (i.e., above the marginal cost as can be seen easily 
from equations (5) and (5’)). In our case, however, the deadweight loss of oligopoly 
pricing is zero due to our simplified demand function. Secondly, the level of investment is 
sub-optimal. The inefficiency is twofold. In the short-run, investment is inefficient because 
of the horizontal spillovers. In the long run, another inefficiency is added due to the short 
time horizon of firms (see section III). Thirdly, the market equilibrium implies too much 
dispersion. The location decision generates this inefficiency because of the presence of the 
(centrifugal) price effect and the absence of the joint-investment effect (centripetal) at the 
market equilibrium. Now that we have described the outcome of the static game (short- 
run), we can turn to the dynamic evolution (long-run).
The dynamic behaviour
To explore the dynamics of our model, we assume that the initial situation is such that 
Cq(x) = Cq.  ^ The dynamics of the cost curve is driven by the aggregation of the 
investments over time. The shape of the spillover diffusion function is thus crucial. 
Potentially complicated dynamics may arise. Before investigating further, we explore two 
simple dynamic paths for which we can give sufficient conditions under which they arise.
Proposition 4 I f  either a  >0 or i f  a  < 0  and a(l/2) < 1/2, the cost function takes an
inverse U-shape, firms keep locating at each other’s opposite and keep investing at the 
same pace when the symmetric equilibrium exists.
I f  a  <0 and a(l) > 0 , the cost function takes a U-shape, firms locate closer and closer to 
the centre and investment decreases over time as long as there is a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. In the beginning of period I, firms face a flat cost curve. According to 
Propositions 1 and 2, the firms will locate at jcj = 0 and X2  = 1. From our assumptions, we 
have:
 ^ We explore here a simple case, but using simulation, a similar analysis can be made for any initial cost 
curve.
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c , (x, X,, X2 , , / 2  ) = Q_, (x) -  Ç,_, (a(|x -  X, |)/-(/i ) + « (1*2 -  x |y { / 2  )). (18)
At the symmetric equilibrium: ?-(/;) = r-(/2 ) = r f / ' j  and %; = 1 -  x, so that:
C, W  = Co -  Co(a(*) + a ( l -  * )> (/* ). (19)
Now we can see that if a(.) is convex, a(x) + a ( l -  x) is also convex and has two maxima 
at X = 0 and x = 1. Then Q  (x) has minima at x = 0 and x = 1. In period t, assuming a 
cost function with two minima at x = 0 and x = 1, firms will thus keep locating at xj = 0 
and X2  = 1. The cost function of t+l will also have two minima in 0 and 1 since it is equal 
to the sum of two functions whose minima are the same, both at x = 0 and x = 1 
(Proposition 2). The same reasoning applies for a(.) concave and a(l/2) < 1/2.
On the contrary, if a(.) is concave with a(l) > 0, then a(x) + a ( l -  x) is concave and has 
one unique maximum at x = 0.5. Then Q  (x) has only one minimum at x = 0.5. In period 
1, unless Q(x)  is sufficiently steep, the firms will be again at xj = 0  and X2  =1. Their 
investment increases the steepness of the cost function at x = 0 and x = 1. Eventually, the 
cost curve can become steep enough for both firms to locate closer. Using the same 
reasoning as above and Proposition 1, it is immediate that x^^+i > x%^ and that
4+1 -  4  • "
In these two cases, the conjunction of cumulative investment and spillovers gives rise to a 
simple self-reinforcing mechanism. When spillovers are weak or when the diffusion 
function a(.) is convex, peripheral technologies benefit from current investments more 
than the central ones. In turn, this reinforces the appeal of the peripheries in the next 
period. Firms are “digging their niches” over time. In other words, a high degree of 
heterogeneity can be sustained by weak spillovers.
On the contrary, when spillovers are strong and when the diffusion function a(.) is
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concave, cumulative investment reinforces the U-shape of the cost function, thus leading to 
diminishing differentiation and diminishing investment. A steady-state with no investment 
can be reached. By contrast with our previous case, the result here states that the “principle 
of diminishing differentiation holds under sufficient and concave spillovers”. Note that our 
assumption of quadratic transport costs, chosen for tractability reasons, tends to make this 
case more difficult to exhibit because of the innate tendency of quadratic transport costs 
towards differentiation (strong price effect).
Moreover, the existence of the equilibrium is not automatically given. When the second- 
order conditions are not satisfied, this means that firms have an incentive to deviate from 
the candidate symmetric equilibrium. It is possible that no equilibrium exists in pure 
strategies. This is a recurrent problem in differentiation models (see Gabszewicz and 
Thisse [1992] for some development on this issue). A first possible interpretation is that 
the non-existence result is especially relevant to game theory itself. The second possibility 
is to relate this possible non-existence to what Porter [1980] calls “industry turmoil”. From 
the simulations that follows it can be shown that the equilibrium becomes more difficult to 
sustain as the standardisation process takes place. Our interpretation of this situation is the 
following. The model here is one of incremental iimovation (evolutionary). But it is 
possible that incremental innovations can be large enough to create a decisive cost 
advantage for one firm, then one must speak of drastic or revolutionary innovations (for a 
discussion of evolutionary and revolutionary innovations, see Langlois and Robertson
[1995]). Hence there is an incentive to relocate in the centre of the market. In this case the 
competitive process we use is not relevant and another framework, maybe more 
Schumpeterian, is needed (Reinganum [1985] or chapter 5).
This result provides an alternative explanation of the so-called life cycle of industries. Oort 
and Klepper [1982], Evans [1987] or Klepper [1996] in his survey, find that the gro^vth 
rate of an industry falls as it matures. Alternatively, Kamien and Schwartz [1982] and 
Klepper [1996] survey evidence sho'wing that large firms tend to generate slower 
productivity growth. All this is usually attributed to a progressive exhaustion of the growth 
possibilities (see Jovanovic and MacDonald [1994a] for a learning argument on these 
lines). Here, with sufficient spillovers and a concave diffusion function, a process of rising
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homogeneity takes place. As stated by Porter [1980], “products have a tendency to become 
more like commodities over time...” This increased standardisation reduces the incentive 
to perform independent cost-reducing investments although they are still feasible and 
socially desirable. In other words, the model we propose here is a model in which 
technological progress creates the conditions for its own demise.
Our model can also be related to the strategic management literature. For instance. Porter 
[1980] writes that “every industry begins with an initial structure [...] This structure is 
usually (though not always) a far cry from the configuration the industry will take later in 
its development. [...] The evolutionary processes work to push the industry towards its 
potential structure, which is rarely known completely as an industry evolves. [...] there is a 
range of structures the industry might possibly achieve, depending on the direction and 
success of research and development, marketing innovations, and the like. It is important 
to realise that instrumental in much industry evolution are the investment decisions by both 
existing firms in the industry and new entrants.” He also underlines that overall cost 
leadership and differentiation are the two most important generic strategies for firms. What 
our model does is to analyse formally these ideas, explore the welfare of some outcomes, 
relates some dynamics to some technological fundamentals and finally shows how some 
generic strategies are optimally chosen depending on the market structure.
Note finally that Proposition 3 states that differentiation is too important with respect to 
the first-best (short-run and long-run). However, incentives to reduce dispersion alone 
would have negative dynamic effects since they would imply less investment. However, it 
is not always true that a market equilibrium with “standardisation” and subsequent 
dwindling investments is worse than a situation of “niche” formation with maximum 
differentiation. If we measure roughly the welfare by the asymptotic total cost, it is equal to 
the total transport costs when niches are formed since production costs tend to zero. Thus 
we have with maximum differentiation rCoo(0,l) = x/12. With the polar case of
standardisation, we find that » ^ 2 ,qo ^  =
Consequently, standardisation can be asymptotically better than niche formation if we have 
oo,^2 .oo) ^  , that is if xxi ^{\ -  2xy^)  > 2C^  .
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A numerical example
For the previous results, we just gave necessary conditions for the equilibrium. However 
we can derive some examples for which the equilibrium exists. If we set
r(I) = (l -1/(1 + 15/))/2 and a(|xi -  x|) = Max\^,\ -  \j/(xi , one can check that
these functional forms satisfy our restrictions concerning the concavity of the investment 
function. Moreover, we also set Q  = 3 and x = 2 . All our simulations are conducted for
different values of \j/, which is an inverse index of the intensity of spillovers (the higher
Y , the weaker the spillovers).
* If v|/ = 4 , we find that V/, %%=0 and / =  0.0387. This result conforms to Propositions 2 
and 4. The shape of the cost function is as in Figure 6a and the costs of both firms are 
reduced by more than 20% at each period for the technologies they use.
* If v|/ = 2 , the results are exactly the same except that the cost function is more complex 
as can be checked on Figure 6b.
* If \|/ = 1.2, we face an intermediate case for which the cost curve is non-monotonic after 
one period (see Figure 6c). Of course for / = 1, = 0 and /  = 0.0387. In the beginning of 
period 2, we have two potential equilibria. The first is the one where both firms locate at 
each other’s opposite. The second is such that Firm 1 locates on the right of the first kink 
and Firm 2 on the left of the second kink of the cost function. However, due to insufficient 
steepness, only the first candidate is an equilibrium. However after three periods, the curve 
becomes sufficiently steep so that maximum differentiation cannot be sustained in 
equilibrium anymore and both firms locate according to Proposition 1 between the two 
kinks (Figure 6d). This is a case of a “complex landscape”. When cumulative investments 
and spillovers generate a non-monotonic cost curve, there is room for multiple equilibria or 
the non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.
* If v|/ = 1, the first period equilibrium is characterised by = 0 and /  = 0.0387 (Figure 
6e). Then over time, we can observe the process of diminishing differentiation and 
investments already described.
t X] /
5 0.152829 0.006523
10 0.175594 0.00172415
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20 0.182723 0.00022115
30 0.183639 0.00003231
50 0.183769 7.15 X 10*^
00 0.5-V Ô Ï«  0.183772 0
The asymptotic situation is represented graphically by Figure 6f. The same evolution 
occurs for all values of vj/ below 1. For instance, if vj/ = 0.8, one converges towards a
situation where and 7 = 0 .  In all those cases, it can be checked
numerically that the candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium. However, if we lower 
the transport costs; or if we set Co at a higher initial value (above 10 is sufficient in our 
simulations), then our candidate equilibrium cannot be sustained any more. The reason is 
fairly simple: if transport costs are much lower, with a U-shape curve, the centrifugal force 
is not sufficiently strong to prevent a deviation whereby the firm would locate at the centre 
of the market and benefit from the lower costs and grab all the market. If the initial level of 
costs is high enough, then it may be also profitable to deviate and locate at the centre of the 
market and invest heavily so that a strong cost advantage can be created to expel the other 
firm.
III. EXTENSIONS
Our basic model suffers from two restrictive assumptions. In what follows, we relax them 
so that new properties can appear.
Free entry
The first restrictive assumption we made concerned the entry process: only two firms were 
allowed. To relax this assumption, we assume a fixed cost of entry K. Again, we start with 
C q {x )  = C q . It seems clear that as K  decreases, the number of entrants increases and thus
the distance between two adjacent firms decreases. Here, this smaller distance drives 
investment to zero if r '  is bounded from above.
Assume first that the fixed cost is such that initially only two firms can enter. Then, from
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equation (6), the equilibrium profits are IT = x^l - - Ç7* -Æ . As the two firms get
closer, their profits keep decreasing. So if standardisation takes place, then the long-run 
profit of each duopolist tends towards = t{ \ - 2 x^) I2  -  K . Then two cases are 
possible. If IToo > 0 , our previous results are unchanged. If Iloo < 0 , then the duopoly is 
asymptotically not sustainable. This means that for t sufficiently high, there can be only 
one firm operating in the market. This firm of course locates at the centre of the market 
and keeps investing to reduce costs.
Of course, this argument can be extended for a lower fixed cost of entry so that more than 
two firms can initially enter the market. The first notable feature of this case is that too 
many firms can enter initially, so that no-one has an incentive to perform any cost- 
reduction investment. We thus face stagnation in the industry due to too much competition 
with respect to a second-best situation. The notable feature is that, if spillovers are 
sufficiently large with a concave diffusion function, the number of firms decreases over 
time. This implication of the model matches a well-known stylised fact in many sectors 
where the number of firms increases quickly first and then slowly decreases (see Klepper 
[1996] for more details on this). The decreasing number of firms in industries is usually 
explained by a leaming-and-selection argument. Firms that fail to keep up with the pace of 
progress in one sector are driven out of the market because they are not sufficiently 
competitive (see for instance Jovanovic and MacDonald [1994b] for a presentation of this 
argument). What we underline here is that the reduction ^  the number of firms can arise 
because of the modification of the “technological conditions” vrithin the market when this 
modification takes the form of a reduction in the range of competitive technologies. Of 
course this evolution of the “technological primitives” is itself endogenous and depends on 
past investments made in the sector. It is also possible that after a few periods of 
incremental innovations, the technological conditions become such that the market is not 
“stable” anymore and the equilibrium in pure strategies ceases to exist (industry turmoil). 
So, with strong spillovers and a concave diffusion function, we observe a tendency towards 
more standardisation, fewer competitors and more instability of the competitive process 
over time.
A last implication of our model is that the standardisation process increases the incentive
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equation (6), the equilibrium profits are H = t^I - 2 x \ ^ j 2 - C l *  - K .  As  two firms get
closer, their profits keep decreasing. So if standardisation takes place, then the long-run 
profit of each duopolist tends towards = x { \ - 2 x ^ ) j 2 -  K . Then two cases are 
possible. If rioo > 0 , our previous results are unchanged. If Iloo < 0 , then the duopoly is 
asymptotically not sustainable. This means that for t sufficiently high, there can be only 
one firm operating in the market. This firm of course locates at the centre of the market 
and keeps investing to reduce costs.
Of course, this argument can be extended for a lower fixed cost of entry so that more than 
two firms can initially enter the market. The first notable feature of this case is that too 
many firms can enter initially, so that no-one has an incentive to perform any cost- 
reduction investment. We thus face stagnation in the industry due to too much competition 
with respect to a second-best situation. The notable feature is that, if spillovers are 
sufficiently large with a concave diffusion function, the number of firms decreases over 
time. This implication of the model matches a well-known stylised fact in many sectors 
where the number of firms increases quickly first and then slowly decreases (see Klepper
[1996] for more details on this). The decreasing number of firms in industries is usually 
explained by a leaming-and-selection argument. Firms that fail to keep up with the pace of 
progress in one sector are driven out of the market because they are not sufficiently 
competitive (see for instance Jovanovic and MacDonald [1994b] for a presentation of this 
argument). What we underline here is that the reduction in the number of firms can arise 
because of the modification of the “technological conditions” within the market when this 
modification takes the form of a reduction in the range of competitive technologies. Of 
course this evolution of the “technological primitives” is itself endogenous and depends on 
past investments made in the sector. It is also possible that after a few periods of 
incremental innovations, the technological conditions become such that the market is not 
“stable” anymore and the equilibrium in pure strategies ceases to exist (industry turmoil). 
So, with strong spillovers and a concave diffusion function, we observe a tendency towards 
more standardisation, fewer competitors and more instability of the competitive process 
over time.
A last implication of our model is that the standardisation process increases the incentive
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to merge. Yet, anti-trust regulation may prevent mergers. Moreover, in real life, there are 
large numbers of dimensions for investment decisions and firms. Finding out which 
activities complement each other is a difficult problem in practice. This slows down the 
merging process. Finally, mergers induce a monitoring problem since it implies more 
hierarchical layers (bureaucratic diseconomies of scale). However, a prediction of our 
model is that mergers should occur more frequently as industries mature.
Non-myopic firms
The second potentially restrictive assumption we made concerns the short-run 
maximisation objectives of firms. However, it is possible to show that the same kind of 
results as previously can be derived with a longer time horizon. For this purpose, we 
assume first that firms maximise over two periods. We write the objective fimction as:
+ 611^^1, (20)
where b < \  is a discount factor. First note that in period r+1, the derivation of the sub­
game equilibrium is the same as in section II. Working backwards, the derivation of the 
equilibrium price in period 1 can be computed as in equations (5) and (5’). As for the 
equilibrium investment in period t, we find:
(2.)
» ! . ,  «'l,
After simplification, we find for the symmetric equilibrium, the necessary condition:
H h i )  3
1 -  a(l -  2x], ) + 6a(l -  (l -  a(l -  2 * ) ) / Q ,
The FOC with respect to location in the first stage of the game is:
(22)
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+ = (23)
dxy, dx,i âx,i
After tedious but straightforward simplifications, we find:
-  -  (l + 4^ 1 ^  )  I t  )(“ ' { ^ 2 , t + l  -  ) -  a ' (^ 1,/+1 “ )) -  0 -(24)
So if a(.) is concave with a ( l ) > 0 ,  a straightforward comparison with equation (13) 
implies that firms locate further apart in period t than in the case of a one period 
maximisation. However, one can also check that > Xi ^. That is, differentiation still
decreases over time. So, when we extend the time horizon of the firms, with a(.) concave 
and a(l) > 0, firms tend to locate further apart in the beginning and then to get closer over 
time. Moreover, in equation (22), one can see that investment in the first period is more 
important than in the case of one-period maximisation (the spillovers are less important 
and the cost reduction is capitalised over two periods instead of one).
One is then led to wonder what happens if the time horizon becomes infinite. Even though 
no closed-form solution can be derived for our model, the same phenomenon of 
standardisation and slow-down of the pace of progress can arise since differentiation may 
not be sustainable in the long run. The following heuristic argument shows that maximum 
differentiation can be impossible in the long run if a(.) is concave and if a(l) > 0. 
Assuming that firms locate at each other’s opposite, the cost difference between the variety 
in 0 and the one in 0.5 is:
Q+, (1/2) -  (0) = C, (1/2) -  C, (0) + (2a(l/2) -1  -  a (l))r(/, )C, (1/2). (25)
Then, at the limit we find that:
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If the difference of costs between 0 and 0.5 is sufficient, Firm 1 can move towards the 
centre of the market and enjoy a higher level of profit. This is true if 
^2 ( ^ 1  = 0.5,^2 = l) < Coo (1), that is if (0.5) -  (0) > 5 r /4 . Consequently for
maximum differentiation to be unsustainable in the long run, a sufficient condition is:
2 a (l/2 )- l-a ( l)^ 5 x
" l â m  - T -
Policy implications
In the face of these persistent inefficiencies, corrective policies can be implemented. As 
suggested by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin [1988], there are positive effects fi*om co­
operative R&D. The main drawback of co-operative R&D in our setting is that by restoring 
investment it encourages standardisation. Simple policies of R&D subsidies can also be 
very ineffective since present R&D subsidies favour standardisation which makes further 
cost reduction more problematic because of stronger spillovers. Effective R&D policies 
need to control the “location” of investments. This may be very difficult to achieve in 
practice since it requires the knowledge of the cost curve by the planner (i.e., the 
knowledge of products which are not manufactured) and the ability to verify the location of 
firms.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has proposed a model of the dynamics of industries that is driven primarily by 
spillovers and cumulative investment. Our model can generate as possible outcomes the 
formation of niches, a standardisation process or instability. If standardisation occurs, the 
number of firms in the industry can decrease as well as the intensity of cost-reducing 
investments. This slowdown in productivity growth does not depend on exhaustion of the 
potential for growth, but stems rather from the formation of a technological landscape that 
inhibits growth.
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As main determinants of market structure and industry evolution, spillovers offer a quite 
attractive explanation. However, some problems are in order. Firstly, these explanations 
based on “invisible technological parameters” may be quite difficult to test. But spillovers 
can actually leave some paper trails, through patent citations for instance, as demonstrated 
by Jaffe et al. [1993]. In this latter case, the “real industrial landscape” is useful to provide 
evidence for our concept of technological landscape. Secondly, the vision we propose of 
industry evolution is opposite to that of management theorists like Porter [1980]. They 
tend to propose a world in which strategies are the result of free decisions by managers, 
whereas here the optimal strategy is dictated by the environment. The resolution of this 
fundamental divergence should be the object of future work. Thirdly, spillovers and their 
diffusion are taken here as exogenous whereas it seems pretty clear that for instance 
location decisions influence spillovers (Jaffe et a l [1993]), although it remains to 
understand precisely why and how.
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Erratum to p ag e  131. The series of graphs replaces the graphs page 131.
GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS OF SECTION H
(C osts are on the vertical axis; the product space is represented by the horizontal axis; the b o ld  dots g iv e  the equilibrium  
locations o f  the firm on the co st curve; vp is an inverse m easure o f  the in tensity  o f  d iffu sion  for sp illovers)
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CHAPTER 5
DOES SCHUMPETERIAN COMPETITION LEAD TO
MONOPOLY?
Abstract: We propose in this chapter a two-sector economy where products are substitutes. 
It is possible to invest to reduce the costs of production. The innovation function is 
random, product specific and the probability of success is increasing in R&D investment. 
The successful innovator is a temporary monopolist. As usual for Schumpeterian 
competition, monopoly profits provide an incentive for R&D. When a product has a 
relatively low marginal cost, the monopoly profits are large because of the large market 
size. Consequently, R&D investment is high for this product relative to that of high costs 
products. So the probability of a new cost-reducing innovation is higher for the already 
more developed product. This simple feed-back effect implies a divergence in the 
investment and development patterns for the products as well as path-dependency.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The necessity of monopolies for innovations has long been recognised. In a perfectly 
competitive world, if new designs can be imitated, nobody has an incentive to innovate 
since the returns to investment in R&D are zero. The need to give monopoly profits to the 
successful innovator if the economy was to keep growing was first noted by Schumpeter 
[1911]. Of course, from this perspective the monopoly still implies a static deadweight 
loss, but this is a necessary evil for the economy to enjoy some “dynamic efficiency”.^  The 
subsequent Schumpeterian literature has always viewed causality as running from 
monopoly power to innovation, assuming some form of “stationarity” in the degree of 
monopoly power.2 What we ask here, by contrast, is the following: does monopoly power 
lead to Schumpeterian competition or does Schumpeterian competition lead to monopoly 
power?
The argument developed below can be sketched easily. Imagine an economy with only two 
products, which are gross substitutes. Initially, the economy is competitive and the 
marginal costs are the same for both products. However, it is possible to invest in reducing 
the costs of production. The innovation function is random, product specific and the 
probability of a successful innovation is increasing in R&D investment. So, as usual in the 
Schumpeterian literature, the successful innovator is a monopolist for at least one period. 
The monopoly profits provide an incentive (and a reward) for R&D. When a product has a 
relatively low marginal cost, the monopoly profits are large because of the large market 
size. Consequently, the R&D investment made on this product increases relatively to the 
investment made on the high cost product. So the probability of a new cost-reducing 
innovation is higher for the already more developed (i.e., low cost) product. This simple 
feedback effect implies a divergence in the investment and development patterns for the 
products, as well as path dependency. Eventually, all the investment will be made on the 
same product, and the monopoly at the product level will turn into a monopoly at the 
industry level. This occurs provided there are no diminishing returns to R&D investment in 
a given product line (or provided the decreasing returns do not appear too early). So our
 ^Empirically, the question is hotly debated. See Nickell [1996] for a short review,
2 See Nelson and Winter [1982], Tirole [1988] and Aghion and Howitt [1996a] for surveys on three different 
strands.
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answer is that Schumpeterian competition leads to more monopoly power.
This analysis enriches the existing literature on Schumpeterian competition and growth 
since we consider here more general demand functions than in previous works. One can 
refer to Aghion and Howitt [1996a] for a survey of new growth theories based on 
Schumpeterian incentives. Our findings underline the potentially unbalanced nature of the 
growth process. In this respect, our work is reminiscent of qualitative considerations that 
can be found in previous work (see for instance Kamien and Schwartz [1982] or Nelson 
and Winter [1982]).
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a real-life example 
to motivate the argument. The model is set up in Section 3, and the results are presented 
and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
n. AN EXAMPLE
Before undertaking any formal analysis, it is worth having a look at one particular example 
of the process this chapter focuses on. Of course, real life case studies never exactly match 
a theoretical argument, especially when this case study is a complex industry. Nonetheless 
it seems that the evolution of the computer industry since 1975 illustrates our argument.^ 
(A detailed description of the rivalry in this sector can be found in Heller [1994]. See also 
Pugh [1995, 313-136] and Langlois and Robertson [1995] for a short technical 
chronology.)
The two generic products we identify are, on the one hand, micro-computers and, on the 
other hand, mainframes and mini-computers. These two products can reasonably be taken 
as substitutes for each other since the question whether to adopt a micro or mainframe 
computer strategy arises in many firms. Of course, NASA probably needs more than micro­
computers, whereas most households will not buy a mainframe system. But for most firms, 
the choice between the two is relevant. At the end of the 1970’s, the “micro” segment was
 ^ Mokyr [1990, pp. 126-135] provides another interesting example with the transport technologies and the 
rise of the internal combustion engine at the expense of the steam engine,
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virtually non-existent and the “mainframe/mini” segment was dominated by IBM. Other 
competitors on this market were DEC, Wang and Hewlett-Packard. In 1977 Apple 
Computers, exploiting a technology developed by Xerox, launched the Apple II. This 
computer contained some major innovations: the mouse, the graphical user interface and 
the use of floppy disks to store data. This was the first serious attempt to establish a 
monopoly position on the segment two years after the first micro-computers were 
introduced. Note, however, that despite (or because of) major improvements with respect to 
existing products, the product made a slow start. IBM also entered the market in 1981. It 
tried to establish a dominant position by launching more powerful products and leaving an 
open access to its standard to other firms (that is, offer a better product and reinforce the 
lead with a network externality). IBM had 63% of the market in 1984, but the figure had 
shrunk to 38% by 1987 (Heller [1994]).
Neither Apple, nor IBM, nor any other competitor (such as Compaq) succeeded in 
establishing a long-run monopoly position. Yet two firms today enjoy very high market 
power in the micro-computer industry. First, Intel introduced better chips (successively the 
80286, 80386, 80486 and Pentium chips) which gave it 2/3 of the market by the beginning 
of the 1990s’, leaving its next challenger. Motorola, far behind (13% of the market). Intel 
resisted the challenge of the RISC technology, but its monopoly position is still at risk, 
threatened by a possible drastic technological innovation (be it the SPARC technology or 
the PowerPC chip). The other dominant firm, Microsoft, is at the other end of the value 
chain. Its first hit was MS-DOS which became the default operating system for PCs. Then, 
using the same ingredients as Apple, it brought “user-friendliness” in the PC universe with 
Windows which became the universal graphical system at the beginning of the 90’s. These 
two Microsoft products (DOS and Windows) successfully withstood the attempts of IBM 
(OS/2) to capture a major share of the market. However the strong position of Microsoft 
may be overthrown in the ftiture by innovative ways of supplying computing services 
(using low-tech terminals and a server on the Internet or in a mainframe system for 
instance).
Following these major innovations (better chips and user-friendly software), the sales of 
micro-computers expanded dramatically, whereas the market for mainframe and mini-
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computers took the opposite direction  ^ This latter market did not really experience any 
major technological improvement. For instance, the 370 series by IBM had a life cycle of 
more than 20 years. This lack of innovation does not, however, stem from the absence of 
R&D since all the major players in the market have invested a lot in their products. Of 
course, relative to the investments in the micro-computer technology, investments in 
mainframe systems and mini-computers have been dwindling. (However, the boundary 
between micro- and mini-computers is blurred because many micro-computers today are 
much more powerful than most mini-computers 15 years ago.)
After this very brief account, some remarks can be made. First, both markets are 
characterised by intense rivalry. Firms try to build monopoly positions through a superior 
technology. Network externalities are pervasive in the industry, but the “standards” are not 
fixed for as long as they are for keyboards or even for video recorders: these monopoly 
positions as we saw are temporary. So network externalities must be seen as “multipliers”, 
helpful to reach a dominant situation for a superior product and as barriers to entry when 
products are good, but without a clear superiority. To summarise, in the computer industry, 
entrepreneurs, such as Bill Gates and Steve Jobs, invest, create new firms, innovate, launch 
new products and try to establish temporary monopoly positions. So competition in the 
computer industry can be held as “Schumpeterian”.
Interestingly, the competitive process in this industry has lead to the emergence of “large 
monopolies”. Yet, as might be expected from a Schumpeterian perspective, the competitive 
process led in each segment to the predominance of one firm, at least on some crucial parts 
of the value-added chain. But it also led to the domination of nearly all the industry by one 
type of product. In other words, the monopoly for one segment of the market is now in a 
dominant position on the whole “industry” since the market for micro-computers is now 
the dominant market for the computer industry. If one views improvements in micro- 
versus mini-computers as two different possible directions for technological change, then 
Schumpeterian competition has led to a unique rather than diversified direction of 
innovation (the domination of micro-computers over any parallel development of both 
technologies).
 ^“Have mainframe computers missed the bus?” asked the Financial Times (4 September 1996).
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Besides, the evolution of the computer industry in the last 20 years has been 
“unpredictable” or at least “unexpected”. It is worth noting that everyone expected a high 
growth rate, but that most predictions as to its direction turned out incorrect. The first 
justification for this view is that most firms in the mainframe/mini segment continued to 
invest heavily long after the launch of the first micro-computers. Secondly, IBM, whose 
knowledge of the computer market cannot be denied, contributed heavily to the 
improvement of products which eventually took over its own market. ^  Thirdly, many users 
kept buying those mini-computers or mainframe systems which soon became obsolete. Yet, 
it is always possible to argue ex-post that the rise of PCs was inevitable. But in this case, 
why didn’t everybody emulate Microsoft (or Compaq) at the outset? This leads us to insist 
on both the inability of people to foresee the systemic implications of innovations and on 
the role of “historical accidents”.^  The unique direction of progress has been taken 
following historical accidents. In our case, one can cite poor strategic decisions by IBM, 
and some successful bets by Microsoft.^ Of course, here we find again the arguments of the 
literature on the network externalities (Arthur [1989] or David [1985]). However, they 
must be amended since it seems that here the competitive and innovative processes must be 
at the forefront of the story. Despite its late start, the micro-computer has come to dominate 
the industry and has emerged as a new “general purpose technology” after a succession of 
purposeful innovations.^ Indeed, none of these innovations was revolutionary in itself and 
would have been sufficient to insure the domination of micro-computers, but taken 
together, they transformed an initially inferior product into a superior one.
The macroeconomic consequences of this are not negligible, since mini-computers and 
micro-computers cannot be considered as two perfectly substitutable technologies 
performing the same tasks in the same way. Rather we may interpret them as two different 
architectures in the sense of Sah and Stiglitz [1986]. In the trade-off between power and
 ^ IBM executives, according to a widespread opinion, viewed the micro-computer segment as a niche market, 
and were unable to forecast its subsequent developments,
 ^Among the many examples given by Rosenberg [1994] and [1996], Marconi saw the usefulness of radio 
transmission for point to point communication without seeing its implications for the mass entertainment 
industry. In the 40s, Thomas Watson, chairman of IBM, considered that the market for computers was 
probably limited to 5 customers and was unable to foresee the potential usefulness of his own products.
 ^Even admitting that without Bill Gates, another businessman would have made them, other decisions than 
those actually made by IBM could have given a different shape to the industry.
 ^These innovations were “drastic” in the sense that they allowed monopoly positions at the segment level but 
they remained small at the economy-wide level.
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flexibility, mainframe systems maintain their (relative) advantage on the “power” side, 
whereas micro-computers have an undeniable competitive advantage on the “flexibility” 
side. Micro-computers are more easily accessible and give more autonomy to their users. 
Then, concerning R&D activities, one may conjecture that the domination of micro­
computers might lead to dispersed research projects of small size.^ Being conceived and 
carried on by small-scale teams (often one researcher), these projects may be biased 
towards the creation of products inducing even more flexibility. The implications of this 
can be a research process leading to more experiments and the exploration of more research 
directions, but also smaller innovations (less co-ordination between projects, loss of 
possible increasing returns to size in research teams, etc). In any case, micro-computer- 
based research is likely to have a qualitative impact on the content of the growth process.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
T im ing  a n d  d y n a m ic  str u c tu r e . Consider an economy populated with overlapping 
generations of agents. They live for two periods and supply one unit of labour inelastically 
during their youth. The population of each generation is normalised to one. Labour can be 
allocated either to the production of (perishable) goods, or can be invested in attempts to 
improve existing technologies. In case of success in these attempts, the improvement made 
in period t can be implemented in period f+1. A patent is granted to the author of the 
discovery. The length of the patent is one period only. Following its successful effort made 
in t, the firm holding this patent will then be able to earn some monopoly profits in ^+1.
Note that the dynamic structure of our model is standard. The young can save by making a 
risky investment in more productive technologies (the possibility of other sorts of savings 
is discussed in Section IV). The expected return on these savings is equal to the monopoly 
profits in the next period, if any, multiplied by the probability of success. Our dynamic 
structure is much simplified to ease the analytical derivation of the results. Note also that 
one-period patents may affect the overall incentive to invest, but this does not play any 
other role in the argument that deals with the distribution of investments and does not
 ^In comparison to what may occur when research is undertaken using mainframe systems.
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change the qualitative features of Schumpeterian competition. An alternative interpretation 
of our assumption is that patents are not enforceable and that it takes one period for the 
other producers to leam to imitate.
D e m a n d . There are two goods in our economy (our model can be generalised directly to 
the n-good case). Those goods are horizontally differentiated and are gross substitutes in 
the benchmark case. For ease of exposition, we assume a CES utility function at each 
period and risk neutrality.^® (More general utility specifications are discussed in Section
IV.) More formally, the utility fimction is of the form:
where
Taking the wage as numéraire, the budget constraint is
1 “ ‘y= + ^2^2’ P )
where s denotes the savings. Then, consumers maximise their utility subject to this budget 
constraint. The first-order conditions give:
and ^  =
^2
(5)
Of course, the aggregate demand for good i is the sum of all individual demands:
The assumption of risk neutrality is widespread in the Schumpeterian literature. It follows the claim of 
Schumpeter [1911] pretending that “the entrepreneur does not take risks”. The assumption of risk-aversion is 
on the contrary at the heart of Knightian theories of entrepreneurship (e.g., Kanbur [1979]). In our model, 
risk-aversion would reduce overall investment and weaken our results due to the will o f diversification. 
However, in a model with a large number o f goods, an application of the law of large numbers would 
eliminate aggregate fluctuations and would yield similar implications to those of our assumptions here.
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Q i = ^ j q j  ■ Total expenditure is denoted E  (and is equal to the consumption 
expenditures of the young and the wealth of their elders, if any).
Supply. The two goods are produced with constant returns to scale and labour is the only 
factor of production. The production function of good i by firm k is
i = l 2 ,  (6)
where is the productivity of labour and is the employment of firm k to produce good
i. Total supply is defined by = ^ j ^ Y i  • We can also define Lj = , the labour
demand in sector i. Of course, market clearing conditions imply that , ^2 -  02
L\-\- L2 = 1. Since labour is taken as the numéraire, it is convenient to invert the 
production function and write the cost function of firm k  to produce good /. We have 
c f  (y) = cj^ X y  where c f  = \ / A f  . The lowest marginal cost in the industry is denoted
by C. = Min[Ci ) , the highest productivity is = \jC.  and we conventionally define the 
origin of time such that C^   ^ < 1.
In all markets, firms compete a la Bertrand:
- If no innovation occurred in r-1, VA:, c f t  =C.^  = Q T h e n  it is immediate that 
Pi,t = Q i j  and = 0 .
- If an innovation occurred in t-\ and if C . . < eC- . . then from the first-order condition— — i , t - i
for profit maximisation, the monopoly price of good i is
C.
Assuming the monopolist is unable to internalise the income effect of its own supply, the 
monopoly profit is equal to
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3/ Erratum to pages 140*141. The following replaces the part between equation (7), page
140 and equation (10), page 141.
with x = n (7 )
Of course we need the mark-up ( l - s  + x)/xs to be below 1/y otherwise the limit pricing 
condition is binding so that
Pi = Min - s i  Ç, (8)
If (l -  8 + jc)/xs < 1/y, monopoly profit is equal to
' 1 - 8 + % '
(9 )
otherwise, when the price is determined by the limit pricing condition, monopoly profit in this
case IS
1 +
(i - y) £
E
( ç , / y P y p
(10)
(8)
1 +
- If an innovation occurred in -^1 and if C.^jÇ.^_Y = y  >8 then the monopoly price is 
given by the limit pricing condition
C.
P i = f -  m
Thus, the monopoly profit is in this case
(i - y) £
< - -----   e '- (10)
Resea r c h . Risky process innovation is the only form of investment we consider. We
denote the probability of a process innovation occurring for product i if an amount
11 of labour is invested in the R&D for this product (and of course I i  + 12 = We
assume that 0 (l)  < 1, O >0 and 0  < 0. This hazard function exhibits decreasing returns 
to scale at the aggregate level. At the individual level, we assume that the probability of 
one firm getting the patent if an innovation occurs is equal to the ratio of its own 
investment divided by the total investment in this product. If the innovation occurs, we 
have C.^ =yC^.^_jWith y <1. The case of a more general improvement function (e.g.,
inter-industry spillovers and/or improvements of variable size) is discussed later. Note, 
however, that our assumptions are similar to those used in the recent Schumpeterian 
competition literature (e.g., Grossman and Helpman [1991, chapter 4] or Aghion and 
Howitt [1992]) except that they are stated here in a discrete-time framework. Moreover, the 
model is expressed in terms of cost-reducing investments, but with minor changes it could 
also be interpreted in terms of quality improvements.
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3/Erratum to page 142-144. The following replaces Proposition 1 and its proof. The first
paragraph on page 144 should be ignored.
Proposition 1 V Q n  -  ^ j t  4 /  -  ^j,t'
Proof From above,
^ 1 - s ^1 + (S ’)
and Pjj+i = + (1 -  e)%;+] ), (8”)
when innovations occurs in both sectors at date /. Then we can show that 
^r+1 /  l^ j ,t+ \) - 0  jc^+i = 1 if  Ç / lQj,t+\ = 1 • If an innovation occurs at date t
in sector i only, then Pj t^+\ ~ Ç.j,t • If we write  ^j \  we can show easily
that d Z f ^ i j ^ r^+1 - 1 If £ /,/ - £y,/ • Then, expected returns on investment
in R&D in sector i are
h,t h,t
(11)
Due to our specification of the utility function (risk neutrality in the second period), the 
following no-arbitrage condition must hold
U ■2,t
(12)
After simplification, equation (12) can also be written
(13)
Now suppose, by contradiction, 7 |, < I21 and C j , ^  Ç 2  / ,  then, due to the concavity of 0 ,
IV. RESULTS
We can now state our first result:
Proposition 1 I f  C-^< Cj   ^f y j e  and y <e then f j .  > I  .
I f  Q n  < C j  ^ and y > 8 then 1 ^  > I j f .
In both cases, f  j  J l j  t increases as JCj f decreases.
Proof We consider first the case of y < e . Expected returns on investment in R&D
in sector i are
h,t h,i 8
.(11)
Due to our specification of the utility function (risk neutrality in the second period), the 
following no-arbitrage condition must hold
W < + i)
 L = - ^  L  (12)
h t  h .t
Using equation (8) and after simplification, equation (12) can also be written
l  +  (Y £ l , r /6 £ 2 ,r ) ' - "  ’ 1 +  ( Ç u / £ 2 , , ) ' - "
1 +  (y £ 2 , , / 8 C , , , ) > -  ' 1 +  ( C 2 , / C i, ) i- b
Now suppose, by contradiction, f  f < f ] /  and Cj  ^ - ^ 2 t  VŸÂ ’ fhen, due to the
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we have ■ Consequently, for (13) to hold, we need:
1 — e + Zf j^ l — e+Xf^l l — e + l/Zf j^ l — e + lfx^ j^
(14)
Rearranging yields that a necessary condition for (13) to hold is:
1
+
l - e  + x^+i 
1
1 -  E + 1/x^+l
+
V^t+1 1-G  4- l/%f+i.
(15)
Since < 1, we have
(16)
So for (13) to hold it thus is necessary that:
lAr+1 1-G  + 1/Xf+i
(161
Which implies that we need
i  +  -  L .  . . 1 1+
1 —E +  l /x ^ ^ l  1 —E + Z ^ ^ j  1 —E +  l /z ^ ^ j  1 —E + X ^ ^ j
(16” )
which cannot be satisfied if z^+j ^Xf^i .  Of course, Pj^f+i is below C j  if  there is an 
innovation in t in sector j .  Then using (7), one can write
1 - T
1 + 1 - S
f
Pi)
=  0 . (16” 1
Using the implicit fimction theorem, it is easy to see that dPj jdP j < 1. This implies then 
z^+i and thus a contradiction in equation (16” ). As a consequence, if ^  C j t , then
(the numbering of equations remains consistant with the rest of the chapter)
concavity of O , we have • Consequently, for (13) to hold, we
need:
(1-0(7,, , ) ) f i+ ( rC 2 ,, /s C ,, ,p i  +<!>(/, i i + ( c 2 , , / £ i , , p
-1
(14)
It is easy to see that this last condition is never satisfied if
& c
i + ( c u / Q , , P  i + ( yC2, , /s£ u P
(15)
That is, after simplification.
(16)
Hence we have a contradiction. The demonstration is exactly the same for y > s except 
that in equation (12) one needs to use equation (10) instead of equation (8). We find
Pu) p 2 . , )
l + ( c , 1+
= 0, (133
and the contradiction is immediate. The last part of the proposition is given by an 
application of the implicit function theorem on equations (13) and (13'). For equation (13),
note that the first and second term can simplify into a first-order term with only o ( / i  ) and
a second order term in 0 (7 2 ) and ^ { l \ ) . A symmetric argument applies for the third and
fourth terms. For equation (13’), the application of the implicit function theorem is 
straightforward. ■
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  lano»'e -  S e e  ^ r t r a . L a  s l e  e L
' f  irst note tharour restriction for the cases when y < s is not very strong since it is satisfied I 
when Cj^ < 7 ^ 2 .^ This means that, if starting from the same initial cost, product 1 has
benefited from one more innovation, the condition is satisfied. This condition is sufficient, / 
whereas for y > s , the condition given in the proposition is of course necessary and 
sufficient
The intuition for the result is very simple. If one product enjoys a cost advantage, then its 
market size is bigger. Concerning R&D, on the one hand, the cost reduction that will be 
achieved on this product is going to be smaller in absolute terms (it is proportional to the 
current cost). On the other hand, it will take place over a greater quantity because the 
substitution effect dominates the income effect. This can be seen from equation (5), where
marginal cost pricing implies that QxiQj  . Since the monopoly profit
margin is equal to a markup over marginal cost, the expected total profit is thus 
proportional to the ratio of marginal costs to the power of c/(l -  e ) . Thus when products 
are substitutes, the incentive to invest is stronger for the product with a lower marginal 
cost. In case of a symmetric Cobb-Douglas utility function (the limiting case with e = 0 ), 
the incentive to invest is independent of marginal cost. Finally, when the products are 
complements ( s < 0 ) the incentive to invest is on the contrary higher in the product with 
the highest marginal cost.
How robust is this result? Note first that this proposition deals only with / / / /y • It is thus
independent of our dynamic structure which determines only the total amount of savings. 
Second, note that this result is valid not only for CES utility functions, but also for any 
demand function for which the substitution effect is stronger than the income effect. 
Finally, this result offers some similarities with those obtained in the patent race literature 
(using different assumptions, see for instance Harris and Vickers [1987]). One possible 
way to weaken the result is to assume that the cost reduction may become more important
for the laggard as the gap between marginal costs increases. However, even if jC.
becomes very small (i.e., important cost reduction), the profit is determined by the markup 
1/e  as in equation (8). If the gap is big enough, this implies that our property is still valid
144
unless y{Cj  I Ç ^ C j  < y[ç .ijC ^C -  (which seems unlikely and would create cycles). We 
can now explore the dynamic properties of our model.
Proposition 2 Asymptotically, we observe that the ratio o f  marginal costs
converges to either lim  ^/Ç 2   ^ = 0  or lim Cj  ^IQ 2  ^ = +°o.
Proof See the Appendix. ■
The Appendix shows that technically our dynamic process is equivalent to an urn process 
(a non-linear Polya process). This associated urn process is such that at every period, one 
event occurs. This event is randomly drawn from the following set: {no innovation, 
innovation for product 1, innovation for product 2, innovations for both products}. The 
probability of each event depends on the history. In other words, each event is equivalent to 
adding a ball of a specified colour in an um and the probability of each colour depends on 
the composition of the um. Indeed, knowing the number of past innovations for each 
product, it is possible to compute their levels of productivity. ^  * In turn, the productivity gap 
determines the probability of each event at the next period through the investment 
functions. After having established that our process is equivalent to an um process, it can 
be checked that the deterministic process associated with our stochastic process converges 
so that one can apply the theorems of Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski [1987]. Those 
theorems state that our process converges towards a stable fixed point of the probability 
function. The fixed point for which A\ t = ^ 2 /  is unstable given the result of Proposition
1 above. Thus our system converges towards a fixed point for which log Ai t ^  ^ogA2,t, 
that is for which lim C i . / C ^ . = O o r  lim C , . /C^ = + 0 0 .
The analysis of um processes has a long history in mathematics. This type of process was 
first explored by the Russian mathematician Polya in 1931 (Polya [1931]). His problem 
was the following. Consider an um, starting with one red ball and one white ball. At each 
period, a ball is chosen randomly and replaced. If it is red (resp. white), another red (resp.
 ^  ^ Take the initial level of productivity and multiply by the exponent of the number of innovations by the size 
of the irmovations.
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white) ball is added. The outcome of this simple process is quite surprising since the 
proportion of red balls converges towards a random variable uniformly distributed between 
0 and 1. Later, the analysis was generalised to more general (i.e., non-linear) um processes 
(Hill, Lane and Sudderth [1980]). For instance, if the probability of adding a red ball is 
40% if their proportion is less than one half and 60% if it is more than one half, the 
composition of the um converges towards either 40% or 60% of red balls. On the contrary 
if the probability of adding a red ball is 40% if their proportion is more than one half and 
60% if it is less than one half, the composition of the um converges towards 50% of red 
balls. In the latter (simplistic) case, the process is predictable and ergodic whereas in the 
former (equally simplistic) case it is not predictable, nonergodic and not necessarily path- 
efficient (i.e., the best asymptotic outcome may not be picked-up). Using a different 
approach, Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski [1987] generalised the theorems to the n- 
dimension case with time variable probability functions.
Returning to the model, we can now understand the intuition of our result. Starting from 
equal levels of productivity, due to the randomness of the innovative process, some 
asymmetries are bound to occur over time.^^ These asymmetries do not wash out in the 
long-run, but on the contrary are self-reinforcing. Due to the mechanism of Proposition 1, 
when a product enjoys a cost advantage over the other, its price is lower and thus its market
size is higher. More specifically, the profit is equal to tc'” = Quantity x Markup, where 
the markup is equal to s / ( l - 8 ) x C .  Moreover, Quantity = Expenditures 4- (Cost + 
Markup). Consequently, in the expression of the monopoly profit, the marginal cost 
vanishes and the monopoly profit is just a function of the market size. The bigger the 
market size, the higher is the monopoly profit and thus the more attractive is R&D for this 
product. So, a cost advantage implies a positive feed-back effect. This feed-back effect 
induces divergence between products in the long-run (but still the possibility of 
leapfrogging when the gap is not too big). So the “principle of vanishing diversity” holds in 
the long-run under Schumpeterian competition when varieties are gross substitutes. Path- 
dependency is prominent here since a simple historical accident can trigger divergence.
Graphically, the process can be represented in a two-dimensioned space. On the horizontal
The probability of only innovations for both products to occur is zero.
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axis we put the productivity of product 1 divided by the sum of log productivity levels. On 
the vertical axis, we represent the conditional probability of an innovation for product 1 
against product 2.
Innovation for 
product 1 vs product 2
Innovation for 
product I vs product 2
1 - - 1 - -
.5-. .5-
logAl
logAl+IogA2
logA l
logAl+IogA2
---------
Figure lbFigure la
Two cases can arise. First, if there are some interior fixed points other than {0.5,0.5}, the 
process converges towards one of the stable fixed point of the set (e.g., A or B in figure 
lb). There, the ratio of productivity levels diverges, but it converges in log. In the other 
case, if {0,0} and {1,1} are the only stable fixed points, productivity levels are going to 
diverge “strongly” since even the ratio of their log is going either to zero or infinity.
The result of Proposition 2 is reversed when both products are complements ( e  < 0 ). In this 
case, when a product has a cost advantage, it is more profitable to invest in the other 
product. As a consequence, productivity gaps vanish in the long-run. In case of inelastic 
preferences (i.e., Cobb-Douglas), the logs of the productivity levels are draws of a normal 
distribution due to straightforward application of the Central Limit Theorem (the nature of 
the result on this limit case is similar to Grossman and Helpman [1991, chapter 4] ).
When products are gross complements, the price is determined by a limit-pricing behaviour. The intuition 
is that the cost reduction for one product will imply a price reduction and thus w ill boost the demand for the 
other product making R&D for this second product more attractive.
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In relation to existing literature, note that path-dependency is present here as in Arthur 
[1989]. However, the mechanism that generates it is different. In Arthur [1989], path- 
dependency stems from increasing returns to adoption and it is viewed essentially as a 
passive process. Here path-dependency is generated by the interaction between market 
demand and R&D-based competition to dominate a segment of the industry.
Our model also bears a strong Schumpeterian flavour. Firstly, the competitive process we 
assume is similar to the one described by Schumpeter [1911]. Competing entrepreneurs 
perform some R&D for which innovations are random and depend on the effort made. 
When successful, they reap some temporary monopoly profits. This type of competitive 
process has been used in the industrial organisation literature where it enjoys quite a long 
tradition (Tirole [1988]) as well as in the more recent growth literature (Aghion and Howitt 
[1996a]). Secondly, our model emphasises the development and the emergence of “large 
monopolies” as a result of the competitive process. Thirdly, it has an “evolutionary” aspect 
where by evolutionary we mean its non-ergodic and non-predictable dynamics.
Welfare analysis is difficult since we use an overlapping generation framework. The 
problem is that an increase in investment by a central planner would eventually raise the 
average growth rate and thus benefit future generations, but at the cost of a decrease in 
welfare for the current generation. Thus, the Pareto criterion is not really interesting since 
any level of saving can potentially lead to a different Pareto-optimal path. If now turn to the 
expected growth rate, it is useful to define the following index:
Yyt -  YltA = A u - ^  + A 2 . , - ^ .  (17)
h t  + h . t  h t  + h t
Then we can state:
Proposition 3 The expected growth rate E (A f/A) increases as the ratio o f  the
highest productivity divided by the lowest increases.
Proof Using Jensen’s inequality, the result stems directly from the concavity of the
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hazard function. For instance, if Ai,t = ^ 2 ,/, we find that £’(A/4/^^) = 0(i/2(1 + 6)) , On 
the contrary, when A if  »  A 2j , we find that E(A/4/ Af) = 0 ( l/( l  + 6)). ■
So the expected growth rate of the economy is higher when one product is much more 
advanced than the other. The reason is the following. The overall amount invested in R&D 
remains the same whatever the productivity gap. When one product dominates the market, 
there is no “dilution effect” of R&D investment. So more asymmetry between products has 
a clear positive effect on the growth rate. However, it would be desirable to enrich the 
model with the possibility of other sorts of savings (e.g., a storage technology Avith a sure 
return). In this case, the total investment in R&D would not be fixed anymore but 
determined by arbitrage between the different possible investments. This would create a 
threshold of minimum profitability for the investment in the lagging product with the 
possibility of a comer solution (all investments in this product stop). Moreover, the 
divergence between products would imply a negative effect on total R&D investment 
because of the concavity of the hazard function (the reduction of investment on the lagging 
product will not transfer completely to the leader but will benefit partly the storage 
technology).
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis has focused on the long-run consequences of Schumpeterian competition. 
Unlike previous analysis which concentrated either on a one-sector economy (Aghion and 
Howitt [1992]) or a multi-sector economy with iso-elastic utility functions (Grossman and 
Helpman [1991, chap. 4]), we consider more general demand functions (even if a 
simplified dynamic structure is needed for that purpose). When considering an industry 
where the products are substitutes, our main findings are the following:
Drastic innovations lead to monopolies in each product market (monopolies at the segment 
level) as usual in this type of model. An innovation for Product 1 may also give it a cost 
advantage over Product 2. This cost advantage enlarges its market. Then, due to this larger 
market, R&D in Product 1 offers higher expected returns. Thus in equilibrium, the R&D
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investment is higher for Product 1. This increases the chances of the next innovation 
incurring in the same segment of the industry. This positive feedback effect leads 
eventually to the domination of one product over the entire industry and the emergence of 
monopolies at the industry level. Those monopolies however have a shorter life-expectancy 
since all the investment concentrates on a single product and thus increase the chances of a 
future innovation on this product.
One can interpret this mechanism as the gradual rise of a new “General Purpose 
Technology” (OPT). So here, the emergence of the OPT is progressive and occurs without 
the assumption of exogenous very large innovations as in Helpman and Trajtenberg [1994] 
or Aghion and Howitt [1996b]. Small innovations complement each other and gradually 
build-up to form a OPT. Subsequent product development is going to take place around the 
OPT (see Mokyr [1990, pp. 292-297] for a lengthy discussion of the concepts of micro­
invention and macro-invention). For producers, a trade-off between compatibility on the 
factor side (i.e., necessity to use the OPT) and differentiation on the product side (to avoid 
competition) is likely to arise.
Our analysis also has implications concerning the direction of technological change. Our 
competitive process determines not only the rate of growth, but also the “structural change” 
in the economy. Interestingly, in the model proposed above the average growth rate is 
predictable, whereas the direction of change depends on historical accidents and cannot be 
predicted ex-ante. If according to Schumpeter [1942, p. 84], “The problem that is usueilly 
visualised is how capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant problem 
is how it creates and destroys them”, the message of our analysis is that this destruction and 
creation of new structures is not deterministic but evolves myopically and randomly despite 
purposeful investment. Of course, the issue of structural change goes far beyond the 
analysis proposed here and should be the object of future work.
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APPENDIX PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The behaviour of our economy can be represented by a stochastic dynamic process with 
four dimensions. At each period, the following four events can take place {no innovation, 
innovation for product 1, innovation for product 2, innovations for both products}. The 
variables , i = 1,2,3,4, denote the proportion of each event in the history at date t. We
can define the following stochastic variables:
P l K r )  = 
P2(^2,l) = 
P 3 (% ,)  = 
P4(-^4,/) =
1 with probability )|l -  ^ h , t  ))
0 with probability 1 - ,
1 with probability 'P2 ,/ = )i}~ ))
0 with probability 1 - 4^ 2, r ,
1 with probability Ygy = ^ ( / i   ^ )
0 with probability 1 - ,
1 with probability 4 4^ ^ = ^ 1 - )J| l -  0 ^/2 ,/ )) 
0 with probability 1 - 4 4^ ^,
(Al)
(A2)
(A3)
(A4)
with Il f and I 2J determined by equation (12) fi*om A\ t and Â 2,t and by the market 
clearing condition + l2,t = l/(l + 6) (which follows firom equation (4)). To study the 
dynamics, let us introduce the following variables
bi,t+\ = bit + i = 12,3,4. (A5)
The proportions are equal to
^ i,t = bit j (b i i  + 2^,1 + 3^,1 + ^4,1 +f)-  (A6)
One can also notice that, following our assumptions, we have
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logAi,t+\ = log Ai,t + + P3 ( ^ 3 f^ ))./og(l/y), i = 1,2. (A7)
We can also set the initial values at b\ i = - lo g  A\ \ / logy , b2 \^ = - log A 2,\jlogy , 
6 3 1  = 0 and Ô4 1 = 0. Thus, the probability of each event is given by equations (A1)-(A4), 
whereas the system (A5) rules the dynamic behaviour of the model. This system is well- 
defined. The vector of proportions [X i} is obtained from the vector |  through equation 
(A6 ) which also allows us to calculate A\ t and A 2,t • Then using equations (12) and (4), it 
is possible to know f and 72/ • Those investments along with the levels of productivity
in turn are sufficient to calculate the vector of probabilities | .
To apply Theorem 1 of Arthur et al. [1987], one can see immediately that the probability 
functions p/(.) are time-invariant so that their convergence is trivially given. It remains to 
check that the deterministic dynamic system associated with equation (A1)-(A5) also 
converges. To see this, note from proposition 1 that if A \t  > ^ 2 ,/» then > l2,t and
^ ( P u ) > ^ ( p 2 ,r)- The process is self-reinforcing until we reach E (p J  = 0 ( l / l  + &),
^ (p 2 ) = 0, ^ (P 3 ) = 0, and £ (P4 ) = 1 - o ( l/ l  + ô ) . If A 1  ^ < ^ 2 ,/> the convergence goes 
along the same mechanism in the opposite direction. Eventually for if A \t  = ^ 2 / ,  the 
vector |t^(p, ) | remains constant at
Zfl = { o ( l/2 (l + i)), o ( l / 2 (l + *)), o ( l / 2 (l + b ) f . ( 1  -  0 >(l/2 (l + b ) ) f  I . (A8 )
We also define Z the set of fixed points of Y : Z =  {%, Y(%) = %}. Note that zq e Z  and 
that Z contains a finite number of connected components due to the continuity of p and the 
monotonicity of the investment functions. As a consequence, the vector of proportions 
converges with probability one to a point z of Z (Arthur et al. [1987]).
Next, we can see that zq is the only fixed point for which f = X 2J . We can also prove
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easily that this point zq is a nonvertex unstable point of p . It stems directly from the last 
part of Proposition 1. If after a small perturbation Xi  f > X 2 t^, then l y  > l 2,t and
) (and conversely if X2^t > ^ \ ,t  )• can now apply theorem 3 of Arthur 
et al [1987] and prove that the process cannot converge towards zq. Then the process 
must converge towards a fixed point such that ^  that is such that # /2,r •
Therefore, and ^ 2 , /will grow asymptotically at different rates. This proves our 
result. ■
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